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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines a recent fundamental shift in the character of
securities class action litigation. Whereas securities cases historically were
anchored by financial or accounting fraud, increasingly such actions are
premised on the alleged concealment of, or misrepresentation concerning,
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the risk of adverse events that negatively impact stock performance. This
new focus is the defining characteristic of event-driven securities litigation
(EDSL), which has been controversial for multiple reasons. The Article
examines the controversy in four parts. Part I examines the ascent of event–
driven securities litigation. Part II examines seven recurring issues in the
litigation, with an emphasis on these topics in EDSL involving the life
sciences sector. Part III takes a deeper dive and analyzes six discrete
categories of EDSL: (A) COVID-19, (B) cannabis, (C) corruption, (D)
antitrust, (E) #MeToo, and (F) cybersecurity. Part IV discusses common
proposed solutions to the perceived plague of event-driven securities
litigation. The Article concludes that critiques of EDSL are mostly
unjustified.
I. THE ASCENT OF EDSL
Securities class action litigation has experienced a major transformation
in recent years.1 Complaints filed in securities class actions asserting
violations of section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act)2 and companion Rule 10b-5,3 section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act),4 and/or section 12 of the Securities Act5 are often referred
to as core or standard filings. From 2009–2014, between 51% and 68% of
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Columbia University, Harvard University, New York University, and the University of
California.
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey Lubitz & Elisa Mendoza, Event Driven Securities Litigation: The
New Driver in Class Action Growth 2, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SERVICES (2020), https://w
ww.issgovernance.com/library/event-driven-securities-litigation-the-new-driver-in-class-act
ion-growth/ [https://perma.cc/5KU3-JQG4] [hereinafter New Driver] (“[T]he trend of eventdriven litigation is rising each year, while the more traditional accounting-based allegations
are on the decline.”); Adam Hakki et al., Civil Litigation Update: Major Civil Cases, SIFMA
COMPLIANCE & LEGAL SOCIETY 2020 ANNUAL SEMINAR 3 (2020), https://www.sifma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/TA1-Civil-Litigation-Update-Securities-Class-Actions-and-otherMajor-Civil-Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GJV-NU8D] (“The biggest change in the realm of
securities litigation has been the rise of the event-driven securities fraud lawsuit.”); PAUL,
WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, MITIGATING SECURITIES LITIGATION RISKS
RELATED TO THE CORONAVIRUS 1 (2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/
securities-litigation/publications/mitigating-securities-litigation-risks-related-to-the-corona
virus?id=30788 [https://perma.cc/HK9B-A6SH] (“The last few years have seen a dramatic
increase in ‘event-driven’ litigation.”).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2021).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77(l).
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the core filings alleged (a) false statements in the defendant company’s
financial statements and/or (b) false projections of defendant’s future
earnings.6 Many of the filings during this period and earlier were made after
defendants announced restatements of their financial statements.7 Major
event-driven filings also occurred, and they date back at least to 2010,8 but
they were uncommon.9
More recent years present a different picture. From 2015–2018 the
share of core filings that alleged (a) false statements in the defendant
company’s financial statements and/or (b) false projections of defendant’s
future earnings never reached 50%.10 By 2016 only 10% of class action
filings included allegations related to false projections of future earnings,11
and the downward trend has continued.
Simultaneously, financial statement restatements and the share of core
6. See STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING,
RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 17
(2019),
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2019/PUB_Year_End_Trends_012819
_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7JU-P6NH] [hereinafter 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW]; see also
RENZO COMOLI & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2013 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 14 (2014), https://www.ne
ra.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2014/PUB_Year_End_Trends_1.2014.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/3LSZ-YNJQ] (setting forth statistics).
7. See Matthew C. Moehlman, The Ascendancy of “Event-Driven” Securities Cases,
POMERANTZ MONITOR (May/June 2018), http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/publications/2018/6/
4/the-ascendancy-of-event-driven-securities-cases [https://perma.cc/2858-YMHW] (“Fifteen
years ago, securities fraud often came to light when a company restated its past financial
results.”).
8. An early example of EDSL is the suit commenced in 2010 against Massey Energy
Co. following an explosion at its Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia that killed 29
miners. See In re Massey Energy Co. Sec. Litig., 883 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. W. Va. 2012)
(denying motions to dismiss consolidated amended class action complaint). This litigation
produced a $265 million all-cash settlement in 2014 that, as of December 31, 2020, ranked as
the 69th largest securities class action settlement in the United States. See Institutional
Investor Services, The Top 100 U.S. Class Action Settlements of All-Time 9 (2021),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/iss-scas-top-100-us-class-action-settlement
s-of-all-time-dec-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT98-B9C6] [hereinafter Top 100 Settlements].
9. See Reynolds Holding, Investors Ignore Law of “Stuff Happens,” REUTERS
BREAKINGVIEWS (Apr. 11, 2019, 10:43 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fraud-br
eakingviews/breakingviews-holding-investors-ignore-law-of-stuff-happens-idUSKCN1RN2
10 [https://perma.cc/L6G3-96HG] [hereinafter Stuff Happens] (noting that EDSL was
“relatively rare before 2017”).
10. See 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 6, at 17.
11. STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, RECENT
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2016 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 15 (2017),
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2017/PUB_2016_Securities_Year-End
_Trends_Report_0117.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC4F-XNCP].
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filings alleging a restatement both sharply declined. The number of
restatements peaked in the years immediately following the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)12 and has plunged since then.13 In 2020
restatements reached a 20-year low.14
The number of reissuance
restatements—those addressing a material error15 that called for the
reissuance of a prior financial statement—decreased every year from 2006–
2017, increased slightly in 2018, and reached a nadir in 2020.16 In 2020 only
80 companies issued restatements, compared with more than 300 companies
in 2011.17 And in 2020 only 5% of core securities class action filings alleged
a restatement,18 compared with 10% in 2016 and 19% in 2014.19
Notwithstanding the declining share of cases alleging financial fraud
and the concurrent sharp reduction in the number of companies listed on
Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),20 the overall number of
securities class action filings reached historically high levels from 2015–
2020. New securities class action filings increased by approximately 80%
from 2015–2017, stabilized between 420 and 430 annual filings from 2017–
12. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
13. Kevin LaCroix, Number of Restatements Continues to Decline, D&O DIARY (June
26, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/06/articles/financial-reporting/number-restate
ments-continues-decline/ [https://perma.cc/66CT-AGDB].
14. See AUDIT ANALYTICS, 2020 FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS: A TWENTY-YEAR
COMPARISON 4 (2021), https://www.auditanalytics.com/doc/2020_Financial_Restatements_
A_Twenty-Year_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZP7-76X2] [hereinafter 2020 FINANCIAL
RESTATEMENTS] (“Since their peak in 2006, the number of annual financial restatements has
declined by over 80%.”).
15. While there are no bright-line rules in this context, an error that results in a
misstatement of 5–10% of pre-tax income is sometimes used as a parameter that defines a
material error. Financial Restatements: Understanding Differences and Significance, EY
CENTER FOR BOARD MATTERS (May 2015).
16. 2020 FINANCIAL RESTATEMENTS, supra note 14, at 5.
17. Nicola M. White, Pervasive SPAC Accounting Error Prompts Mass Restatements,
BLOOMBERG TAX (July 26, 2021, 4:46 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/financialaccounting/pervasive-spac-accounting-error-prompts-mass-restatements [https://perma.cc/R
X68-WBK9].
18. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2020 YEAR IN REVIEW
11 (2021), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Fili
ngs-2020-Year-in-Review [https://perma.cc/BQV4-7LEK] [hereinafter 2020 YEAR IN
REVIEW].
19. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2018 YEAR IN REVIEW
10 (2019), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-ActionFilings-2018-Year-in-Review [https://perma.cc/BH5K-GDKJ].
20. From 1996–2020 the number of U.S.-listed companies dipped by 35%, from 8,783 to
5,720. JANEEN MCINTOSH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, RECENT
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2020 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 2 (2021),
https://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2021/PUB_2020_Full-Year_Trends_
012221.pdf [https://perma.cc/M37C-9VRU] [hereinafter 2020 FULL-YEAR REVIEW].
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2019, and then declined to 326 new filings in 2020, possibly as a short-term
repercussion of the COVID-19 pandemic.21 In 2020 the ratio of new filings
to listed companies declined to 5.7%, but this measure was still higher than
the annual ratios during the first twenty years following the enactment of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)22 in 1995.23
Two major factors explain the recent explosive growth in the overall
number of securities class action filings during a span in which financial
fraud cases have declined and there are significantly fewer publicly listed
companies. First, beginning in 2016 cases objecting to mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) migrated from the Delaware Court of Chancery to
federal district court in Delaware or elsewhere. The federal filings typically
allege a violation of § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits material
misrepresentations and omissions in proxy solicitations associated with
registered securities.24 In 2020 M&A objection filings accounted for 33% of
the aggregate 326 federal securities class action filings.25 In 2019 the share
was 39% and in 2016 it was 31%.26 By comparison, from 2009–2015 M&A
objection suits accounted for a significantly lower mean 22% of the annual
number of securities class action filings.27 This migration to federal court is
attributable to a 2016 decision by the Court of Chancery which clarified that
so-called M&A disclosure settlements, which merely seek enhanced proxy
disclosures, are strongly disfavored and generally will not be approved.28
Second, complaints alleging securities fraud linked to specific negative
events or occurrences have proliferated.29 In a typical event-driven case the
21. Id.
22. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
23. See 2020 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 20, at 2 (setting forth statistics).
24. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2021) (prohibiting proxy solicitations that violate rules
promulgated by the SEC) and SEC Rule 14a-9 (prohibiting false or misleading statements
made in any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting, or other communication).
Liability is generally subject to a negligence standard. Beck v. Dobrowski, 559 F.3d 680, 682
(7th Cir. 2009).
25. 2020 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 20, at 3.
26. Id.
27. 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 6, at 6.
28. In re Trulia S’holder Sec. Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).
29. See Roger A. Cooper & Noelle M. Reed, Defending Event-Driven Securities
Litigation, CORPORATE DISPUTES, Jan.-Mar. 2021, at 49, 51, 56 (“The event-driven securities
litigation trend has continued over the last 12 months. . . . [EDSL] in some form is here to
stay.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation in 2019: Predictions and Speculations, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 2019, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee, Predictions]:
[T]he character of securities litigation has recently changed. Once, securities
class actions were largely about financial disclosures. . . . In this world, the
biggest disaster was an accounting restatement. Now the biggest disaster may be
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defendant company’s stock price drops following the disclosure or
occurrence of a negative event which plaintiffs link to prior soft statements
by the issuer that it was in regulatory compliance, its internal controls were
effective, or it adhered to its corporate code of conduct or ethics. The
underlying theory in most of these actions is that the occurrence or event
upon which the case is based was the materialization of an undisclosed or an
under-disclosed risk that caused a stock price drop.30 This differs from
traditional accounting fraud cases which are usually initiated following a
corrective disclosure—in which a company corrects a false or misleading
statement or omission—that is alleged to have caused a price drop.31
Complaints in event-driven cases are often filed in the immediate
aftermath of a stock’s price decline, whereas complaints in traditional
accounting cases are generally filed only after months of investigation by
plaintiffs’ counsel.32 However, an inference that EDSL pleadings therefore
must be considerably flimsier is undercut by at least three factors. First,
EDSL complaints commonly free-ride on both government investigations
into defendant firms’ misconduct33 and the associated press coverage.
Indeed, government investigations and enforcement proceedings are a major
catalyst for event-driven litigation.34 Second, other EDSL follows consumer
cases in which discovery has already occurred.35 Third, plaintiffs in the
a literal disaster. . . . The best characterization for this new type of securities
litigation is that it is ‘event-driven’ litigation.
30. New Driver, supra note 1, at 4 (“The main theory in the event-driven cases is that the
occurrence or event upon which the case is based was the materialization of an underdisclosed or downplayed risk.”).
31. See Arkansas Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 879 F.3d 474, 480 n.3
(2d Cir. 2018) (“A ‘corrective disclosure’ is an announcement or series of announcements
that reveals to the market the falsity of a prior statement.”).
32. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Changing Character of Securities Litigation in 2019: Why
It’s Time to Draw Some Distinctions, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 22, 2019), http://clsbl
uesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/01/22/the-changing-character-of-securities-litigation-in-2019why-its-time-to-draw-some-distinctions/ [https://perma.cc/X49U-VUKJ] [hereinafter Coffee,
Distinctions].
33. See Emily Strauss, Is Everything Securities Fraud?, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 19,
2021), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/05/19/is-everything-securities-fraud/ [https:
//perma.cc/8HNK-NMGM] (observing that in EDSL, “shareholder plaintiffs almost
universally benefit from government investigations”).
34. See Nancy J. Laben et al., Initial Litigation Phase—Coordinating Parallel
Proceedings Involving the Government, in 5 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 67B:8 (Apr. 2021 Update).
35. JEFFREY A. DAILEY & NEAL ROSS MARDER, THE RISE IN EVENT-DRIVEN SECURITIES
LITIGATION—WHY IT MATTERS TO DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 2 (2018), https://www.akingum
p.com/a/web/99361/aokuj/the-rise-in-event-driven-securities-litigation-why-it-matters-to.pd
f [https://perma.cc/A6BJ-G4ZK].
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derivative actions that often proceed in tandem with event-driven class
actions increasingly sue only after inspecting corporate books and records
obtained pursuant to section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.36
This statute often operates as a tool for shareholders to obtain pre-complaint
discovery to construct their derivative cases based on adverse events37 or as
a device to bolster existing complaints.38 Delaware courts have liberalized
their interpretation of section 220 in recent years,39 thereby enabling
shareholders to pursue claims for breach of director oversight duties that
more frequently survive motions to dismiss.40
EDSL historically had been uncommon, but by 2018 such suits
accounted for more than one-quarter of all securities class actions filings41
and an expanding portion of aggregate Investor Losses42 in core cases.43 The
36. See Cooper & Reed, supra note 29, at 53 (noting inspection trend); Ed Micheletti,
Bonnie David & Alexis Wiseley, Trends in Books and Records Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/11/trendsin-books-and-records-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/HJ2C-NVWB] (same).
37. See Paul Ferrillo & Gregory A. Markel, Guest Post: Section 220 Books and Records
Demands: Can You Obtain Privileged Documents Too?, D&O DIARY (May 17, 2021), https
://www.dandodiary.com/2021/05/articles/corporate-litigation/guest-post-section-220-booksand-records-demands-can-you-obtain-privileged-documents-too/# [https://perma.cc/3QKGT4TU] (“There has been an explosive growth in Section 220 demand litigation in recent years
with many shareholders using Section 220 as a tool for obtaining pre-complaint discovery to
build cases against corporations and their officers and directors.”); William Savitt, Sarah K.
Eddy & Cynthia Fernandez Lumermann, Section 220 as Pre-Complaint Discovery—Recent
Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 15, 2020), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2020/12/15/section-220-as-pre-complaint-discovery-recent-developments/
[https://perma.cc/2ZM8-LX4S].
38. See, e.g., J. Edward Moreno, New McDonald’s Suit Widens Stockholder Sex Scandal
Probe, LAW360 (Aug. 6, 2021, 7:14 PM), https://www.law360.com/delaware/articles/14105
76/new-mcdonald-s-suit-widens-stockholder-sex-scandal-probe [https://perma.cc/VC5E-3C
22] (observing that information requested in § 220 litigation could play vital role in parallel
#MeToo derivative litigation against McDonald’s Corporation).
39. Caremark Claims on the Rise Fueled by Section 220 Demands, CLEARY GOTTLIEB
(Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/care
mark-claims-on-the-rise-fueled-by-section-220-demands [https://perma.cc/YX6Q-K62B].
40. See Robert C. Bird, Caremark Compliance for the Next Twenty-Five Years, 58 AM.
BUS. L.J. 63 (2021) (examining recent phenomenon of such claims surviving motions to
dismiss); Roy Shapira, A New Caremark Era: Causes and Consequences, 98 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1857 (2021) (same).
41. Stuff Happens, supra note 9.
42. NERA Economic Consulting uses the term “Investor Losses” as a proxy for the
aggregate amount that investors lost from buying defendant’s stock, rather than investing in
the broader market during the alleged class period. Historically, Investor Losses “have been
a powerful predictor of settlement size.” 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 6, at 11.
43. See id. at 12 (“Over the past couple of years, growth in aggregate Investor Losses
was concentrated in filings alleging regulatory violations, a substantial number of which were
also event-driven securities cases. . . .”).
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rise of EDSL has continued since then. One report concluded that the
number of new event-driven filings increased from 34 in 2018 to 47 in
2020,44 and even this is a significant under-count insofar as it excludes, inter
alia, most filings in the life sciences sector and antitrust-driven securities
litigation. Suits against foreign companies whose securities are traded on
U.S.-based exchanges have been a major component of EDSL,45 consistent
with the recent overall increase in suits involving such companies. The share
of securities fraud class actions filed against non-U.S. issuers spiked from
15% in 2019 to 27% (88 cases) in 2020.46
This Article does not examine M&A objection litigation, which has
been widely chronicled elsewhere.47 Instead, the Article is concerned with
EDSL, which has received scant scholarly attention despite its undeniable
importance. It has been suggested that such litigation has multiple salient
characteristics. First, critics assert that law firms filing most of these cases
represent a new breed of plaintiffs’ firms not previously associated with
traditional securities class action litigation and lacking connections to
institutional investors.48 This description is flawed. The so-called new breed
primarily includes three plaintiffs’ firms—The Rosen Law Firm, Pomerantz
LLP (which was founded in 1936),49 and Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP
(collectively, the RPG Firms). The RPG Firms were responsible for more
than 50% of first filed securities class action complaints each year from

44. See New Driver, supra note 1 (setting forth statistics).
45. Colby Hamilton, Skadden Securities Team Sees ‘Event-Driven’ Class Actions as
Continuing Trend for 2019, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 7, 2019, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjourna
l/2019/01/04/skadden-securities-team-sees-event-driven-class-actions-as-continuing-trendfor-2019/ [https://perma.cc/4SSM-66N8].
46. DECHERT LLP, 2020 DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
AGAINST NON-U.S. ISSUERS 6 (2021), https://www.dechert.com/knowledge/publication/2021
/3/developments-in-u-s--securities-fraud-class-action-lawsuits-agai.html [https://perma.cc/6
NQE-5JQL].
47. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for
Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) (examining merger litigation); Gideon Mark,
Multijurisdictional M&A Litigation, 40 J. CORP. L. 291 (2015) (same).
48. See Kevin LaCroix, Scrutinizing Event-Driven Securities Litigation, D&O DIARY
(Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/03/articles/securities-litigation/scrutin
izing-event-driven-securities-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/877G-WWL4] (noting emergence
of two-tier plaintiffs’ bar in securities class action litigation, in which older, more established
firms focus on financial fraud cases while new entrants focus on event–driven cases “because
that is what is left to them”).
49. See POMERANTZ LLP, The Firm, https://pomlaw.com/the-firm [https://perma.cc/
QE63-TGCA] (describing Pomerantz as “the oldest law firm in the world dedicated to
representing defrauded investors”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2021).
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2015–2020.50 But their filings did not ignore traditional accounting fraud
and, conversely, non-RPG traditional plaintiffs’ firms make numerous EDSL
filings. In 2018 the RPG Firms served as lead or co-lead counsel in more
settlements of traditional securities class actions with accounting allegations
than any other plaintiffs’ firm,51 and a 2021 analysis of filings concluded that
“[t]he cream of the shareholder bar . . . is betting on event-driven securities
class actions.”52
The second commonly attributed characteristic is that in cases in which
the RPG Firms do serve as lead counsel, lead plaintiffs are less likely to be
institutional investors and settlement amounts are lower compared with cases
involving other plaintiffs’ firms.53 The PSLRA created a rebuttable
presumption that the lead plaintiff in a securities class action will be the
shareholder seeking appointment with the largest financial stake in the
litigation,54 rather than the first class member to sue. In the years following
the statute’s enactment institutional investors were increasingly appointed as
lead plaintiff in core filings, and from 2004–2012 they were as likely or more
likely to be appointed lead plaintiff than were individuals.55 Subsequently,
this pattern changed. From 2013–2018 individuals were appointed as lead
plaintiff more often than were institutional investors56 and in 2019 the
proportion of securities class action settlements with a public pension plan
as lead plaintiff declined to its lowest level during the decade 2010–2019.57
The RPG Firms are largely responsible for the increasing frequency of the
50. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2020 MIDYEAR
ASSESSMENT 24 (2020), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/2020-SecuritiesClass-Action-Filings-2020-Midyear-Assessment [https://perma.cc/M793-65HS].
51. Rachel Graf, Filing-Happy Law Firms Not Limited to Event-Driven Claims, LAW360
(Apr. 17, 2019, 8:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1150820/filing-happy-law-firm
s-not-limited-to-event-driven-claims [https://perma.cc/5SZV-PRNH].
52. Alison Frankel, Competing Shareholder Class Actions Against Peloton Show
‘Everything Is Securities Fraud’ Trend, REUTERS (May 25, 2021, 4:02 PM), https://www.reu
ters.com/business/legal/competing-shareholder-class-actions-against-peloton-show-everythi
ng-is-2021-05-25/ [https://perma.cc/74EM-F6H2].
53. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2018
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 2 (2019), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Secur
ities-Class-Action-Settlements-2018-Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.cc/N82F-4SXM].
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B).
55. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, ACCOUNTING CLASS ACTION FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS:
2018 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 18 (2019), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Report
s/2018-Accounting-Class-Action-Filings-and-Settlements [https://perma.cc/6LMA-BAW9].
56. Id.
57. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2019 REVIEW
AND ANALYSIS 12 (2020), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Cla
ss-Action-Settlements-2019-Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.cc/V94Y-U2GE] [hereinafter 2019 SETTLEMENTS].
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appointment of individuals, rather than institutional investors, as lead
plaintiff in securities class actions.58
Institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs may play a role in
ensuring greater recovery for the class of investors in strong cases59 and such
plaintiffs are associated with a lower level of attorneys’ fees in relation to
damages.60 Institutional investors do tend to be involved in cases with
significantly larger potential damages and which involve much larger
defendant companies, and these factors correlate with settlement size. Of
the top 100 securities class action settlements of all-time, as of December 31,
2020, 92% had an institutional lead plaintiff.61
The foregoing outcomes, desirable from investors’ perspective, likely
occur for multiple reasons.62 But these benefits may be offset by political
factors. The largest institutional investors serving as lead plaintiffs have
been state or municipal pension funds, which are managed directly by elected
politicians (such as state comptrollers) or by political appointees.63 This
suggests that some plaintiffs’ firms pay to play via campaign contributions,64
58. Id. at 12.
59. See Adam C. Pritchard & Stephen J. Choi, Lead Plaintiffs and Their Lawyers:
Mission Accomplished, or More to be Done?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May
25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/25/lead-plaintiffs-and-their-lawyers-mis
sion-accomplished-or-more-to-be-done/ [https://perma.cc/26J7-Y83S].
60. 2019 SETTLEMENTS, supra note 57, at 12.
61. Top 100 Settlements, supra note 8, at 11.
62. See, e.g., Serena Hallowell, Alec Coquin & Jake Bissell-Linsk, Mutual Funds Should
Consider Shareholder Litigation, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2019, 12:43 PM), https://www.law360.co
m/classaction/articles/1206257/mutual-funds-should-consider-shareholder-litigation [https://
perma.cc/Z6BV-BBZ6] (observing that institutional investors
make good lead plaintiffs because they are likely to have a substantial interest in
the outcome of the litigation, typically have adequate record-keeping regarding
their investments, are not susceptible to the disruptions caused by changing life
circumstances that can affect individuals, and are experienced fiduciaries and
sophisticated consumers of legal services).
63. Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi & Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, The Price of Pay
to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 650, 651 (2011).
64. See Adam C. Pritchard & Stephen J. Choi, Lead Plaintiffs and Their Lawyers:
Mission Accomplished, or More to Be Done?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG.
(May 25, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/25/lead-plaintiffs-and-their-lawyer
s-mission-accomplished-or-more-to-be-done/ [https://perma.cc/NYW6-BR4T] (suggesting
that “some class action law firms are buying lead counsel status with campaign
contributions”); Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Note, Paying-to-Play in Securities Class Actions:
A Look at Lawyers’ Campaign Contributions, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1725, 1750 (2009)
(“[P]laintiffs’ law firms are contributing to the pension funds that select them as counsel. . . .
[I]t is clear that the campaign contributions that could be the basis of paying-to-play are
present across a broad range of cases. The amount of money contributed by firms is also
significant.”).
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and a prime reason newer plaintiffs’ firms are unable to form relationships
with major institutional investors is they cannot afford to ante up.65
Accordingly, a reduced role for pension funds as lead plaintiffs in securities
class actions may be advantageous.
Moreover, depending on the metric used, it is arguable whether the RPG
Firms recover less for their investor clients. None of the RPG Firms ranked
among the top ten most frequent lead counsel in the top 100 U.S. securities
class action settlements, as of December 31, 2020.66 Collectively, the three
firms accounted for only four of the top 100 settlements.67 But conversely,
in 2020 Glancy Prongay, The Rosen Law Firm (the plaintiffs’ firm probably
most closely associated with EDSL),68 and Pomerantz placed eighth, tenth,
and thirteenth, respectively, among fifty law firms ranked according to total
investor recovery, expressed as an aggregate dollar amount.69
Third, it has been asserted that the dismissal rate for EDSL is higher
than it is for other categories of securities class actions.70 This assertion also
is dubious. According to litigation consulting firm Cornerstone Research,
from 2014–2019 the RPG Firms had 53% of their class actions dismissed,
compared to 41% for all other plaintiffs’ law firms.71 However, Cornerstone
did not conclude that this difference is statistically significant72 and the
comparative dismissal rates were not segregated into event and non-event
securities filings. Moreover, a separate review of approximately 500
securities class actions filed against public firms from 2000–2015 concluded
that EDSL has a significantly lower dismissal rate than traditional securities
fraud cases.73
Justified or not, there is common attribution of the foregoing three
primary characteristics to EDSL. The attribution has provided substantial
fuel for the argument that such litigation is meritless and should be curtailed,
either legislatively or judicially.74
65. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What’s Really Happening in Securities Litigation? A Tale of
Two Bars, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 2018 (raising this argument).
66. See Top 100 Settlements, supra note 8, at 13 (listing top 100 settlements).
67. Id. at 13–19.
68. Coffee, Predictions, supra note 29, at 2.
69. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, THE TOP 50 OF 2020, at 5 (2021), https://ww
w.issgovernance.com/file/publications/iss-scas-the-top-50-of-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA
G3-RWF4].
70. See, e.g., Andrew J. Pincus, Back to the Future: Jump in Securities Class Actions
Shows Need for Reform, 24 (No. 25) WESTLAW J. SEC. LITIG. & REG. (Apr. 11, 2019) (noting
higher dismissal rates for cases filed by RPG Firms).
71. 2020 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 18, at 34.
72. Id.
73. See Strauss, supra note 33 (reporting dismissal rates).
74. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, CONTAINING THE CONTAGION:
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II. RECURRING EDSL ISSUES
This next part analyzes a spectrum of recurring issues in event-driven
securities litigation, which is not restricted to private actions.75 Six major
issues are discussed: (A) the proposition that corporate mismanagement does
not constitute securities fraud; (B) the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano,76 with a spotlight on EDSL in the life
sciences sector; (C) the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare,
Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund
(Omnicare)77 and the related problem of determining which statements are
non-actionable puffery; (D) disclosure obligations under Items 103 and 303
of Regulation S-K; (E) the safe harbor for forward-looking statements; (F)
confidential witnesses; and (G) loss causation and class certification. Some
combination of the foregoing issues arises in virtually every event-driven
case. The part begins with the most common argument advanced by
critics—that the events generating EDSL constitute non-actionable corporate
mismanagement.
A. Corporate Mismanagement as Securities Fraud
Critiques of EDSL often commence with the proposition that whereas
many of the events that drive the litigation merely constitute corporate
mismanagement, the law is settled that neither the Exchange Act nor the
Securities Act is designed to regulate such conduct.78 A related and perhaps
subsidiary argument is that EDSL often constitutes an impermissible attempt
to establish fraud by hindsight, by blurring the distinction between fraud and
PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE BROKEN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM 14 (2019), https://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Securites-Class-Action-System-ReformProposals.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUJ3-F23U] [hereinafter CONTAINING THE CONTAGION].
75. See Michael S. Flynn, James P. Rouhandeh & Michael Kaplan, Regulators Join in
Event-Driven Securities Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 13, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/13/regulators-join-in-event-driven-securitieslitigation/ [https://perma.cc/W668-NPEF] (discussing EDSL by SEC against Volkswagen AG
stemming from the company’s use of software “defeat devices” to evade emissions tests of
diesel vehicles).
76. 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
77. 575 U.S. 175 (2015).
78. See, e.g., Richard Zelichov, Guest Post: Corporate Mismanagement Becomes EventDriven Securities Litigation, D&O DIARY (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/20
18/10/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-corporate-mismanagement-becomes-event-driv
en-securities-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/E5ZP-5AZS] (arguing that event-driven cases
undermine established law that “Section 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] does not create a federal
private right of action for corporate mismanagement”).

534

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

mistake. In short, the argument goes, mere misplaced optimism has been
transformed by plaintiffs into fraud.
There is no doubt that mismanagement is not the subject of federal
securities laws. In 1977 the Supreme Court stated in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green79 that “[w]e thus adhere to the position that ‘Congress by [§]
10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than
internal corporate mismanagement.’”80 Similarly, in 2019, when the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a putative class action complaint in Singh
v. Cigna Corp., it highlighted plaintiffs’ “creative attempt to recast corporate
mismanagement as securities fraud.”81 Numerous other federal courts are in
accord.82 Because the federal securities laws do not regulate this category of
conduct, a corporation has no affirmative duty to disclose mismanagement.83
No doubt some—perhaps many—complaints filed in event-driven
cases merely allege non-actionable corporate mismanagement and are
properly dismissed. However, as will be demonstrated in subsequent parts
of this Article, a sizeable fraction of EDSL does not concern internal
corporate mismanagement and thus is not subject to the Santa Fe limitation.
The expansive critique of EDSL also falters because numerous other
complaints that might encompass mismanagement fit within recognized
fraud categories.
To state a claim for securities fraud under section 10(b) a plaintiff must
plead, inter alia, that defendant acted with scienter.84 Under the PSLRA,
plaintiff is required to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.85 In the
context of section 10(b), scienter “refers to a mental state embracing intent
79. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
80. Id. at 479 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)).
81. 918 F.3d 57, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2019). The Second Circuit added: “The attempt relies
on a simple equation: first, point to banal and vague corporate statements affirming the
importance of regulatory compliance; next, point to significant regulatory violations; and
voila, you have alleged a prima facie case of securities fraud!” Id.
82. See, e.g., In re Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., 905 F.3d 106, 117 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[W]e
have long held ‘that an allegation of mismanagement on the part of a defendant will not alone
support’ a securities fraud claim.”); City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys.
v. Waters Corp., 632 F.3d 751, 760 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Allegations of corporate mismanagement
are not actionable under Rule 10b-5.”); Acito v. IMCERA Grp., Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir.
1995) (“It is well settled that section 10(b) was not designed to regulate corporate
mismanagement.”).
83. Ulbricht v. Ternium S.A., No. 18-CV-6801, 2020 WL 5517313, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2020).
84. Lehmann v. Ohr Pharm., No. 19-3486, 2020 WL 5988517, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 9,
2020).
85. Id.

2022]

EVENT-DRIVEN SECURITIES LITIGATION

535

to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”86 Scienter is the most frequently
litigated issue in section 10(b) cases, particularly at the pleading stage.87
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd.,88 a complaint adequately pleads scienter “only if a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts
alleged.”89 Corporations are defendants in virtually all section 10(b) cases.90
Where a defendant is a corporation, Tellabs requires pleading facts that give
rise to a strong inference that an individual whose intent could be imputed to
the corporation acted with the requisite scienter.91
One caveat to the general proposition that corporate mismanagement
does not equate to fraud is that lying to investors about the mismanagement
is actionable. The Ninth Circuit observed in 2019 that “Santa Fe does not
protect defendants who mismanage their company and lie to investors about
that mismanagement.”92 Similarly, the Third Circuit explained in 2018 that
allegations of mismanagement can support the requisite inference of scienter
in a section 10(b) action if facts are alleged that defendant was aware that
mismanagement had occurred “and lied about the existence of that
mismanagement.”93
But lying is not essential. Both materially misleading statements about
mismanagement94 and material omissions about mismanagement95 also may
be actionable. Rule 10b-5 has always specified that it is unlawful to “omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not

86. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). Accord Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
87. Daniel A. McLaughlin & Mark Taticchi, Corporate Scienter Under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, 46 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & LAW REP. 875 (2014).
88. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
89. Id. at 323.
90. McLaughlin & Taticchi, supra note 87.
91. Jackson v. Abernathy, 960 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
92. Oklahoma Police Pension and Ret. Sys. v. LifeLock, Inc., No. 17-16895, 2019 WL
3020946, at *2 n.4 (9th Cir. July 10, 2019).
93. In re Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., 905 F.3d 106, 117–18 (3d Cir. 2018). See also
Richard A. Booth, Loss Causation and the Materialization of Risk Doctrine in Securities
Fraud Class Actions, 75 BUS. LAW. 1791, 1800 (2020) (noting that claims of mismanagement
may be actionable “if covered up by an affirmative misrepresentation”).
94. See, e.g., In re Meridian Sec. Litig., 772 F. Supp. 223, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“The
plaintiffs here do not allege mere mismanagement; they allege fraud disguised by materially
misleading public statements.”).
95. In re Ebix Sec. Litig., 898 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (noting that false
or misleading statements concerning material facts about mismanagement may be actionable).
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misleading.”96 Thus, if a non-disclosure about corporate mismanagement
renders misleading other statements by defendants, a viable securities fraud
claim may be stated.97
In short, because corporate mismanagement violates section 10(b) if the
conduct at issue is fraudulent,98 the most common critique of EDSL is
flawed. Numerous event-driven securities cases involve conduct proscribed
by Rule 10b-5, as will be shown below. At this juncture it suffices to note
that, of the top 100 U.S. securities class action settlements, as of December
31, 2020, 61 did not involve an accounting restatement.99 Of the top 50
settlements, 25 did not involve a restatement.100 The import is that “the
argument that securities fraud cases should be limited to instances of
accounting fraud would leave defrauded investors in a majority of cases
without any recourse.”101 Indeed, such a limitation would substantially
undermine both of the commonly recognized goals of private securities
litigation—compensation and deterrence,102 which are mutually reinforcing.
The corollary argument that event-driven complaints also
impermissibly plead fraud by hindsight has been well-received as doctrine
by federal courts.103 But the doctrine, which lacks both nuance and clear
parameters, has primarily functioned as a case management device.104 The
device facilitates case screening, based on judicial intuition, at the motion to
96. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2021).
97. Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., No. 19 Civ. 7536
(NRB), 2021 WL 1199035, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021); Fries v. N. Oil & Gas, Inc., 285
F. Supp. 3d 706, 718–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
98. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §
12.191 (May 2021 Update) (“[T]he fact that mismanagement is involved does not preclude a
Rule 10b-5 claim for material misrepresentation.”).
99. Top 100 Settlements, supra note 8, at 24–25.
100. Id.
101. Julie G. Reiser & Steven J. Toll, Event-Driven Litigation Defense, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 23, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/23/eventdriven-litigation-defense/ [https://perma.cc/QD9D-ZWTS].
102. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities
litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 336 (identifying dual goals).
103. See, e.g., Karth v. Keryx Biopharm., 6 F.4th 123, 135 (1st Cir. 2021) (stating that
plaintiff may not plead fraud by hindsight); In re Triangle Cap. Corp. Sec. Litig., 988 F.3d
743, 754–55 (4th Cir. 2021) (stating that plaintiff is not permitted to “‘use the benefit of 2020 hindsight to turn management’s business judgment into securities fraud’”) (citing In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994)); In re 3M Co. Sec. Litig.,
No. 20-CV-2488, 2021 WL 4482987, at *10 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2021) (dismissing action
against 3M in large part because plaintiffs were pleading fraud by hindsight). See also Mitu
Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
773, 775 (2004) (“Courts cite concerns with hindsight in nearly one-third of all published
opinions in securities class action cases.”).
104. Gulati, Rachlinski & Langevoort, supra note 103, at 776-77.
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dismiss stage of securities litigation.105 But it does not permit an obvious or
even principled demarcation between fraud and mistake.
B. The Matrixx Effect
A plaintiff asserting a section 10(b) claim generally must plead and
prove that defendant made a material misrepresentation or omission.106 In
2011 the Supreme Court unanimously held in Matrixx that plaintiffs
adequately pleaded materiality when the defendant drug manufacturer failed
to disclose warnings from doctors and hospitals that a statistically
insignificant number of people claimed they suffered from anosmia after
using Matrixx’s nasal spray Zicam.107 Prior to Matrixx numerous courts had
ruled that pharmaceutical companies had no duty to disclose reports of
adverse events associated with a drug if the reports did not provide
statistically significant evidence that the adverse events may have been
caused by, and were not simply randomly associated with, the drug’s use.108
The Supreme Court declined in Matrixx to adopt a bright-line rule that
adverse event reports relating to a company’s products are immaterial absent
a statistically significant risk that the product is the cause of the adverse
event. Instead, the Court affirmed the continued application of the
materiality standard it previously established in 1988 in Basic v.
Levinson109—whether a reasonable investor would have viewed the
undisclosed information as having significantly altered the total mix of
information made available.110 While Matrixx concluded that the mere
existence of an adverse event report does not automatically satisfy the
materiality standard, and something more is needed,111 it failed to illuminate
what that means.112 Matrixx also rejected a bright-line rule requiring an
105. Id. at 825 (“Instead of developing the doctrine into a clear rule about what constitutes
fraud by hindsight, judges rely on their own intuition to sort out facts that suggest real
problems and facts that suggest nothing more than fraud by hindsight.”).
106. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
107. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 44–49.
108. Robert Giuffra, Materiality of Misrepresentations in U.S. Securities Litigation,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 5, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20
11/04/05/materiality-of-misrepresentations-in-u-s-securities-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/SZ2
C-PUFA].
109. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
110. Id. at 231–32.
111. 563 U.S. at 44.
112. See Stephen M. Goodman, If You Smell Smoke, When Do You Report the Fire? The
Impact of the Matrixx Case on Disclosure of Adverse Event Reports, 9 PHARM. L. & INDUS.
REP. 652 (May 27, 2011) (“[A]s a result of Matrixx, the first whiff of smoke may force a
drugmaker to make a public disclosure of the possibility that its drug is causing a fire, even
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allegation of statistical significance to establish the requisite strong inference
of scienter under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.113
Matrixx reaffirmed Basic, but some scholars contend that Matrixx
simultaneously relaxed and expanded the definition of a material risk and
simplified the requisite pleading of scienter.114 The result, according to other
critics, is that Matrixx opened the floodgates of EDSL.115 Indeed, the
Supreme Court decided in Matrixx—an event-driven case—that an adverse
event can be the basis for a securities fraud class action.116
Drug companies might have obtained a significant litigation advantage
if the Supreme Court had adopted a bright-line materiality standard, given
that adverse event reports are pervasive. In 2020, for example, the Food &
Drug Administration (FDA) received more than 2.2 million such reports.117
The over-the-counter homeopathic drug at issue in Matrixx was not subject
to the FDA’s adverse event reporting requirements and the Court did not
decide whether the public availability of an adverse event report suffices to
defeat a securities claim based on a company’s alleged failure to disclose the
information. This created some ambiguity.
Ten years later the impact of the Court’s refusal to adopt a bright-line
standard in Matrixx has been most evident in two respects. First, companies
continue to lack direction about their disclosure obligations, especially
regarding the clinical trial data that underlie much of the disclosures in the
life sciences sector.118 The uncertainty concerning such data—which,
combined with evaluations, often totals thousands of pages119—has been
compounded by other factors. The PSLRA’s statutory safe harbor—which
protects forward-looking soft information accompanied by adequate
cautionary language—does not protect such hard data as the information
derived from clinical trials120 or forward-looking statements made in initial
though it may ultimately be shown that the smoke came from some unrelated source.”).
113. 563 U.S. at 48–49.
114. See Coffee, Distinctions, supra note 32 (advancing this argument).
115. Stuff Happens, supra note 9.
116. 563 U.S. at 43–47.
117. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Adverse Events Reporting System (FAERS) Public
Dashboard, https://fis.fda.gov/sense/app/d10be6bb-494e-4cd2-82e4-0135608ddc13/sheet/7a
47a261-d58b-4203-a8aa-6d3021737452/state/analysis [https://perma.cc/UMT2-EDHG] (last
visited Oct. 12, 2021).
118. Joseph G. Milner, Sunlight and Other Disinfectants: Disclosure Obligations under
the Federal Securities and Drug Regulatory Regimes, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 141, 168 (2017).
119. Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class Action
Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 911, 927 (2010).
120. Eric Schmid, Note, Fraud or Confusion: A Pill for Chronic Securities Litigation in
the Life Sciences Sector, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1899, 1916 (2020).
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public offering (IPO) registration statements.121 Life sciences companies
also are handicapped by a general absence of guidance from the SEC
concerning disclosure requirements.122
Second, while Matrixx initially seemed to favor plaintiffs, the odds that
life science defendants can prevail on motions to dismiss appear to have
shortened since the decision was issued, whether in connection with scienter
or materiality. Both elements can be raised at this stage of the litigation, but
courts often deferred ruling on materiality prior to Matrixx because it is
inherently fact-based. Since then, dismissal motions in EDSL have
frequently asserted materiality arguments, especially as to whether
defendants’ alleged misrepresentations are mere puffery or vague
expressions of corporate optimism. Both are generally non-actionable
because they are immaterial as a matter of law.123 Defendant Matrixx did not
raise a puffery defense,124 but the issue has acquired importance generally in
EDSL and specifically in life sciences cases.125
Because biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies are
disproportionately impacted by event-driven litigation it is useful to consider
how defendants in this sector have fared on motions to dismiss in the postMatrixx era. A 2017 survey examined all 61 district court decisions on
motions to dismiss federal securities claims from 2005–2016 where the
defendant biotechnology company did not already have a drug or device on
the market and its alleged false or misleading statements concerned clinical
trials or the FDA approval process for its primary drug or device candidate.
During the post-Matrixx period 2012–2016, 78% of the decisions resulted in
complete dismissals, compared with only 56% of the decisions during the
pre-Matrixx period of 2005–2011.126
More recent results are similar. In 2020, eighty securities fraud class
actions were filed against life sciences companies, accounting for almost

121. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2)(D) (setting forth IPO exclusion).
122. Katherine Cohen, Joseph W. Cormier & Mahnu V. Davar, Predictable Materiality:
A Need for Common Criteria Governing the Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results by PubliclyTraded Pharmaceutical Companies, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH & POL’Y 201, 215 (2013).
123. Singh v. Cigna Corp., 918 F.3d 57, 630–64 (2d Cir. 2019).
124. 563 U.S. at 33 n.2.
125. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Nabriva Therapeutics PLC, 19 Civ. 4183 (VM), 2020 WL
7701463, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss in large part because
alleged misrepresentations were puffery).
126. Doug Greene, Genevieve York-Erwin & Michael Tomasulo, Myths and
Misconceptions of Biotech Securities Claims: An Analysis of Motion to Dismiss Results from
2005-2016, D&O DISCOURSE (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.dandodiscourse.com/2017/03/14
/myths-misconceptions-of-biotech-securities-claims-an-analysis-of-motion-to-dismiss-result
s-from-2005-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3PYV-X3MQ].
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25% of all securities fraud lawsuits, and this share was similar in 2019.127
Two of the three RPG Firms were two of the top four leaders in the 2020
sector filings.128 Life sciences companies present an attractive EDSL target
for multiple reasons. Clinical stage ventures often must tap capital markets
to fund expensive drug trials, exposing them to potential liability under the
more lenient standards applicable to securities claims involving IPOs.129 In
addition, the prospects of drug companies are highly dependent on the
unpredictable regulatory approval process. A setback at any stage can
present disclosure issues. An unexpected adverse approval decision by the
FDA typically results in an immediate precipitous stock price decline,130
which may be especially severe for a newly public clinical stage company
with a single product candidate. Market volatility caused by the COVID-19
pandemic exacerbated this concern for numerous small-cap newly public life
sciences companies whose stock prices dipped below their IPO prices in
2020.131
Motions to dismiss are filed in nearly all life sciences EDSL. In 2020
courts issued 43 opinions in class actions in the life sciences sector, 24 of
which concerned allegations of misrepresentations during product
development. Of the 24 cases, courts dismissed 15 in whole and five in part,
including appellate decisions affirming lower courts’ dismissal orders.132
Winning arguments for defendants encompassed both materiality and
scienter.133 In 2020 courts also issued six opinions addressing fraud claims
that arose after a drug or medical device’s development process. Of the six
cases, five were dismissed in whole and one was dismissed in part.134
Matrixx was not particularly helpful to plaintiffs in the foregoing litigation135

127. DECHERT LLP, Dechert Survey: Developments in Securities Fraud Class Actions
Against Life Sciences Companies 4 n.7 (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.dechert.com/knowledge
/publication/2021/1/dechert-survey--developments-in-securities-fraud-class-actions-a.html
[https://perma.cc/YSP6-WPZG] [hereinafter Dechert 2021 Survey].
128. Id. at 6.
129. WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, 2019 Life Sciences Securities Litigation
Roundup (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/2019-life-sciences-securitieslitigation-roundup.html [https://perma.cc/4Z8X-ZPSB] [hereinafter 2019 Roundup].
130. Lisa Dwyer, Michael Biles & Rebecca Matsumura, Avoiding Shareholder Class
Actions after FDA Drug Denials, LAW360 (Oct. 26, 2020, 6:03 PM EDT), https://www.law3
60.com/articles/1319457/avoiding-shareholder-class-actions-after-fda-drug-denials [https://p
erma.cc/MMA7-AWSE].
131. 2019 Roundup, supra note 129.
132. Dechert 2021 Survey, supra note 127, at 11–12.
133. Id. at 12–14.
134. Id. at 14.
135. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Endologix, Inc., 962 F.3d 405 418 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming
dismissal of class action and rejecting plaintiff’s reliance on Matrixx).
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and overall, the developing body of case law in life sciences EDSL has been
generally defense-friendly.
C. Omnicare’s Impact, the Puffery Problem, and Codes of Conduct
The next section considers the impact of the Supreme Court’s Omnicare
decision and the related problem of addressing statements that may constitute
puffery. The decision addresses opinion statements, which are ubiquitous in
corporate communications, are frequently crucial to investors, and often
underlie EDSL.
1. Omnicare
In 2015 the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and unanimously
held in Omnicare that pure statements of opinion are not untrue statements
of material fact actionable as securities fraud, regardless whether an investor
can ultimately prove the belief wrong.136 Pursuant to that holding, opinion
statements give rise to liability in only three circumstances: (1) when the
speaker does not actually hold the stated belief, (2) when the statement
incorporates an underlying untrue statement of fact; and (3) when the
statement omits a material fact and thus is misleading to a reasonable
investor.137
Omnicare set a high bar for pleading the falsity of opinion statements
but in some respects the case favors plaintiffs. Omnicare removed from
plaintiffs the burden of alleging knowing noncompliance with applicable
laws. Now they can allege that defendants’ claim of compliance is baseless
given pervasive violations.138 Another clear implication of the case is that
opinion statements can create omission-based liability for securities fraud.
Omnicare, like Matrixx, thus may have served to encourage plaintiffs to
pursue EDSL,139 especially in the third circumstance noted above. Omnicare
is informative in all cases that involve opinion statements,140 but the case
136. 575 U.S. at 185.
137. Id. at 183–87, 189.
138. James D. Cox, “We’re Cool” Statements after Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits for
Failure to Comply with the Law, 68 SMU L. REV. 715, 724 (2015).
139. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Event-Driven Securities Litigation: Its Rise and Partial Fall,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 20, 2019, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/03/20/event-driven
-securities-litigation-its-rise-and-partial-fall/?slreturn=20190803000217
[https://perma.cc/37BB-7UNB] (suggesting that plaintiffs’ firms may have overread the two
cases “and concluded that all disasters would be material”).
140. Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the
Shadow of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 976 (2019).
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“provided a hook on which plaintiffs tie event-driven suits.”141
Omnicare was a section 11 action and in the aftermath of the decision
some counsel hoped to confine it to that statute,142 which imposes strict
liability for untrue statements and misleading omissions made in registration
statements and prospectuses. However, lower federal courts have disagreed
as to whether and how the holding should be cabined. By late-2021 the Ninth
Circuit had extended Omnicare to section 10(b) claims143 and section 14
claims;144 the Fourth Circuit had applied Omnicare to dismiss a section 14
claim;145 the Third Circuit had twice declined to decide whether Omnicare
applies to Exchange Act claims;146 and four additional Circuits had expressly
extended Omnicare to section 10(b) claims.147 According to one federal
district court decision, issued in 2021, “[o]utside the Third Circuit, the
majority view appears to be that Omnicare applies to 10(b) and 10b-5
cases.”148 Omnicare has been extended by numerous courts, and applied in
SEC enforcement actions,149 despite the considerable differences between
section 11 and section 10(b) claims.
Omnicare, like Matrixx, is especially relevant for EDSL involving life
sciences companies. Omnicare is germane because much event-driven
litigation in this sector is underpinned by allegations that defendants’ opinion
statements during or after product development were misleading, and the
decision likely applies broadly to any statement related to medical or
scientific matters in which interpretive judgment is required. This includes
pandemic EDSL targeting vaccine development and efficacy, where
“Omnicare will likely play a significant role.”150
141. Michelle Reed & Matthew Lloyd, Stemming the Tide of Meritless Securities Class
Actions, 24 WESTLAW J. DERIVATIVES (2020).
142. Coffee, supra note 139.
143. City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856
F.3d 605, 616 (9th Cir. 2017).
144. Golub v. Gigamon Inc., 994 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2021).
145. Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 322–23
(4th Cir. 2019).
146. Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 912 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2018); In re Amarin Corp.
PLC Sec. Litig., 689 F. App’x 124, 132 n.12 (3d Cir. 2017).
147. Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016); Police & Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit
v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., 777 F. App’x 726, 730 (5th Cir. 2019); Nakkhumpun v.
Taylor, 782 F.3d 1142, 1159 (10th Cir. 2015); Carvelli v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 934 F.3d 1307,
1322 (11th Cir. 2019).
148. Ortiz v. Canopy Growth Corp., No. 2:19-cv-20543-KM-ESK, 2021 WL 1967714, at
*33 (D.N.J. May 17, 2021) (amended op.)
149. See, e.g., SEC v. Thompson, 238 F. Supp. 3d 575, 601 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(suggesting that Omnicare applies to all antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws).
150. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2021 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update 18
(Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2021-mid-year-
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Prior to Omnicare courts tended to find opinion statements nonactionable in life sciences cases for multiple reasons, including defendants’
common argument that the statements were immaterial puffery. Now,
motions to dismiss in life sciences EDSL often turn on Omnicare’s
application.151 While some attorneys believe the decision has provided a
firmer foundation for dismissal,152 federal courts appear to disagree as to
whether Omnicare expanded or restricted liability for opinion statements.
For example, in a pair of contrasting 2020 decisions the Second Circuit stated
that Omnicare increased plaintiffs’ ability to plead an actionable opinion,153
whereas the Third Circuit observed that Omnicare imposed a rigorous
benchmark.154 The judicial disagreement appears intertwined with the
courts’ somewhat inconsistent articulation of Omnicare’s requirements.155
Nevertheless, the judicial application of Omnicare to biotechnology claims
has resulted in a higher dismissal rate than the overall rate for securities class
actions.156
The higher dismissal rate in post-Omnicare life sciences EDSL may be
explained by Omnicare’s acknowledgement that when evaluating opinion
statements investors take into account “the customs and practices of the
relevant industry.”157
This might be especially important in the
pharmaceutical industry, where manufacturers and the FDA engage in an ongoing dialogue about clinical trials during the drug approval process.158 The

securities-litigation-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE4Y-DZDM].
151. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, Client Memorandum, Addressing the Growing
Threat of Securities Class Actions in the Life Sciences Sector 2 (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.
davispolk.com/publications/addressing-growing-threat-securities-class-actions-life-sciencessector [https://perma.cc/EJC5-C9K8].
152. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2021 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update
17 (Aug. 30, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2021-mid-ye
ar-securities-litigation-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3JF-BA98] (“Omnicare has remained a
significant pleading barrier in the first half of 2021.”); Doug Greene et al., Omnicare, Five
Years Later: Strategies for Securities Defense Lawyers’ More Effective Use of the Decision,
35 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 3, 2020, https://www.wlf.org/2020/04/02/publishing/omni
care-five-years-later-strategies-for-securities-defense-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/K4Q3-AC8
L] (setting forth this argument).
153. Abramson v. Newlink Genetics Corp., 965 F.3d 165, 174–76 (2d Cir. 2020).
154. Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 962 F.3d 701, 717 (3d Cir. 2020).
155. See SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Securities Class Actions in the Life Sciences Sector: 2019
Annual Survey 6 (2020), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2020/05/secu
rities-class-actions-in-the-life-sciences-sector-2019 [https://perma.cc/3QFN-QK8A] (noting
inconsistency).
156. Greene et al., supra note 152.
157. Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 190.
158. See Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 211 (2d Cir. 2016) (observing that sophisticated
investors would fully expect FDA and defendants to engage in such a dialogue).
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importance of the factor is magnified in the case of sophisticated investors,
who should understand that optimistic statements by issuers about the
likelihood of drug approval do not constitute assurances of success.159
2. The Puffery Problem and Codes of Conduct
As noted supra, a successful section 10(b) claim generally requires
proof of a material misrepresentation or omission.
An alleged
misrepresentation or omission is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding whether
to buy or sell stock shares, and a statement is not material unless, in view of
such an investor, it has “significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information
made available.”160 A fundamental unresolved problem with this framework
is that “there are conflicting visions of the reasonable investor.”161
Some assertions are immaterial as a matter of law. Puffery is one major
category of immaterial statements. Courts have set forth disparate
definitions, but in the Second Circuit—which hears more federal securities
cases than any other Circuit—puffery is defined as statements that are “too
general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them.”162 Archetypical
examples include statements that are explicitly aspirational, general
statements about reputation, integrity, and compliance with ethical norms,
and mere generalizations regarding a company’s business practices.163 At
least in the Second Circuit, consistent with the general standard regarding
materiality, determining whether a specific statement constitutes puffery
requires a court to look at context, including the specificity of the statement
and whether it is clearly designed to distinguish the company to the investing
public in some meaningful way.164 This approach likewise is consistent with
Omnicare. The issue of whether a statement is mere puffery is not
encompassed by the Omnicare framework, but puffery issues often arise in
securities litigation that involves opinion statements and the case
underscored that “whether an omission makes an expression of opinion

159. Id. at 211–12.
160. Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
161. Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 776 (2016).
162. City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 175, 183
(2d Cir. 2014).
163. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., 389 F. Supp. 3d 221, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
164. Indiana Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 98 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Petrobras
Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 3d 368, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Whether a representation is ‘mere
puffery’ depends, in part, on the context in which it is made.”).
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misleading always depends on context.”165
Puffery issues often arise in EDSL when plaintiffs allege that defendant
corporation’s code of ethics or code of conduct includes material
misrepresentations.166 Multiple definitions of an ethics code have been
expressed, and one functional rendering is “a formal document that states an
organization’s primary values and the ethical rules it expects its employees
to follow.”167 Codes of ethics are often referred to interchangeably as codes
of conduct, but many companies have created discrete documents168 which
are subject to different requirements.
SOX section 406 and its implementing regulations require each public
company to: (1) disclose whether or not it has adopted a code of ethics, (2)
publish the code if it has been adopted, and (3) disclose why a code has not
been adopted, if none has been.169 SOX, enacted in 2002, did not mandate
code adoption, but it clearly provided a strong incentive to do so.170
Subsequently, in 2003 the SEC approved NYSE and Nasdaq rules that
require listed companies to adopt. The NYSE specifies that “[l]isted
companies must adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for
directors, officers and employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the
code for directors or executive officers.”171 Nasdaq Rule 5610 is similar, but
it specifically refers to a code of conduct.172 The exchange requirements are
much broader than the relevant SOX provisions, which apply only to the
registrant’s principal executive officer and principal financial and

165. Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 190.
166. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, Client Memorandum, Codes of Ethics and Securities
Litigation (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/codes_of_ethics_
and_securities_litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ8T-B8PM] (“[F]ederal securities lawsuits
targeting statements about corporate codes of ethics are now common in so-called ‘eventdriven’ cases. . . .”).
167. Margaret Anne Cleek & Sherry Lynn Leonard, Can Corporate Codes of Ethics
Influence Behavior?, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 619, 622 (1998).
168. See, e.g., Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for So. Cal. v. CBS Corp., 433 F. Supp. 3d
515, 532–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (discussing CBS’s separate Business Conduct Statement and
Code of Ethics).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(a), (c) (2021).
170. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 LAW SEC. REG. § 9:97 (Dec. 2020 Update) (noting shaming
effect of § 406).
171. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, Listed Company Manual § 303A.10 (amended Nov.
25, 2009). https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual [https://perma.cc/XUP6P6BT].
172. See NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, Rulebook, Rule 5610, https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com
/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/nasdaq-5600-series [https://perma.cc/MB37-3DXU] (last visited
Nov. 28, 2021) (“Each Company shall adopt a code of conduct applicable to all directors,
officers and employees, which shall be publicly available.”).
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accounting officers and do not require code adoption.173
Most of the largest public companies doing business in the United
States had adopted an ethics code prior to SOX, often in response to negative
publicity surrounding major bribery scandals.174 SOX and the SEC’s
approval of the new NYSE and Nasdaq rules accelerated this trend because
companies that fail to comply with the foregoing requirements may lose their
listing status. More than 95% of both Fortune U.S. 100 and Fortune Global
100 companies have adopted a code of ethics.175 Many U.S. companies have
chosen to adopt a single code that satisfies the requirements of both the SEC
and the relevant exchange and is applicable to all employees, officers, and
directors.
EDSL complaints frequently allege that defendant company’s code of
conduct or ethics falsely represented reporting or compliance standards, or
the company used its code misleadingly to trumpet the existence of an ethical
corporate culture while omitting to disclose allegedly prevalent
misconduct.176 Historically, code-based claims rarely survived the pleading
stage177 and courts continue to be highly skeptical in the EDSL era. For
example, in Singh, decided in 2019, the Second Circuit explained that
general statements about reputation, integrity, and ethical norms are nonactionable puffery—because they are too general to cause a reasonable
investor to rely upon them—and then held that statements in defendant
Cigna’s code of conduct fell squarely within this category.178 Numerous
other decisions, issued both before and after Singh, are in accord.179
173. PILLSBURY WINTHROP LLP, Client Alert, SEC Rule Changes Require New York Stock
Exchange and Nasdaq-Listed Companies to Adopt Codes of Conduct or Ethics Policies for
All Directors, Officers and Employees (Jan. 28, 2004), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/image
s/content/2/6/v2/2601/3B440EB3356461C853C814386738BAEA.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5
KR-WYVC].
174. Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the
Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 255–56 (2005).
175. See Maira Babri, Bruce Davidson & Sven Helin, An Updated Inquiry into the Study
of Corporate Codes of Ethics: 2005–2016, J. BUS. ETHICS (2019), https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007/s10551-019-04192-x [https://perma.cc/TDG7-4ZY9] (setting forth statistics);
Alexander Cohen & Joel Trotter, Codes of Ethics: SEC Requirements (Nov. 14, 2013),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/codes-of-ethics-sec-requirements-26240/ [https://perma.
cc/2TA8-FPYW] (“Unsurprisingly, almost all public companies have adopted a code of
ethics. . . .”).
176. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 166.
177. Id.
178. 918 F.3d at 63. See also Adam Hakki & Agnès Dunogué, 2d Circ.’s Logical Take
on ‘Event-Driven’ Securities Claims, LAW360 (May 13, 2019, 3:29 PM), https://www.law36
0.com/articles/1151124/print?section=appellate [https://perma.cc/JH5F-5PNM] (predicting
that Singh will increase dismissal rate for EDSL).
179. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1405–
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The foregoing outcomes are driven in large part by a concern about
creating a rule that would “turn all corporate wrongdoing into securities
fraud.”180 The judicial solution to that concern has been to usually deem
statements in codes of conduct and ethics immaterial as a matter of law. This
solution directly counters Congress (as expressed in SOX), the SEC, the
NYSE, and Nasdaq, which collectively determined that codes of conduct and
ethics are of such high importance to investors that they must be adopted and
disclosed.181
Courts are more inclined to permit code-based claims in at least three
situations. First, the code includes highly specific, affirmative factual
statements—as opposed to broad declarations describing a company’s
ethical goals—that directly conflict with conduct alleged by plaintiffs.182 In
multiple Circuits the test is whether the code contains objectively verifiable
factual misrepresentations.183 Second, the subject statements concern the
company’s adherence to its code.184 Companies seeking to minimize
exposure in the second scenario likely would confine statements about their
codes to merely aspirational goals of compliance.185 Third, the code
06 (2006) (observing that “despite hostility from scholars, defendants [in securities cases]
have been increasingly successful in obtaining dismissals based on puffery arguments”).
180. Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
845 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2017).
181. See Ann Lipton, The Puffery Problem, BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Jan. 25, 2020),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2020/01/the-puffery-problem.html [https://
perma.cc/T3AH-5MRJ] (suggesting that it is “perverse” to deem immaterial as a matter of
law statements in mandated codes of ethics).
182. See, e.g., In re Groupo Televisa Sec. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 711, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(“[S]tatements contained in a code of conduct are actionable where they are directly at odds
with the conduct alleged in a complaint.”); In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d
493, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Moody’s repeatedly asserts its independence in its Code of
Conduct. . . .”).
183. See, e.g., In re Stratasys Ltd. S’holder Sec. Litig., 864 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 2017)
(“Optimistic statements are not actionable if they cannot be supported by objective data or
otherwise subject to verification by proof.”); Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local
338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 845 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that
codes of conduct are inherently aspirational and not objectively verifiable).
184. See, e.g., Holwell v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-06790, 2020 WL 5235005, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2020) (concluding that statements in defendant’s Code of Business Conduct
were not inherently aspirational and instead were unqualified statements regarding
defendant’s conduct); In re Grupo Televisa Sec. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 711, 721–22
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that corporate statements about code of ethics proclaimed the
concrete steps that Televisa was taking to ensure that its executives and employees did not
violate bribery prohibition).
185. See William F. Sullivan, Scott Carlton & Ryan A. Walsh, Decoding the Import of a
Company’s Code of Ethics, LAW360 (Feb. 6, 2017, 10:26 AM), https://www.law360.com/ar
ticles/887959/decoding-the-import-of-a-company-s-code-of-ethics [https://perma.cc/P8D5-
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delineates mandatory rules for employee behavior, rather than standards or
guidelines.186 A 2020 decision involving defendant Tenaris, S.A. is
instructive. In that event-driven case, the district court distinguished
between statements set forth in the company’s Code of Ethics and Code of
Conduct. The former was non-actionable, because the statement was
generalized and aspirational about how Tenaris expected its employees to
comport themselves. The latter was actionable, because it stated that Tenaris
will not condone bribery, whereas the complaint alleged involvement by the
company in bribery schemes in both Argentina and Uzbekistan.187
D. Items 103 and 303
Disclosure requirements are the cornerstone of federal securities
regulation. The requirements seek to level the playing field for investors,
issuers, and the public, by reducing asymmetries and the space for fraud.188
However, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Matrixx, disclosure is
mandatory only if there is a specific legal duty to disclose.189 Such a duty
may arise in two situations. The first is where a statement would otherwise
be inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading without the omitted fact.190 The
second is where a statute or regulation requires disclosure.191 Disclosure
complications multiply because the case law concerning a duty to update is
jumbled,192 and the Supreme Court has declined to provide clarity.193
VY97] (recommending such an approach).
186. See Plymouth Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Patterson Cos., Inc., No. 18-cv-871 (MJD/SER), 2019
WL 3336119, at *16 (D. Minn. July 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted as
modified, 2019 WL 4277302 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 2019) (“[T]his is a code of ethics that
outlines specific guidance for compliance with a specific subset of [antitrust] law.”); Sarah
Lightdale, Jan Shapiro & Linh Nguyen, Puffery or Not? Courts Examine Corporate Codes of
Conduct, N.Y. L.J., July 16, 2020, https://www.cooley.com/-/media/cooley/pdf/reprints/202
0/nylj07162020454413cooley.ashx [https://perma.cc/4DW5-4X56].
187. In re Tenaris S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 18-cv-7059, 2020 WL 6108919, at *7–8 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 9, 2020).
188. Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1045 (2019).
189. 563 U.S. at 45.
190. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015).
191. Id.
192. See Bruce Mendelsohn & Jesse Brush, The Duties to Correct and Update: A Web of
Conflicting Case Law and Principles, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 67 (2015).
193. See Jason Halper, Kyle De Young & Adam Magid, 2019 Year in Review: Securities
Litigation and Enforcement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/02/20/2019-year-in-review-securities-litigation-andenforcement/ [https://perma.cc/K9FL-DZAZ] (observing that Supreme Court declined to hear
appeal of Ninth Circuit decision concerning duty to update which “appears to be in tension
with six other circuits”).
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For U.S. reporting companies the principal disclosure requirements are
set forth in Regulation S-K (Reg S-K), which governs required disclosures
in a company’s periodic Form 10-K and 10-Q filings. EDSL complaints
often allege violations of S-K Items 103 and 303.194 The former requires a
brief description of any material and pending non-routine legal proceedings
against the issuer or one of its subsidiaries.195 The instructions for Item 103
add that issuers must disclose “any such proceedings known to be
contemplated by governmental authorities.”196 Courts have interpreted this
language to require disclosure only of actions “substantially certain to
occur.”197 As noted by Professor Langevoort, “this standard truncates the
duty considerably.”198
Plaintiffs in EDSL often rely on the defendant’s failure to disclose the
details of uncharged criminal violations and unpublicized government
investigations to plead a claim stemming from an Item 103 violation.199 Such
reliance is usually, but not always, misplaced. The controlling principle
concerning uncharged violations is that “disclosure is not a rite of confession,
and companies do not have a duty to disclose uncharged, unadjudicated
wrongdoing.”200 However, a company may be required to disclose
194. See, e.g., Gregg L. Weiner & Israel David, Next ‘Trend’ in Securities Litigation:
Fraud Cases Brought Under Item 303, N.Y. L.J., May 28, 2015, https://www.friedfrank.com/
siteFiles/Publications/NYLJ%2006022015.pdf [https://perma.cc/57FX-75WH]. Item 105 of
Reg S-K also provides a basis for EDSL. Item 105, most recently amended in 2020, requires
that, where appropriate, companies must: (1) provide under the caption “Risk Factors” a
discussion of the material factors that make an investment in the registrant or offering
speculative or risky, and (2) concisely explain how each risk affects the registrant or the
securities being offered. 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 (2021). The 2020 amendment changed the Item
105 disclosure standard from “the most significant factors” to “material” factors that make an
investment risky. See COOLEY, SEC Adopts Amendments to Regulation S-K to Modernize
Descriptions of Business, Legal Proceedings and Risk Factors (Oct. 2020), https://www.coo
ley.com/news/insight/2020/2020-10-05-sec-amendments-regulation-s-k-modernize-descripti
ons [https://perma.cc/2RRK-TGVG] (explaining 2020 amendment to Item 105). This change
may further encourage EDSL. In 2021 the Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of
certiorari seeking clarity with respect to the scope of disclosures required under Item 105. See
M&T Bank Corp. v. Jaroslawicz, 141 S. Ct. 1284 (2021).
195. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2021).
196. Id.
197. In re Lions Gate Ent. Corp. Sec. Litig., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 261, 274–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
198. Langevoort, supra note 140, at 998.
199. See, e.g., Emps. Ret. Sys. of Providence v. Embraer S.A., No. 16 Civ. 6277, 2018
WL 1725574, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (discussing DOJ and SEC investigations
concerning potential FCPA violations).
200. City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 184
(2d Cir. 2014); In re Banco Bradesco S.A. Sec. Litig., 277 F. Supp. 3d 600, 649–50 n.14
(S.D.N.Y. 2017).
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uncharged wrongdoing if its statements are or become materially misleading
in the absence of disclosure.201
The law regarding regulatory investigations—which are generally
confidential—is somewhat more nuanced. There is no automatic duty to
disclose even those investigations deemed material,202 because an
investigation on its own is not a pending legal proceeding.203 At least in the
Southern District of New York, a company has no disclosure obligation
unless and until it determines that an on-going investigation is “substantially
certain” to lead to a formal enforcement action—so long as the company’s
other disclosures are not rendered misleading by the omission of information
about the investigation.204
The same is true with regard to issuance of a Wells Notice, in which
SEC Enforcement Division staff inform a potential defendant that they are
considering recommending that the Commission begin an enforcement
proceeding and the company is allowed a final opportunity to counter such a
recommendation.205 Several courts have held that nothing in Item 103
mandates disclosure of a Wells Notice.206 This is sensible because SEC staff
have no power to authorize an enforcement action, and if disclosure occurs
but no action follows, then the defendant will have prematurely and
disadvantageously disclosed a securities fraud investigation that has gone
nowhere. Similarly, no disclosure obligation is triggered merely because a

201. Singer v. Reali, 883 F.3d 425, 441 (4th Cir. 2018); Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgt.
Grp. LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 568, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
202. Langevoort, supra note 140, at 997.
203. Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Patterson Cos., Inc., No. 18-cv-871, 2019 WL 3336119,
at *14 (D. Minn. July 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2019 WL
4277302 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 2019).
204. In re Lions Gate Ent. Corp. Sec. Litig., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12, 21–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 261, 273–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see
also James J. Beha II, Jordan Eth & Craig D. Martin, Corporate Disclosure of Government
Investigations Under Securities Law, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 27, 2016, https://media2.mofo.com/d
ocuments/160427corporatedisclosuregovtinvestigations.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GS8-LN9G]
(discussing Lions Gate decision).
205. In re Lions Gate, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 9 (“A Wells Notice informs the recipient that the
SEC Enforcement Division staff has decided to recommend that the Commission bring an
enforcement proceeding, identifies alleged violations of securities law, and provides potential
defendants the opportunity to make a responsive submission.”); see also David M.J. Rein &
Jacob E. Cohen, Further Clarity on Duty to Disclose Wells Notices, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2016,
10:06 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/754295 [https://perma.cc/8G2N-CG8W]
(discussing duty to disclose Wells Notices).
206. See, e.g., Richman, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 274 (“At best, a Wells Notice indicates not
litigation, but only the desire of the Enforcement staff to move forward, which it has no power
to effectuate.”).
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regulator requests documents,207 requests a tolling agreement, or decides not
to close an investigation.208 Both the Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC
routinely request and receive tolling agreements,209 but such requests
typically occur during investigative fact-finding, before an enforcement
decision has been made.
Consistent with the foregoing principles, multiple courts have rejected
securities fraud claims stemming from undisclosed or minimally disclosed
investigations.210 But this is not a uniform result. Some courts have deemed
disclosures to be actionable half-truths when they take the form of statements
that the company is unaware of any pending government investigations that
would have a material impact on the company or its operations. Half-truths
are distinguishable from pure omissions, which entail a complete failure to
make a statement.211 If an undisclosed investigation presented a serious
threat, this may constitute an actionable half-truth, even if the extent of the
threat was indeterminate.212
In 2020 the SEC adopted amendments to Item 103 and certain other
provisions of Reg S-K, which became effective in late 2020 and early
2021.213 Those amendments, while significant, failed to provide further
207. See In re PolarityTE, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 2:18-cv-00510, 2020 WL 6873798, at *13
(D. Utah Nov. 22, 2020) (rejecting argument that SEC document request constitutes an
investigation).
208. Robin Bergen, Matthew Solomon, Adam Fleisher, Rahul Mukhi & Alexander
Janghorbani, Mylan Case Shows SEC Stance on Disclosing Investigations, LAW360 (Oct. 17,
2019, 4:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1208570 [https://perma.cc/9RJ3-6TNT].
209. See, e.g., Russell Ryan, What if SEC Tolling Agreements are Unenforceable in
Court?, LAW360 (July 24, 2020, 6:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1291961
[https://perma.cc/59NT-PLJA] (noting that the SEC is increasingly reliant on tolling
agreements and investigative subjects usually accede to SEC demands for them).
210. In re Inv. Tech. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F. Supp. 3d 596, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); In
re Lions Gate, 165 F. Supp. 3d at 21–22; Lubbers v. Flagstar Bancorp. Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d
571, 580 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
211. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing
between pure omissions and half-truths); Ong v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 16 Civ.
141, 2017 WL 933108, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2017).
212. Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 568, 584 (S.D.N.Y.
2016); In re BioScrip, Inc. Sec. Litig., 95 F. Supp. 3d 711, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); In re FBR
Inc. Sec. Litig., 544 F. Supp. 2d 346, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
213. Nicolas Grabar, Jeffrey D. Karpf & David Lopez, Major Changes to MD&A and
Related Requirements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/11/major-changes-to-mda-and-relatedrequirements/ [https://perma.cc/EB6E-FVQA]; Mark S. Bergman & Raphael M. Russo, SEC
Amends Disclosure Requirements for Business Sections, Legal Proceedings and Risk Factors,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 3, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/20
20/10/03/sec-amends-disclosure-requirements-for-business-sections-legal-proceedings-andrisk-factors/ [https://perma.cc/RBT6-YJXA].
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clarity concerning required disclosures of investigations. Many of the rule
changes opt for a principles-based approach in lieu of a prescriptive
approach, allowing companies to choose how to disclose material
information to investors.214 In the absence of a robust body of case law and
SEC interpretative guidance, disclosure practices concerning investigations
vary. Some companies choose to disclose regulatory investigations for
multiple practical reasons, including a desire to preemptively manage the
narrative.215 Many of the same considerations applicable to voluntary
disclosure of regulatory investigations also can shape the decision to disclose
significant internal investigations, and both situations brim with risk for the
company.216
EDSL plaintiffs similarly rely on Item 303, which requires companies
to include in certain public filings management’s discussion and analysis of
their financial conditions and results of operations (MD&A).217 It applies to
registration statements, tender offer statements, annual and quarterly reports,
and any other documents required to be filed under the Exchange Act.218
Item 303, as amended in 2020, requires disclosure when a company knows
of (1) any trends or uncertainties that have had or are reasonably likely to
have a material impact on revenues or income and (2) events that are
reasonably likely to cause a material change in the relationship between costs
and revenues.219 Prior to amendment the standard was whether the events
“will cause” a material change, and this modification may further encourage
EDSL.220 Whereas Item 103 requires principally descriptive disclosure, Item
303 mandates some analysis of the probability of an adverse outcome, its
potential amount, and the potential effect on the company’s financial
214. Valerie Jacob, Pamela Marcogliese & Sarah Solum, New Wave of Regulation S-K
Amendments, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 22, 2020), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2020/12/22/new-wave-of-regulation-s-k-amendments/ [https://perma.cc/JU4M897F].
215. Deborah S. Birnbach, Do You Have to Disclose a Government Investigation?, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 9, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016
/04/09/do-you-have-to-disclose-a-government-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/EU5K-F6QJ].
216. Robin M. Bergen, Matthew Solomon, Adam Fleisher, Rahul Mukhi & Alexander
Janghorbani, Cleary Gottlieb Discusses SEC Action for Non-Disclosure of DOJ Investigation,
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 15, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/10/15/clear
y-gottlieb-discusses-sec-action-for-non-disclosure-of-doj-investigation/
[https://perma.cc/PC7H-BB48].
217. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a) (2021).
218. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(a) (2021).
219. Id. § 229.303(a).
220. PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, Client Memorandum,
Mitigating Securities Litigation Risks Related to the Coronavirus (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www
.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/securities-litigation/publications/mitigating-securitieslitigation-risks-related-to-the-coronavirus?id=30788 [https://perma.cc/4Z44-FUPV].
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statements.
Both section 10(b) and Item 303 impose materiality requirements, but
the standard is lower for the latter. As noted supra, materiality of an
omission for purposes of liability under section 10(b) is subject to a
“substantial likelihood” standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Basic—
there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the total mix of information made available.221
By contrast, Item 303 materiality is subject to a more relaxed
“reasonable likelihood” standard adopted by the SEC. The Commission
considers an analysis of whether a trend, uncertainty, or event is “reasonably
likely” to require an objective assessment of the likelihood that an event will
occur balanced with a materiality analysis concerning the need for
disclosure.222 Pursuant to this framework, where a trend, demand,
commitment, event, or uncertainty is known, corporate management must
make dual assessments. First, management must determine whether the
foregoing is likely to come to fruition. If management determines that it is
not reasonably likely to occur, then no disclosure is required.223 Second, if
management cannot make that determination, then it must objectively
evaluate the consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment, event,
or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure is
then required unless management determines that a material effect on the
registrant’s financial condition or results of operations is not reasonably
likely to occur.224 The SEC has unequivocally distinguished the Item 303
standard from the Basic standard.225 However, at least in the Second Circuit,
both materiality tests must be satisfied in order for a plaintiff to state a section
10(b) claim stemming from an Item 303 violation.226
EDSL plaintiffs often allege that the defendant omitted the requisite
description of known trends and uncertainties under Item 303,227 even though
the provision provides no express private right of action for non-

221. Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
222. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Aaron J. Benjamin, Stuck with Steckman: Why Item 303 Cannot Be a Surrogate for
Section 11, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.ha
rvard.edu/2017/05/17/stuck-with-steckman-why-item-303-cannot-be-a-surrogate-for-section
-11/ [https://perma.cc/WV9K-2CHH].
226. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103.
227. See, e.g., Das v. Rio Tinto PLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 786 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (alleging
failure to make requisite Item 303 disclosure in case involving FCPA violations).
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compliance.228 Specifically, while regulatory investigations do not often
trigger MD&A disclosure, plaintiffs frequently claim that Item 303 requires
such disclosure if the company reasonably expects the investigation will
have a material adverse effect.229 Plaintiffs likely assert the claim to
circumvent the fundamental securities rule that silence, absent a duty to
disclose, is not misleading.230
Notwithstanding a perception by some scholars and practitioners of a
circuit split on this issue,231 and the Supreme Court’s initial grant of certiorari
to resolve the purported split,232 there is agreement among those circuits that
have considered the issue that a failure to comply with Item 303 may
constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 but it does not automatically do so.233
Instead, a determination of whether an Item 303 violation should give rise to
section 10(b) liability requires a case-specific inquiry and is greatly
dependent on the unique qualities of defendant corporation’s business and
markets. As will be seen in multiple parts supra, this inquiry has proven
difficult for courts. Non-compliance with Item 303 by omitting known
trends and uncertainties from a registration statement or prospectus also may
be actionable under Securities Act sections 11 and 12(a)(2).234 The latter
statute imposes liability for material misstatements and material misleading
omissions on persons who offer or sell securities by a prospectus or oral
communication.235
E. The PSLRA’s Safe Harbor
The PSLRA introduced into both the Exchange Act and the Securities
Act safe harbors for certain forward-looking statements that protect issuers
and those acting on their behalf, subject to some exclusions. The PSLRA
broadly defines “forward-looking statement” to encompass projections of
228. Benjamin, supra note 225.
229. Birnbach, supra note 215.
230. Douglas W. Greene, Why Item 303 Just Doesn’t Matter in Securities Litigation,
LAW360 (Oct. 13, 2015, 12:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/711040 [https://perma
.cc/N4NE-EU5Y].
231. See, e.g., Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1637–38 (2018) (noting “an important circuit split”).
232. Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. 1395 (2017). The Supreme Court
dismissed the case after being advised of a settlement by the parties. Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub.
Ret. Sys., 138 S. Ct. 2670 (2017) (mem.).
233. See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood
Duty to Disclose in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 1033 (2018) (rejecting view
that actual circuit split exists).
234. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015).
235. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).
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future performance, plans and objectives for future operations, and
assumptions underlying these statements.236 The statute immunizes from
liability any forward-looking statement provided that: (1) the statement is
identified as such and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary language
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the statement, or (2) the statement is immaterial, or
(3) a plaintiff fails to show that defendant had actual knowledge that the
statements were false or misleading when made.237 The immunizing
language is disjunctive, so there is no liability with respect to statements
covered by any of the three categories.238 Because the safe harbor
incorporates an actual knowledge standard, a complaint may allege scienter
as to a forward-looking statement only by alleging “knowing falsity.”239
Plaintiffs often seek to establish actual knowledge using information
provided by confidential witnesses,240 who typically are defendants’ former
employees.241
The PSLRA safe harbor can be characterized as a trade-off between
encouraging honest voluntary disclosures and effectively shielding forwardlooking information from liability.242 More than twenty-five years after the
PSLRA’s enactment, safe harbor warnings have become ubiquitous in
issuers’ periodic reports and other communications containing such soft
information as earnings estimates,243 but the success of the tradeoff remains
unclear.244 The statutory harbor continues to complement the similar and
sometimes overlapping common law “bespeaks caution” doctrine. Under
the doctrine alleged misrepresentations are deemed immaterial as a matter of
law if no reasonable investor could consider them important in light of
adequate cautionary language,245 and thus if a statement is puffery the
236. Id. §§ 77z-2(i)(1), 78u-5(i)(1).
237. Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(1), 78u-5(c)(1).
238. Wochos v. Tesla, Inc., 985 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2021).
239. Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 773 (2d Cir. 2010).
240. Richard A. Rosen & Jessica S. Carey, The Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking
Statements After Twenty Years, INSIGHTS, May 2016, https://www.paulweiss.com/media/35
92238/insights_0516_rosen.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JVQ-2PCB].
241. See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witness Interviews in Securities Litigation, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 789, 790 (2018) (noting that CWs are defendant company’s current or former
employees or, less frequently, customers or suppliers).
242. See Langevoort, supra note 140, at 995.
243. Ann Morales Olazábal, False Forward-Looking Statements and the PSLRA’s Safe
Harbor, 86 IND. L.J. 595, 597–98 (2011).
244. See, e.g., Marilyn F. Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the
Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 297
(2001) (summarizing costs and benefits of PSLRA safe harbor).
245. See, e.g., In re Bemis Co. Sec. Litig., 512 F. Supp. 3d 518, 537 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)
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doctrine likely applies. Forward-looking statements often are aspirational246
and if they are deemed to be puffery they will be regarded as immaterial and
likewise will be protected under the statutory harbor.
The PSLRA safe harbor and bespeaks caution doctrine have particular
importance in EDSL because in such litigation “what is being challenged is
often a forward-looking risk assessment.”247 For example, in life sciences
EDSL, issuers’ remarks about their expectations concerning FDA approval
and the timeline for commercial release of a drug have often been framed as
forward-looking statements.248
Separately or in combination, the harbor and doctrine often block EDSL
plaintiffs, who primarily pursue two lines of attack. First, plaintiffs argue
that the subject statements are not forward-looking, because certain elements
or aspects relate to unprotected present or historical facts. Resolution of this
argument can be difficult. The ultimate test is whether the truth or falsity of
the statement depends on subsequent events,249 and this framework gives
plaintiffs some ground on which to scrimmage. If a statement is linked to a
future event, and its veracity cannot be determined until after this future
event occurs, it generally finds a harbor.250 Six circuits have held that if a
statement is mixed, the elements unrelated to the future receive no
protection.251 The Ninth Circuit has taken an additional step and held that a
materially false, non-forward-looking portion of a mixed statement generally
precludes application of the safe harbor to the forward-looking portion.252
Other courts have agreed with the Ninth Circuit253 and the Supreme Court
has declined to address the issue.254
(explaining the doctrine).
246. See, e.g., SEC v. Revolutions Med. Corp., No. 12-cv-3298, 2015 WL 11190068, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2015) (observing that statements classified as puffery frequently are
forward-looking).
247. Langevoort, supra note 140, at 995.
248. See, e.g., In re Aratana Therapeutics Sec. Litig., 315 F. Supp. 3d 737, 758 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (“Nearly all of defendants’ statements as to their expectations regarding FDA approval
and the timeline for ENTYCE’s commercial release were framed as opinions, forwardlooking statements, or both.”).
249. Rosen & Carey, supra note 240, at 2.
250. Julianello v. K-V Pharm. Co., 791 F.3d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 2015).
251. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, SPAC Litigation Alert: SEC Cautions SPAC
Participants that Claims of Reduced Liability Exposure Are Overstated 3 n.13 (Apr. 13,
2021), https://www.srz.com/resources/spac-litigation-alert-sec-cautions-spac-participantsthat-claims.html [https://perma.cc/732L-TRVK].
252. In re Quality Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130, 1146–48 (9th Cir. 2017).
253. See, e.g., In re 3M Co. Sec. Litig., No. 20-CV-2488, 2021 WL 4482987, at *16 (D.
Minn. Sept. 30, 2021) (noting that safe harbor does not protect a combination of (a) false or
misleading statements about past or present facts and (b) forward-looking statements).
254. Quality Sys., Inc. v. Miami Fire Fighters, 139 S. Ct. 589 (2018).
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Second, EDSL plaintiffs argue that the cautionary language is
insufficiently meaningful. Cautionary statements identify important factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forwardlooking statement, and a determination as to whether the accompanying
caution is meaningful is inherently case specific.255 The issue is frequently
litigated and courts are especially hostile to defendants if the cautionary
language implies that a predicted risk is merely possible when management
knows that it is certain or has already materialized.256
F. The Role of Confidential Witnesses
Confidential witnesses (CWs) play an outsized role in EDSL. One of
the major unintended consequences of the PSLRA has been the widespread
use of such witnesses in securities cases. CWs are usually current or former
employees of the defendant company who provide information to plaintiffs
for use in their complaints,257 typically in an effort to buttress falsity or
scienter allegations, or both.258 This information is furnished anonymously,
in the sense that the CWs—commonly located by private investigators hired
by plaintiffs’ counsel—are not identified by name in the pleadings.
Anonymity is provided because the witnesses fear retaliation by the
defendant companies against which they provide information.259 Federal
courts have accepted this pleading practice, in recognition of the risk of
retaliation.260 There is some inconsistency between courts, but at least in the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits the use of CWs is allowed if they have
certain indicia of reliability and personal knowledge. At a minimum, the
CW must be described with sufficient particularity to support the probability
that a person in a position occupied by the witness would possess the

255. Rosen & Carey, supra note 240, at 6.
256. See, e.g., In re Harman Int’l Indus. Inc. Sec. Litig., 791 F.3d 90, 102–03 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (explaining that cautionary language cannot be meaningful if it is misleading in light
of historical facts).
257. In re BofI Holding, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 15-CV-02324, 2016 WL 5390533, at *16
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016); Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36
J. CORP. L. 551, 554–55 (2011).
258. See, e.g., Kendall v. Odonate Therapeutics, Inc., No. 30-cv-01828, 2021 WL
3406271, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss in life sciences EDSL
after crediting information from five CWs in scienter analysis).
259. See Gideon Mark, Recanting Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 45 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 575, 596–97 (2014) (discussing multiple forms of retaliation).
260. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (observing that
requiring plaintiffs to name their confidential internal corporate sources would have a chilling
effect on employees who provide information about corporate malfeasance).
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information alleged.261 Courts generally expect to see job descriptions and
responsibilities, and often dates of employment and reporting lines.262
Two specific aspects of the PSLRA have sparked the ubiquitous use of
CWs in securities litigation. The first is the statute’s elevated bar for
pleading securities fraud. The PSLRA amended the Exchange Act to impose
two strict pleading requirements, both of which must be satisfied for a
complaint to survive a dismissal motion. A private securities complaint
involving an allegedly false or misleading statement must specify each
statement alleged to be misleading, the reason(s) why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation is made on information and belief, all facts
on which that belief is formed.263 In addition, the complaint must, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate the securities laws, state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the particular
defendant acted with the requisite scienter.264
The second major change mandated by the PSLRA is the imposition of
an automatic stay of all discovery and other proceedings during the pendency
of a motion to dismiss,265 absent application of one of two exceptions—when
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to the party seeking relief.266 Congress created the stay to
prevent fishing-expedition and extortive discovery.267 Federal courts have
an expansive view of the scope of the provision,268 and most of them have
261. Davoli v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 854 F. App’x 116, 117 (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming
dismissal of second consolidated amended complaint after rejecting allegations by CWs);
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000).
262. See, e.g., Brendon v. Allegiant Travel Co., 412 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1260 (D. Nev.
2019) (noting that first amended complaint specified job titles, locations, responsibilities,
dates of employment, and supervisors for each CW).
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
264. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
265. Pre-PSLRA, defendants in federal securities litigation were required to participate in
discovery while motions to dismiss were pending. Defendants could avoid discovery only by
moving for a protective order, requesting a stay, and showing good cause under Rule 26(c) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such motions were usually denied. Gideon Mark,
Federal Discovery Stays, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 405, 434 (2012).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
267. Wendy Gerwick Couture, The PSLRA Discovery Stay in Complex Litigation, CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (July 7, 2014), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/07/07/the-pslradiscovery-stay-in-complex-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/5FXR-J4MH].
268. In July 2021 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the PSLRA’s
discovery stay also applies in state court securities class actions based on federal law. State
trial courts have sharply divided on this issue, even within such jurisdictions as California and
New York, where most sections 11 and 12 claims are filed. See Pivotal Software, Inc. v.
Superior Ct. of Cal., 141 S. Ct. 2884 (2021) (granting petition for certiorari); Andrew Clubok,
Melissa Sherry & Gavin Masuda, Supreme Court’s Impending Decision Concerning Whether
PSLRA Discovery Stay Applies in State Court, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July
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rejected attempts to lift the stay on the ground that a defendant has already
produced the documents in a government investigation, an internal
investigation, a bankruptcy proceeding, or another action not governed by
the PSLRA.269
The PSLRA stay has major practical significance. The parties in
securities class actions rarely file motions for summary judgment270 and from
1997 to 2020 only 0.4% of core federal securities filings (nineteen cases)
advanced to trial.271 Accordingly, the ultimate outcome of the litigation is
primarily dependent on the resolution of motions to dismiss. If plaintiffs
survive the motion, the likelihood of a substantial settlement—following
almost inevitable class certification and not infrequent mediation—
exponentially increases.272 Not surprisingly, then, motions to dismiss were
filed in ninety-five percent of all securities class actions filed and resolved
from 2000 to 2018.273 These motions are almost always resolved absent
discovery, because plaintiffs generally fail to have the automatic stay lifted
under either of the two statutory exceptions.274 Approximately half of
securities fraud class action complaints do survive motions to dismiss,275 and
almost all of them rely on confidential witnesses.
The combination of the PSLRA’s strict pleading requirements and
28, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/28/supreme-courts-impending-decisionconcerning-whether-pslra-discovery-stay-applies-in-state-court/ [https://perma.cc/82JV-P2P
Z] (stating that state trial courts, including New York and California, where most security
claims are filed, are divided on the issue). In September 2021 the case was removed from the
Supreme Court’s November argument calendar, pending a settlement. Dean Seal, Justices
Shelve Securities Discovery Case as Sides Near Deal, LAW360 (Sept. 2, 2021, 9:45 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1418647 [https://perma.cc/HP9X-BWRL] (reporting that
the Court had suspended review of the case as the parties closed in on a settlement).
269. DAVID M.J. REIN, MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN P. COLLINS, JR., SECURITIES
LITIGATION INVOLVING THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT (PSLRA) (2021),
Thomas Reuters Practical Law W-010-6738.
270. See 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 6, at 19 (“Motions for summary judgment
were filed by defendants in 7.1%, and by plaintiffs in only 1.9%, of the securities class actions
filed and resolved over the 2000–2018 period, among those we tracked.”).
271. 2020 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 18, at 18.
272. William S. Freeman & Catherine T. Zeng, The Trouble with ‘Confidential Witness’
Allegations, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2012, 2:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/303826
[https://perma.cc/387H-FDPD]; accord CONTAINING THE CONTAGION, supra note 74, at 19
(“The district court’s decision on the motion to dismiss is the critical event in securities class
actions: if the motion to dismiss is denied, class certification and settlement virtually always
follow. . . .”).
273. 2018 FULL-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 6, at 20.
274. Mark, supra note 241, at 795.
275. GREGORY A. MARKEL, GIOVANNA A. FERRARI & HEATHER E. MURRAY, DEFENDING
AGAINST CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS ALLEGATIONS (2021), Thomson Reuters Practical Law W000-6239.
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discovery stay explains the prevalence of CWs.276 Plaintiffs must plead their
cases with particularity, but they are generally barred from obtaining
discovery to bolster their complaints until after all motions to dismiss have
been resolved. The repercussion has been almost universal reliance by
plaintiffs in securities class action pleadings on information furnished by
confidential witnesses.277 Absent publicly available information generated
by regulatory investigations, allegations based on information from CWs
often are the only specific allegations in a complaint supporting a securities
fraud claim.278
Confidential witnesses are even more critical in EDSL than in
traditional accounting-based securities fraud litigation. In virtually all
securities fraud suits pleading and proving scienter is the major challenge
confronting plaintiffs, because a showing of scienter almost always requires
some form of non-public information that was actually known to defendants
when they made false or misleading statements to the public.279 In this
respect scienter differs from pleading and proving falsity and loss causation.
In the standard accounting case that until recently dominated securities
litigation, the pool of CWs potentially useful to plaintiffs was finite and
generally restricted to non-executive level accounting staff.280 But with
EDSL’s ascent the pool of potential CWs has ballooned. In a typical eventdriven case there are likely to be numerous current or former employees with
knowledge of non-public negative developments in the defendant company’s
core operations. The list extends beyond accounting staff to encompass
sales, marketing, administrative, and supply-chain personnel, among
others.281
276. See Union Asset Mgt. Holding AG v. SanDisk LLC, 227 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1100
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The combined effect of the high scienter standard in securities fraud
litigation and the strict PSLRA discovery stay is to place great weight at the pleading stage
on the statements of confidential witnesses.”).
277. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 15-CV-02324, 2016 WL 5390533,
at *16 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (“The Court is aware that confidential witnesses have
become a staple of securities litigation.”).
278. ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. SEC. LITIG. COMM., SUBCOMM. ON USE OF
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, DIALOGUE ON THE CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ON
THE USE OF INFORMATION FROM AND THE DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS 3
(2009), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071798-UseofConfidentialSources.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U32G-X36M].
279. Steve Berman & Mike Stocker, The Rise in Event-Driven Securities Class Actions,
LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2018, 12:35 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1025863 [https://per
ma.cc/5FQC-N8QL].
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Okla. Police Pension & Ret. Sys. V. Lifelock, Inc., 780 Fed. App’x 480,
484 n.5 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that in securities class action based on defendants’ defective
identity theft alerts, plaintiffs rely on CW who was Identity Alert Specialist); Schiro v. Cemex,
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Massive job cuts stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 are
also likely to accelerate the use of CWs in EDSL. As noted above, the typical
CW is a former employee. At the peak of the pandemic in 2020 more than
22 million jobs vanished in the United States and by February 2021 barely
half of those jobs had been recovered.282 The large-scale layoffs by
numerous companies greatly expanded the universe of former employees
who might become CWs, and this expansion is likely to further catalyze
plaintiffs’ use of such witnesses.283
The common use of CWs raises some difficult issues. First, federal
courts disagree about how to evaluate information provided by such
witnesses. Some circuits, including the Fifth284 and Seventh,285 automatically
steeply discount allegations based on information furnished by CWs. This
reflexive steep discounting is indefensible286 but common. Other courts that
do not automatically discount still are skeptical. In one case the First Circuit
rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on statements from at least a dozen different
CWs.287
Second, the use of CWs raises thorny issues concerning both the
discovery of the witnesses288 and the discovery and filing (sealed or not) by
defendants of witness interview notes and memoranda prepared by plaintiffs’
private investigators, particularly when one or more of the confidential
witnesses recant after being contacted and sometimes pressured by defense

S.A.B. de C.V., 396 F. Supp. 3d 283, 304–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that in EDSL based on
bribery of Colombian government officials, plaintiffs rely on statements from CWs who
include security guard and community relations representative).
282. Anneken Tappe & Tal Yellin, These Five Charts Show the Pandemic’s Brutal Impact
on American Workers, CNN.COM (Mar. 11, 2021, 7:21 AM), https://www.cnn.co
m/2021/03/11/economy/pandemic-job-market/index.html [https://perma.cc/R96Y-NNVV].
283. See Joni Jacobsen, Nicolle Jacoby & Angela Liu, Mitigating Risk Amid Layoff-Driven
Confidential Witness Boom, LAW360 (Mar. 10, 2021, 4:13 PM EST), https://www.law360.
com/articles/1362556 [https://perma.cc/9PQA-GXVP] (predicting expanded use of CWs in
light of pandemic layoffs).
284. Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 535 (5th Cir.
2008).
285. City of Livonia Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2013);
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2007).
286. See Mark, supra note 257, at 569–73 (explaining why automatic steep discounting is
unjustified).
287. In re Biogen Inc. Sec. Litig., 857 F.3d 34, 41–44 (1st Cir. 2017).
288. See Jeff G. Hammel & Elizabeth R. Marks, Confidential Witnesses: Reliable Source
or Imaginary Friend?, 45 SEC. REG. & LAW REP., July 15, 2013 (discussing discovery issues).
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counsel.289 Third, CW recantation, which is not rare,290 often requires the
court to decide how to treat recanting statements in connection with a motion
to dismiss and whether to reconsider the denial of such a motion if the
recantation occurs after the initial ruling. Reconsideration is procedurally
improper because it introduces extrinsic material at the pleading stage, but
numerous courts have glossed over this point.291 Alleged recantation also
requires courts to decide whether and when to impose sanctions under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,292 which “should be reserved for
egregious cases.”293 The foregoing issues are likely to arise even more often
as EDSL becomes the norm.294
Finally, two appellate decisions from 2020 may impact the continued
use of CWs in EDSL. In the first case the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff
cannot establish corporate scienter by relying on the statements of employees
who never shared their knowledge with specific senior executives who made
alleged misstatements.295 This holding may provide a robust defense to
companies confronting complaints based on information provided by
CWs.296
In the second case, the Ninth Circuit held that a former employee’s
allegations in a whistleblower lawsuit may qualify as a corrective disclosure
and thus may be used to plead loss causation in a subsequent securities class
action, even absent additional disclosures or corroborating evidence.297 The
289. See, e.g., Mosell v. Sasol Ltd., No. 20-cv-01008, 2021 WL 67107 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,
2021) (resolving issues concerning proposed redactions and sealing of exhibits); Heather
Speers, Confidential Witness Allegations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 31 CORP. COUNSEL,
No. 2, Mar. 15, 2017, at 9–10 (noting that defense counsel often attempt to contact CWs).
290. See Mark, supra note 241, at 804–16 (discussing recantation by CWs).
291. See Michael B. Eisenkraft, Dealing with Confidential Witness Recantation
Statements, LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/883453
[https://perma.cc/RC7B-ZA9E] (discussing failure by multiple courts to follow clear rule that
extrinsic evidence should not be considered during reconsideration of motion to dismiss).
292. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
293. John C. Coffee, Jr., Confidential Distortion: Dealing with Confidential Witnesses in
Securities Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 25, 2017), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia
.edu/2017/09/25/confidential-distortion-dealing-with-confidential-witnesses-in-securities-lit
igation/ [https://perma.cc/GA76-HKKC].
294. See, e.g., WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, Plaintiffs Increasingly Pursuing Class Action
Securities Fraud Claims Following Data Breaches (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.winston.c
om/en/thought-leadership/plaintiffs-increasingly-pursuing-class-action-securities-fraud.html
[https://perma.cc/E6TZ-977F] (noting potential importance of CWs in data breach EDSL).
295. Jackson v. Abernathy, 960 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
296. Susanna M. Buergel et al., Paul Weiss Discusses Increased Burden of Pleading
Corporate Scienter, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 5, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.ed
u/2020/06/05/paul-weiss-discusses-increased-burden-of-pleading-corporate-scienter/ [https:/
/perma.cc/L8FL-Q8U6].
297. In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., 977 F.3d 781, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2020).
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Ninth Circuit credited the whistleblower in light of his detailed and specific
descriptions and firsthand knowledge298—a test similar to that commonly
used to evaluate information sourced from CWs. In so holding, the Ninth
Circuit joined the Sixth Circuit in rejecting the categorical rule that
allegations in another civil lawsuit, standing alone, can never qualify as a
corrective disclosure.299 Rejection of such a rule may create a new path for
EDSL plaintiffs to plead and prove scienter if information attributed to CWs
is discounted, even though the Ninth Circuit’s discussion was confined to
loss causation. The new avenue is to allege scienter based on prior
whistleblower claims.300
G. Loss Causation and Class Certification
To state a claim for securities fraud under section 10(b) a plaintiff must
plead both that (1) she relied upon defendant’s allegedly fraudulent conduct
in purchasing or selling securities and (2) defendant’s conduct caused, at
least in part, plaintiff’s subsequent economic loss.301 These two elements are
generally known, respectively, as transaction causation (or reliance) and loss
causation. The latter is codified in the PSLRA, which specifies that the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof on this issue.302 Pleading and proving the
two elements have raised multiple difficult issues that have featured
prominently in EDSL.
1. Rebutting the Basic Presumption
In Basic the Supreme Court held that if plaintiff-investors prove that a
company’s alleged material misrepresentations were publicly known, the
company’s stock traded in an efficient market, and plaintiffs purchased their
stock after the misrepresentations were made but before the truth was
revealed, they can invoke a presumption that the misrepresentations affected
the stock price and they purchased the stock in reliance on the integrity of
that price.303 Thus, under Basic plaintiffs may satisfy Rule 10b-5’s reliance
298. Id. at 792.
299. Norfolk Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 877 F.3d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 2017).
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a contrary view. Sapssov v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. 608
F. App’x 855, 863 (11th Cir. 2015).
300. See Glenn Vanzura & Kevin Kelly, BofI Ruling May Erode Cos.’ Securities Class
Action Defenses, LAW360 (Oct. 28, 2020, 5:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/13236
72 [https://perma.cc/C8KW-WARR] (discussing such an approach).
301. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 812 (2011).
302. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
303. 485 U.S. at 247, 248 n.27.
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requirement by invoking a presumption that the price of stock traded in an
efficient market fully reflects all public material information. The
fundamental premise underlying the fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) theory is
that an investor presumptively relies on a misrepresentation that was
reflected in the market price at the time of her transaction,304 even if the
investor was unaware of the fraudulent conduct at the time of her purchase
or sale.
The FOTM theory can establish the requisite transaction causation, but
it does not establish the requisite loss causation, which is conceptually
different. In order to establish loss causation plaintiff must show that after
purchasing her shares and before selling, the following occurred: (1) the truth
became known, and (2) the revelation caused the fraud-induced inflation in
the stock’s price to be reduced or eliminated.305 The most direct way for
plaintiffs to satisfy the requirement is to identify one or more corrective
disclosures,306 which reveal the falsity of a previous representation to the
market.307 In a FOTM case the plaintiff must show that the corrective
disclosure was a substantial factor in causing a decline in the security’s price,
thus creating an actual economic loss for the plaintiff.308 The disclosure need
not precisely mirror the prior misrepresentation309 and it can be established
by a series of cumulative, partial disclosures.310 What exactly constitutes a
corrective disclosure for purposes of loss causation is an unresolved
question. In general, however, a disclosure is not corrective if it contains
information derived entirely from public sources of which the market was
presumed to be aware.311 Corrective disclosures in EDSL often arise
externally—for example, when a regulatory action is announced.312
Corrective disclosures are not essential for plaintiffs to prevail but
proving causation in their absence can be daunting. Plaintiffs have an
alternative—albeit not entirely distinct—theory at their disposal, which is
that the occurrence or event upon which the case is based was the
304. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 813 (2011).
305. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005).
306. In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., 977 F.3d 781, 790 (9th Cir. 2020).
307. Id.
308. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 425–26 (3d Cir. 2007).
309. Howard v. Liquidity Servs., 177 F. Supp. 3d 289, 315 (D.D.C. 2016).
310. Sapssov v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 608 F. App’x 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2015).
311. Grigsby v. BofI Holding, Inc., 979 F.3d 1198, 1205 (9th Cir. 2020).
312. Lyle Roberts, Justices Should Clarify Securities Fraud Loss Causation, LAW360
(Apr. 29, 2021, 6:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1380152 [https://perma.cc/Y
A46-SDZC]. See also Richard A. Booth, What’s A Nice Company Like Goldman Sachs Doing
in the Supreme Court? How Securities Fraud Class Actions Rip Off Ordinary Investors—And
What to Do About It, 66 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 71, 75 (2021) (observing that events can
serve as corrective disclosures, even though the Supreme Court has never expressly so held).
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materialization of an undisclosed or an under-disclosed risk that caused a
stock price drop. The Circuits remain divided, but a majority of them to
consider the issue have held that some form of risk materialization can
suffice to show loss causation.313 Some courts have treated this as the
equivalent of a corrective disclosure.314 The use of the risk materialization
theory is especially common in EDSL,315 and plaintiffs in event-driven cases
have pursued both approaches simultaneously.316
Defendants often challenge the pleading of loss causation at the motion
to dismiss stage, whether plaintiffs’ complaint has alleged corrective
disclosures or a risk materialization theory. However, loss causation issues
can be highly factual, thus often precluding a successful motion to dismiss
based on this issue. If defendants’ motion is entirely or partially denied, their
next best chance to escape the case is to defeat plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification. In recent years this next stage has become a critical
battleground in securities litigation. To obtain certification plaintiffs must
show, inter alia, that questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over individual questions.317 Historically, predominance has
been the primary issue contested at the certification stage in securities fraud
cases. Basic’s creation of a presumption of reliance in cases where the
security at issue trades in an efficient market considerably eases plaintiffs’
burden in this regard, and thus most purported securities classes seek
certification based on the FOTM theory.318
To determine whether a security traded in an efficient market courts
generally analyze a set of structural features commonly known as the
Cammer319 and Krogman320 factors, which include both indirect indicia of
313. Dorothy Spenner, James Heyworth, Daniel McLaughlin & Ariel Atlas,
‘Materialization of Risk’ in Securities Class Actions: Part 1, LAW360 (June 6, 2017, 2:04
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/927937 [https://perma.cc/9FBX-QEPA].
314. Id.
315. Elissa Mendoza & Jeff Lubin, Event Driven Securities Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 18, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/18/eventdriven-securities-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/ZGW4-U4HH] (“The main theory in the eventdriven cases is that the occurrence or event upon which the case is based was the
materialization of an under-disclosed or downplayed risk.”).
316. See, e.g., In re Aurora Cannabis, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 19-20588, 2021 WL 2821167,
at *15 (D.N.J. July 6, 2021) (asserting both theories in cannabis EDSL).
317. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3).
318. David Tabak, Testing Securities Market Efficiency with Cammer Factors, LAW360
(Feb. 5, 2019, 2:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1125546/testing-securities-market
-efficiency-with-cammer-factors [https://perma.cc/UFH4-Y4PK].
319. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1279–87 (D.N.J. 1989).
320. Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 474 (N.D. Tex. 2001). The three Krogman
factors are the market capitalization of the company, the bid-ask spread of the stock, and the
percentage of stock not held by insiders. Id.
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efficiency such as high average weekly trading volume and direct empirical
evidence demonstrating a cause and effect relationship between unexpected
corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock
price.321 The existence of a causal relationship is the fifth Cammer factor,
and it may be the most important one. However, if the remaining factors
strongly support a presumption of market efficiency, courts can dispose of
causation.322
The Supreme Court held in 2011 that plaintiffs need not prove (and
defendants cannot rebut) loss causation in order to enjoy the Basic
presumption of class-wide reliance at the class certification stage, because
loss causation has no logical connection to the facts necessary to establish
the efficient market predicate to the FOTM theory.323 But loss causation
remains relevant at the certification stage, for multiple reasons. First, loss
causation may be relevant to the typicality of the class representatives’
claims and the adequacy of the representation under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.324 Class representatives who sold prior to any
corrective disclosure or risk materialization, or otherwise early in the class
period, could be subject to distinctive loss causation defenses.325
Second, the Supreme Court held in 2013 in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend
that because plaintiffs must satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance
requirement through evidentiary proof, plaintiffs seeking class certification
must proffer a model establishing that damages are capable of measurement
on a class-wide basis.326 That model must be applicable to the proposed class
in a manner consistent with plaintiffs’ overall theory of liability. While
plaintiffs need not prove damages (or materiality or loss causation) when
seeking certification, and a plurality of courts has held that inadmissible fact
evidence may be considered at this stage,327 the requisite damages model
necessarily implicates loss causation issues. Comcast involved federal
321. In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 862 F.3d 250, 276 (2d Cir. 2017).
322. In re Allergan PLC Sec. Litig., No. 18 Civ. 12089, 2021 WL 4077942, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2021).
323. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 813 (2011).
324. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
325. Dorothy Spenner, James Heyworth, Daniel McLaughlin & Ariel Atlas,
‘Materialization of Risk’ in Securities Class Actions: Part 2, LAW360 (June 7, 2017, 11:24
AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/927977 [https://perma.cc/HL68-Y5X3].
326. 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013).
327. See Alexander Madrid, Allison Ebeck & Chelsey Dawson, Courts’ Clashing
Standards for Evidence at Class Cert.: Part 1, LAW360 (July 15, 2021, 7:14 PM),
https://www.law360.com/employment-authority/articles/1402801 [https://perma.cc/66VXC5YJ] (discussing conflicting standards adopted by federal courts). Conversely, the plurality
position (adopted by five Circuits) is that courts may only consider admissible expert evidence
at the certification stage. Id.
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antitrust law, but the holding applies to class certification generally and in
securities litigation specifically. Still, the case has sowed much confusion
among the lower courts.328 The Fifth Circuit rejected a proposed class in
EDSL arising from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill and premised on a
risk materialization theory, because plaintiffs’ proposed damages model
failed the Comcast test.329 In other EDSL, plaintiffs’ models satisfied
Comcast,330 or the court certified a class after deciding that Comcast was
inapposite.331
Third, the Supreme Court held in 2014 in Halliburton Co. v. Eric P.
John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II) that defendants are entitled to rebut the
Basic presumption before a class is certified.332 This can be done by (1)
showing a lack of reliance, (2) disproving the indirect indicia of efficiency,
or (3) showing that the alleged misrepresentation did not actually impact the
price of the security, and the same substantive evidence that is relevant to
loss causation also may be relevant to reliance.333
Efforts to rebut the Basic presumption spell trouble for courts because
the Cammer factors do not create bright lines. There are no clear benchmarks
for how securities should perform with respect to each of them,334 and while
in theory a test could disprove that a security traded in an efficient market,
no single test—nor any combination of tests—can prove that a security did
trade in an efficient market.335 Still, it is defendants rather than plaintiffs
who confront a steep uphill battle in this environment. The fraction of stocks
deemed inefficient in class certification proceedings is less than 2% of all
stocks for which a class certification has been decided by the courts.336 A
328. See, e.g., Alex Parkinson, Comment, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend and Chaos on the
Ground, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1225–38 (2014) (describing chaos among lower federal
court concerning Comcast’s implications).
329. Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 689–91 (5th Cir. 2015).
330. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming
certification in § 10(b) action against investment bank for allegedly providing secret
advantages to high-frequency traders); In re Allergan PLC Sec. Litig., No. 18 Civ. 12089,
2021 WL 4077942, at *14–15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2021) (certifying class in pharmaceutical
EDSL after rejecting argument premised on Comcast that plaintiffs’ damages model was
inconsistent with liability theory).
331. See, e.g., Utesch v. Lannett Co., No. 16-5932, 2021 WL 35609949, at *13, 19 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 12, 2021) (certifying class in antitrust EDSL stemming from generic drug pricefixing).
332. 573 U.S. 258, 269 (2014).
333. In re Allstate Corp. Sec. Litig., 966 F.3d 595, 605–08 (7th Cir. 2020).
334. David Tabak, Testing Securities Market Efficiency with Cammer Factors, LAW360
(Feb. 5, 2019, 2:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1125546 [https://perma.cc/7PKYVPKE].
335. Id.
336. Assen Koev & Tiago Duarte-Silva, The Cammer Turnover Factor in Securities Class
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separate analysis reported that certification motions were denied in only 1%
of securities fraud class actions resolved from 2011–2020, and denials often
involved unique facts “rather than reflecting consistently viable strategies for
opposing class certification.”337
Both plaintiffs and defendants often present event studies—the basic
function of which is to determine whether a highly unusual price movement
has occurred—to seek to prove the presence or absence of price impact.
Such studies often play a prominent role in impact analysis,338 but it is not
exactly clear what defendants must do to prevent class certification with
respect to this factor. In order to mount a successful Halliburton II
challenge, defendants must prove an absence of front-end impact, which is
price impact at the time of the misrepresentation.339 However, there is
disagreement as to whether defendants also must prove an absence of backend impact, which occurs at the time of the corrective disclosure.340
2. Goldman Sachs and the Inflation Maintenance Theory
The lack of clarity concerning price impact is perhaps most acute when
plaintiffs rely on the inflation maintenance theory, as they increasingly do in
EDSL. Plaintiffs relying on this theory argue that a misrepresentation that
does not cause a stock price drop can still be actionable under section 10(b)
if the misrepresentation prevented the stock’s artificially inflated price from
dropping.341 The theory’s implication is that front-end price impact is
unreliable for determining whether the representation affected a stock’s
price.342

Actions 4, Charles River Associates (2019), https://media.crai.com/wp-content/uploads/2020
/09/16163718/Charles-River_CammerTurnoverFactor.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6Q3-W8JK].
337. Jared Gerber & Allison Kim, Justices Must Weigh Class Cert. Denial Stats in
Goldman Case, LAW360 (May 18, 2021, 5:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/13858
83 [https://perma.cc/DW2V-6UY7].
338. Kristin Feitzinger, Amir Rozen & Shaama Pandya, Cornerstone Research, Economic
Analysis at the Class Certification Stage of Exchange Act Securities Class Actions 3 (2020),
https://www.cornerstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Economic-Analysis-at-the-Clas
s-Certification-Stage.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9TB-N23U].
339. Rooney v. EZCORP, Inc., 330 F.R.D. 439, 449 (W.D. Tex. 2019).
340. See Laurence A. Schoen & Kaitlyn A. Crowe, Halliburton II in Action: The Impact
of ‘Price Impact’ on Class Certifications, Am. Bar Ass’n Litig. Section (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/securities/articles/2020/hal
liburton-ii-price-impact-class-certifications/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AD-WUNE] (discussing
conflicting decisions).
341. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 256 (2d Cir. 2016).
342. Noah Weingarten, Halliburton II at Four: Has it Changed the Outcome of Class
Certification Decisions?, 25 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 462 (2020).
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While the inflation maintenance theory been accepted by the Second,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits,343 by 2020 the Supreme Court had neither
recognized nor even considered it. The theory is especially critical for EDSL
plaintiffs, who often allege the existence of generic statements that probably
have not moved a stock’s price,344 but it is not always available. EDSL
plaintiffs cannot switch to the theory at the class certification stage after
omitting it from their complaint,345 and it is likely inapplicable in multiple
factual scenarios. These scenarios include those in which the absence of
upward price movement is explained by macroeconomic or companyspecific confounding factors, the stock price was inflated prior to the subject
misrepresentations, or defendants’ conduct was a failure to disclose bad
news to investors such that the omission simply maintained the status quo.346
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the inflation maintenance theory is
often invoked and almost always fatal to defendants’ efforts to defeat class
certification. A 2019 review examined twenty-eight post-Halliburton II
federal district court decisions that addressed defendants’ attempt to rebut
the Basic presumption. Twenty-seven rejected the attempt. Twenty of the
opinions specifically referenced the inflation maintenance theory and in all
twenty the theory was the reason the rebuttal attempt failed.347
The inflation theory created practical problems, some of which concern
burdens. Both the Second and Seventh Circuits held that defendants bore
the burden of persuasion—by a preponderance of evidence—on the lack of
price impact,348 but by early 2021 there was no majority view. Moreover, it
was unclear where the burden lay if defendants offered evidence that the
price remained unchanged. Did the burden then shift to plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the price would have declined but for the alleged
misrepresentation?
In December 2020 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in long-running
Second Circuit securities fraud litigation involving defendant Goldman
343. See In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 256 (2d Cir. 2016); Glickenhouse
& Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 419 (7th Cir. 2015); FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v.
FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011). Cf. IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v.
Best Buy Co., 818 F.3d 775, 782–83 (8th Cir. 2016) (rejecting application of the theory).
344. Matthew A. Schwartz & Michael R. Mayer, Issues and Trends in Event-Driven
Securities Class Actions, 52 REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 239, 244 (Nov. 20, 2019).
345. See In re Finisar Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 11-cv-01252, 2019 WL 2247750, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. May 24, 2019) (“Plaintiff has not previously and cannot now proceed on a price
maintenance theory. . . .”).
346. Schoen & Crowe, supra note 340.
347. Note, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities Fraud Class Actions,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1067 (2019).
348. In re Allstate Corp. Sec. Litig., 966 F.3d 595, 610 (7th Cir. 2020); Waggoner v.
Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 103 (2d Cir. 2017).
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Sachs that raised some of the key unresolved class certification issues
discussed above.349 The litigation stemmed from a collateralized debt
obligation (CDO) transaction that Goldman underwrote in 2007 that lost
CDO investors $1 billion after the bank allegedly helped a client short the
CDO while simultaneously selling it elsewhere. Goldman settled an SEC
enforcement action concerning its conduct for $550 million in 2010.350
Plaintiffs in the securities litigation, who were Goldman shareholders,
claimed that the bank’s corporate statements misrepresented the transaction
as being conflict-free in order to maintain an artificially inflated stock price
that was deflated when the SEC enforcement action revealed conflicts.
Goldman’s opening brief asked the Supreme Court to address two
questions. The first was whether a defendant may rebut the Basic
presumption by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged
misrepresentations in showing that the statements had no price impact, even
though the evidence is also relevant to the substantive element of materiality.
The second was whether a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption
bears only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of
persuasion.351 The Second Circuit answered the first question in the negative
and answered the second question by holding that defendant bears the burden
of persuasion.352
Goldman’s opening brief directly targeted EDSL and argued that the
Second Circuit’s approach exacerbates the phenomenon of such litigation.
The brief asserted that the inflation maintenance theory already seriously
impedes defendants’ ability to rebut the Basic presumption. It noted that, of
the more than 2,000 securities class actions filed post-Halliburton II, only
one produced an appellate finding that defendants successfully rebutted the
presumption by showing price impact and only four produced a district court
finding of even partial successful rebuttal.353 The brief then argued that the
Second Circuit’s decision to allow class certification on the basis of generic
statements will accelerate EDSL and threaten to “‘convert Rule 10b-5 into a
scheme of investor’s insurance.’”354
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Goldman Sachs in June 2021.
349. Goldman Sachs Grp. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., No. 20-222, 2020 WL 7296815 (U.S.
Dec. 11, 2020).
350. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle
SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO, Press Release No. 2010-123 (July 15,
2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm [https://perma.cc/Y9QS-YLT9].
351. Brief for the Petitioners, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., No. 20222, 2021 WL 307471, at *1 (U.S. 2021).
352. See id. at *18–19.
353. Id. at *34–35.
354. Id. at *36 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005)).
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It vacated the class certification and held that courts may consider the generic
nature of alleged misrepresentations as evidence of the lack of price impact
when defendants attempt to rebut Basic’s presumption of class-wide reliance
at the class certification stage, even if the evidence overlaps with materiality
or any other merits issue.355 This holding reconciled Halliburton II, which
allows rebuttal by disproving price impact, with the earlier case of Amgen
Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,356 which held that
plaintiffs are not required to prove materiality at the certification stage. The
Court also held in Goldman Sachs that defendants seeking to rebut the
presumption of reliance bear both the burden of production and the burden
of persuasion to prove lack of price impact by a preponderance of the
evidence, consistent with prior decisions in the Second and Seventh
Circuits.357 Finally, in Goldman Sachs the Supreme Court recognized the
inflation maintenance theory for the first time ever, but declined to address
its merits. In a footnote it stated: “Although some Courts of Appeal have
approved the inflation-maintenance theory, this Court has expressed no view
on its validity or its contours. We need not and do not do so in this case.”358
The net impact of Goldman Sachs is unclear because the decision
delivered both a shield to defendants and a sword to plaintiffs. On the one
hand the Supreme Court recognized that an alleged misstatement’s
generality often will be important evidence of a lack of price impact, and this
is particularly true in inflation maintenance cases where there may be less
reason to infer front-end price inflation from a back-end price drop.359 In
addition, the decision expressly allowed defendants to rebut Basic reliance
by using merits evidence at the class certification stage. Such evidence is
not limited to event studies or other economic analyses—it also includes the
contents of the alleged misrepresentations and subsequent corrective
disclosures. These aspects of the decision may enable more successful
rebuttals360 by underscoring the importance of genericness and granting
355. Goldman Sachs Grp. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., No. 20-222, 2021 WL 2519035, at
*6 (U.S. June 21, 2021). The Supreme Court remanded to the Second Circuit, which
subsequently remanded to the district court. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp.,
Inc., No. 18-3667, 2021 WL 3776297, at *4 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2021). The district court once
again certified a class, and in March 2022 the Second Circuit granted leave to appeal the
certification order. Order, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Teachers Ret. Sys., No. 1:10-cv03461-PAC (2d Cir. Mar. 9, 2022).
356. 568 U.S. 455 (2013).
357. Goldman Sachs Grp. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., No. 20-222, 2021 WL 2519035, at
*7 (U.S. June 21, 2021).
358. Id. at *4 n.1.
359. Id. at *5–6.
360. Alison Frankel, Securities Class Action Defendants Counting on SCOTUS’ Goldman
Ruling, REUTERS (June 22, 2021, 4:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/sec
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lower courts more discretion to deny certification based on the entire
record.361 Just two days after the Supreme Court decided Goldman Sachs,
defendants in pending #MeToo EDSL against CBS Corporation cited the
case to oppose class certification on the basis that the misrepresentations at
issue were too generic to establish price impact.362
Conversely, Goldman Sachs made clear that the generic nature of
defendants’ statements does not exclude them from consideration at the class
certification stage.363 The Supreme Court’s refusal to shift the burden of
proving price impact also aids plaintiffs. The Court observed that “the
allocation of the burden is unlikely to make much difference on the
ground”364—and generally will become dispositive only in the rare case
where the evidence is in equipoise, but plaintiffs can further enhance their
chances of avoiding successful Basic rebuttals if they rely less on generic
misstatements. Alternatively, they can sidestep Basic and undertake the
herculean task of demonstrating direct reliance by showing they were aware
of, and directly misled by, misrepresentations.365
Finally, Goldman Sachs left intact for the foreseeable future the
inflation maintenance theory, upon which much EDSL is premised. As
Professor Coffee noted, in Goldman Sachs “there is enough discussion of
inflation maintenance that lower courts are likely to treat it as established
doctrine until if and when the court reconsiders it.”366 On remand from the

urities-class-action-defendants-counting-scotus-goldman-ruling-2021-06-22/ [https://perma.
cc/X82T-MRVB].
361. Stephen L. Ascher, Ali M. Arain & Reanne Zheng, Supreme Court Gives More Tools
for Defendants to Challenge Class Certification in Securities Fraud Cases, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 7, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/07/supremecourt-gives-more-tools-for-defendants-to-challenge-class-certification-in-securities-fraudcases/ [https://perma.cc/E3YW-N349].
362. Notice of Supplemental Authority, Constr. Laborers Tr. for So. Cal. v. CBS Corp.,
No. 1:18-cv-07796-VEC (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2021).
363. See Marc Gross & Jeremy Lieberman, Plaintiff Takeaways from High Court’s
Goldman Ruling, LAW360 (July 2, 2021, 5:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/139941
2 [https://perma.cc/G2SY-3FFW] (highlighting this point).
364. Goldman Sachs Grp. v. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., No. 20-222, 2021 WL 2519035, at
*7 (U.S. June 21, 2021).
365. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing
that plaintiffs can prove direct reliance by establishing they were aware of, and directly misled
by, an alleged misrepresentation).
366. See Dean Seal, Goldman Ruling Unlikely to Move Needle on Class Actions, LAW360
(June 22, 2021, 8:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1396441 [https://perma.cc/9WG
L-JQ9T] (quoting Professor Coffee). See also In re Allergan PLC Sec. Litig., No. 18 Civ.
12089 (CM)(GWG), 2021 WL 4077942, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2021) (citing Goldman
Sachs and certifying class in life sciences EDSL premised in part on inflation maintenance
theory).
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Supreme Court to the Second Circuit, and subsequent remand to the district
court, plaintiffs in Goldman Sachs continued to rely on the inflation
maintenance theory, in opposition to defendants’ on-going bid to have the
class decertified and not re-certified.367
III. SIX MAJOR EDSL CATEGORIES
The prior part analyzed seven key issues arising in EDSL. While there
is no definitive list of the universe of events that generates such litigation,
the next part of this Article examines those issues in the context of six major
event categories: (A) the COVID-19 pandemic, (B) cannabis, (C) corruption
(including violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)),368 (D)
antitrust, (E) #MeToo, and (F) cybersecurity. Other major categories, which
are beyond the scope of this Article, include, inter alia, non-cyber
components of environmental, social and governance (ESG)369—oil spills,
dam collapses, mining disasters, and wildfires,370 opioid addiction,371
367. See Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Supplemental Brief 3, Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Goldman
Sachs Grp., No. 18-3667 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 2021) (asserting theory); Lead Plaintiff’ Opening
Brief Regarding Class Certification on Remand from the Supreme Court and Second Circuit
3, In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:10-cv-03461-PAC (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct.
5, 2021) (asserting theory).
368. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
369. See Roshaan Wasim, Note, Corporate (Non)disclosure of Climate Change
Information, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1311, 1332 (2019) (suggesting that EDSL stemming from
climate change risk disclosures may proliferate); Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keyes,
Climate-Change Related Losses and Other Event-Driven Litigation Risks, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 19,
2019, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/01/28/climate-change-related-lossesand-other-event-driven-litigation-risks/?slreturn=20210520192811 [https://perma.cc/S6B9NSSP] (arguing that climate change-related events may be particularly well-suited to drive
EDSL).
370. See, e.g., In re Vale S.A., Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-9539-GHW, 2017 WL 1102666
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017) (partially denying motion to dismiss in EDSL stemming from 2015
collapse of Fundão mining dam in Brazil that killed 19 people and severely polluted numerous
waterways). This litigation settled for $25 million in 2020. Peter Brush, Mining Co.’s $25M
Dam Failure Deal Gets OK’d by Judge, LAW360 (June 10, 2020, 6:23 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1281869 [https://perma.cc/ATY8-WJSV]. A subsequent
2019 dam collapse in Brazil that killed at least 65 people also resulted in EDSL. Kevin
LaCroix, Latest Brazilian Dam Disaster Leads to Event-Driven Securities Suit, D&O DIARY
(Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/01/articles/securities-litigation/latestbrazilian-dam-disaster-leads-event-driven-securities-suit/ [https://perma.cc/94MB-KEE4].
371. See, e.g., Hailey Konnath, Walmart Hit with Investor Suit over DOJ Opioid Crisis
Probe, LAW360 (Jan. 20, 2021, 7:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1346823
[https://perma.cc/A8KF-J36E]. The Walmart case was one of eleven event-driven securities
class actions involving opioids to be filed by March 2022. STAN. L. SCH., Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, Current Trends in Securities Class Action Filings, Opioid Crisis, https
://securities.stanford.edu/current-trends.html [https://perma.cc/ZES6-6ACU] (last visited
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airplane crashes,372 and apartment building fires.373
A. COVID-19
By 2021 the COVID-19 pandemic had become the most recent
significant source of EDSL.374 Counts vary as a function of methodology,
but according to one reliable tally at least 40 coronavirus-related federal
securities class actions were filed from March 2020–November 2021375 and
approximately 80% of them included Rule 10b-5 claims.376 At least twelve
shareholder derivative actions stemming from the virus also were filed, and
virtually all of them followed the commencement of securities class action
litigation.377 The pandemic EDSL primarily but not exclusively comprises

Mar. 23, 2022). A $26 billion settlement announced in July 2021 ended most of the parallel
opioid litigation initiated by state Attorneys General against various drug manufacturers and
distributors. Emily Field, AGs Unveil $26B Global Opioid Deal with J&J, Distributors,
LAW360 (July 21, 2021, 2:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1405349 [https://perma
.cc/G2DL-6GMY].
372. See Kevin LaCroix, First the Plane Crash, Then the Securities Lawsuit, D&O DIARY
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/11/articles/securities-litigation/first-pla
ne-crash-securities-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/FDA5-XK9F] (discussing EDSL arising from
October 2018 crash of Boeing 737 MAX 8 jet in Java Sea). In November 2021 derivative
litigation resulting from the Java Sea crash and a second crash in Ethiopia, based on an alleged
breach of the duty of oversight, settled for $238 million. Linda Chiem, Boeing Board Inks
$238M Deal to End 737 Max Derivative Suit, LAW360 (Nov. 5, 2021, 10:12 PM), https://ww
w.law360.com/articles/1438180 [https://perma.cc/4UHK-HRZU].
373. See Howard v. Arconic Inc., No. 17-cv-1057, 2021 WL 2561895 (W.D. Pa. June 23,
2021) (partially denying motion to dismiss second amended complaint in EDSL stemming
from fire at Grenfell Tower in London, England that killed 71 and injured at least 70).
374. See Richard Zelichov & Christina Costley, COVID-19 Securities Class Actions May
Hinge on Disclosures, LAW360 (Apr. 15, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1259356/covid-19-securities-class-actions-may-hinge-on-disclosures [https://perma.cc/U5H
X-75J6] (“COVID-19 might be the ultimate in event-driven securities litigation. . . .”).
375. Kevin LaCroix, Shareholder Files New Pandemic-Related Litigation Variant Suit
Against Citrix Systems, D&O DIARY (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/1
1/articles/coronavirus/shareholder-files-new-pandemic-related-litigation-variant-suit-against
-citrix-systems/ [https://perma.cc/F3S5-VKCV].
376. Jeff Lubitz & Louis Angelo M. Panis, COVID-19 Update: Investor Related Class
Actions, ISS Securities Class Action Services (May 18, 2021), https://insights.issgovernance.
com/posts/covid-19-update-investor-related-class-actions/ [https://perma.cc/8TGU-HPFV].
377. Kevin LaCroix, SEC Files COVID-19-Related Enforcement Suit Against Biotech
Firm, D&O DIARY (Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/08/articles/coronavir
us/sec-files-covid-19-related-enforcement-suit-against-biotech-firm/ [https://perma.cc/C98U
-2RJU]; Blair Connelly, Colleen C. Smith & Cindy Guan, Securities Litigation Trends during
COVID-19, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 7, 2020), https://corpgov.law.har
vard.edu/2020/11/07/securities-litigation-trends-during-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/RF2C-E
XVG] (identifying derivative actions).
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three major case categories—those involving companies: (1) such as cruise
lines and private prison systems that sustained a virus outbreak in their
facilities, (2) such as vaccine manufacturers and diagnostic testing providers
that trumpeted their capacity to prosper as a result of the pandemic, and (3)
whose operations or financial results were impaired by pandemic-related
closures or lockdown orders.378 Defendants likely will have the greatest
difficulty obtaining dismissals of cases in the second category, which targets
pharmaceutical businesses, including giant AstraZeneca379 and penny stock
Vaxart.380
By late-2021 pandemic EDSL was less common than some observers—
primarily defense counsel—had previously projected,381 but still
significant.382 The prospect of major litigation prompted the filing with the
SEC in October 2020 of a rulemaking petition by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (Chamber) that seeks restrictions. Petitions to the SEC to issue,
amend, or repeal an agency rule are authorized by Rule 192 of the SEC’s
Rules of Practice.383 They are uncommon, have become more frequent in the
last decade, and unlike the Chamber’s petition rarely address private
securities litigation.384
378. See Kevin LaCroix, COVID-19 Securities Suits Continue to Accumulate, D&O
DIARY (Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/04/articles/coronavirus/covid-19securities-suits-continue-to-accumulate/ [https://perma.cc/96GY-Q8QU] (describing case
categories).
379. See Rachel O’Brien, AstraZeneca Hit with Investor Suit over COVID-19 Vaccine,
LAW360 (Jan. 29, 2021, 7:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1350194 [https://perm
a.cc/9BR5-6XS4] (discussing pandemic EDSL against AstraZeneca); WILMERHALE, COVID19: Lessons from the Second Wave of Securities Fraud Class Actions 9 (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20201028-covid-19-lessons-from-thesecond-wave-of-securities-fraud-class-actions [https://perma.cc/U7BL-YEY5] (discussing
pandemic EDSL against pharmaceutical companies).
380. See Dorothy Atkins, Vaxart Buried Investors in ‘Avalanche of B.S.,’ Judge Says,
LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2021, 5:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1426908/vaxartburied-investors-in-avalanche-of-b-s-judge-says [https://perma.cc/R2R3-ZJGC] (reporting
on oral argument on motion to dismiss in EDSL involving Vaxart).
381. Dean Seal, Why a Surge of COVID-19 Securities Suits Hasn’t Happened, LAW360
(Mar. 11, 2021, 9:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/transportation/articles/1363829 [http
s://perma.cc/A58E-FTUP]; Robert Long, Elizabeth Clark & Alex Ingoglia, What to Expect
from Securities Litigation in 2021, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2021, 5:21 PM), https://www.law3
60.com/articles/1339565 [https://perma.cc/2YYC-VGFK] (noting inaccuracy of early
predictions concerning pandemic-related securities litigation).
382. See Dean Seal, The Next Wave of COVID-19 Securities Litigation Is Building,
LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2021, 12:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1338682/the-nextwave-of-covid-19-securities-litigation-is-building [https://perma.cc/3XJX-WMDM] (noting
significance of pandemic EDSL).
383. 17 C.F.R. § 201.192 (2021).
384. Joe Mont, Want to Change an SEC Rule? Petition the Commission, COMPLIANCE
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The Chamber’s petition provided a broad but shallow critique of EDSL,
noted the continued rise of pandemic EDSL, and then identified supposed
defects in the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions. The primary defects are that
(1) various documents or transactions are expressly excluded from
protection, including financial statements prepared according to generally
accepted accounting principles, IPOs, and tender offers, and (2) the harbors
are insufficient to deter the filing of meritless securities claims.385
The petition then urged the SEC to make at least three rule amendments.
First, the Chamber asked the SEC to bar liability for statements about the
impact of COVID-19 on a company’s business, whether forward-looking or
not, if suitable warnings were attached. Second, the Chamber cited
Omnicare and alternatively requested that the SEC limit liability for all such
statements to circumstances in which plaintiff can prove that the speaker had
actual (subjective) knowledge of its falsity. Third, the Chamber requested
that the SEC mandate the inclusion of certain warnings in financial
statements—which are currently unprotected by the safe harbor— and then
bar liability for claims based on statements that satisfy the warnings or treat
them as the equivalent of opinions requiring proof of subjective knowledge
of falsity in order to be actionable.386
The Chamber’s rulemaking petition was misguided for numerous
reasons. First, its hook was a mostly unfocused critique of EDSL. The
Chamber’s one specific criticism was that EDSL often relies upon the
“tenuous” theory of materialization of risk,387 which requires plaintiffs to
show loss causation by proving that the materialization of an undisclosed
risk caused the alleged investment loss.388 But far from being a tenuous
theory, it has been adopted or at least recognized by most of the Circuits.389
Second, the petition assumed that federal courts will be inundated with
a wave of unjustified COVID-related EDSL. In fact, the surge of pandemic
litigation has been less significant than many observers had predicted and,
as of the date of the filing of the petition, no court had determined that any
such lawsuit was non-meritorious. Third, whereas the petition also rested
upon the dubious proposition that the PSLRA’s safe harbor provisions
WEEK (Sept. 30, 2013, 8:00 PM), https://www.complianceweek.com/want-to-change-an-secrule-petition-the-commission/3851.article [https://perma.cc/ZT5M-5FJS] (describing petitions).
385. Letter from Harold Kim & Tom Quaadman to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, SEC, at
1–8 (Oct. 30, 2020), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/petition-for-rulemaking-on-covid19-related-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/7DMH-8LZY].
386. Id. at 9–10.
387. Id. at 4.
388. McCabe v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 494 F.3d 418, 429 (3d Cir. 2007).
389. Booth, supra note 93, at 1792.
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require revision, the Chamber provided virtually no support for this
argument. Fourth, adoption of the proposed rule changes might encourage
fraud, insofar as they overtly limit liability. Fifth, adoption would unwisely
extend Omnicare to the contents of financial statements. Sixth, at least some
of the proposed changes probably could—and should—only be
accomplished legislatively. SEC rulemaking should not create a safe harbor
for projections about the effect of the pandemic on operations and liquidity.
Some of the earliest pandemic EDSL targeted the cruise line industry
and constituted a significant share of the first category of cases identified
above. The cases, litigated against Carnival Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise
Line, and Royal Caribbean Cruises in the Southern District of Florida, are
likely to serve as a barometer as to whether specific safety disclosures about
the virus are actionable. Cruise case outcomes suggest that plaintiffs will
encounter rough waters. As discussed below, in 2021 courts dismissed the
actions against Carnival and Norwegian and plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed
the Royal Caribbean suit.
One obvious defense tactic in pandemic EDSL is to challenge
application of the FOTM theory. Post-Basic, if plaintiff-investors prove that
their company’s stock traded in an efficient market, they can invoke a
presumption that the misstatement affected the stock price and they
purchased the stock in reliance on the integrity of that price.390 Prior to class
certification in a FOTM case defendant can rebut the Basic presumption by
showing a lack of price impact, and any showing that severs the link between
the alleged misrepresentation and the stock price decline will suffice.391
Market volatility during the pandemic’s early phase presents a rebuttal
opportunity. From its historic peak of 3,3386.15 on February 19, 2020 the
S&P 500 Index lost 34% of its value in approximately one month as the
potential consequences of COVID-19 began to be incorporated into share
prices, but by July 31, 2020 the Index had largely reversed its sharp
decline.392 This was the most dramatic quarter-to-quarter swing since
1932.393 An analysis published in November 2020 concluded that Carnival’s
common stock price drops on some of the alleged corrective disclosure dates

390. 485 U.S. at 247, 248 n.27.
391. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 268 (2014).
392. Andrew Roper & Clifford Ang, How the Pandemic Is Changing Stock Volatility
Calculations, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2020, 8:34 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1307410
/how-the-pandemic-is-changing-stock-volatility-calculations [https://perma.cc/2NW6-UVD
P].
393. John Schreiber & John Tschirgi, Market Rebound May Curb Securities Class Actions,
Damages, LAW360 (July 31, 2020, 5:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1295065/
market-rebound-may-curb-securities-class-actions-damages [https://perma.cc/4ZL4-SEMP].
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were “fully explained by market and industry factors.”394
A second defense tool, related to the foregoing, is to argue an absence
of loss causation based on an absence of price impact. Loss causation is a
fact-based inquiry.395 If a market-wide event creates losses for most
companies, and there is significant volatility—as in the early stages of the
pandemic—it becomes increasingly more difficult for plaintiffs to prove
causation. The 2007-08 financial crisis is instructive. Securities class action
filings increased nearly 20% in 2008396 and the crisis litigation continued for
more than a decade, with loss causation a frequently disputed issue. Multiple
defendants prevailed on this issue during motion practice because their stock
drops at the time of alleged corrective disclosures tracked market sector
declines.397
The early stages of the pandemic caused the largest market decline since
2008398 and defendants in COVID-19 cases should take some solace from
the prior litigation. Defendants should be reassured even though the
pandemic cases are fundamentally different than the prior litigation, which

394. Atanu Saha & Yong Xu, What Really Caused Carnival’s COVID-19 Stock Drop?,
LAW360 (Nov. 9, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1326392 [https://p
erma.cc/8WH9-AEKE]. See also Jennifer Huckleberry, Stock Market Volatility: The Death
Knell of Section 10(b) Securities Fraud Class Certifications, AM. BAR ASS’N (July 6, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercial-business/articles
/2021/stock-market-volatility-section-10b-securities-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/US2F-8REG]
(asserting that “[t]he 2020 stock market volatility, as a practical matter, eradicates plaintiffs’
ability to prove price impact”).
395. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2005).
396. TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP, The Inevitable Wave of COVID-19Related Securities Litigation: What Public Companies Can Expect and Do to Prepare (Apr.
6, 2020), https://www.troutman.com/insights/the-inevitable-wave-of-covid-19-related-secur
ities-litigation-what-public-companies-can-expect-and-do-to-prepare.html [https://perma.cc/
RD65-YHGM].
397. J. Timothy Mast, Pamela S. Palmer & Robert L. Hickok, Operating in a Pandemic:
Securities Litigation Risk and Navigating Disclosure Concerns, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 14, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/14/operating-in-apandemic-securities-litigation-risk-and-navigating-disclosure-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/7R
H8-UWEC]. See also In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Rep. Sec. Litig., 568 F. Supp. 2d
349, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting motion to dismiss in part because complaint failed to
allege facts supporting inference that plaintiff’s losses were due to alleged securities fraud,
rather than to collapse of Internet market sector); Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Lynch,
No. 652732/2011, 2020 WL 2302989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2020) (granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant Merrill Lynch and dismissing common law fraud claim arising
out of investment in 2006 collateralized debt obligation arranged by defendant, because loss
causation was not proven).
398. WILMER HALE, COVID-19: An Early Look at Securities Act Litigation amid COVID19 (May 8, 2020), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20200508-an-earlylook-at-securities-act-litigation-amid-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/4TS7-5E47].
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arose from systemic deception and was primarily confined to the financial
and real estate sectors. As the Second Circuit observed, a “financial crisis
may stand as an impediment to proving loss causation because it can be
difficult to identify whether a particular misstatement or macroeconomic
forces caused a security to lose value in the fog of a coincidental marketwide downturn.”399
The 2007-2008 crisis litigation confirmed that courts are generally
hesitant to grant a motion to dismiss based on loss causation,400 and thus the
argument probably must await subsequent stages of pandemic EDSL, when
event studies can be deployed by the parties. Such studies—which constitute
a statistical tool borrowed from financial economics—seek to determine
whether a highly unusual price movement has occurred. If properly
conducted, they rely on regression analysis to separate the price effect of
information affecting only the defendant company from the price effect of
information with broader implications for the overall stock market and
defendant’s industry peers.401
Event studies have become ubiquitous in modern securities fraud
litigation,402 playing a key role in analyzing market efficiency, price impact,
loss causation, and damages notwithstanding their common misuse and
multiple limitations.403 One pre-pandemic review concluded that “the
existing event study methodology will predictably fail to find a statistically
significant price impact in a substantial number of cases where actionable
fraud really did occur.”404 Event studies will not inevitably preclude proof

399. Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 873 F.3d 85, 155 (2d Cir.
2017).
400. QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Coronavirus Implications for
Securities Litigation, https://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/semfs4ae/coronavirus-implicat
ions-for-securities-litigation-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV46-BVAR] (last visited Oct. 12,
2021).
401. Allan W. Kleidon & Filipe Lacerda, Event Studies and “Bellwether” Effects, NAT’L
L. REV. (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/event-studies-and-bellweth
er-effects [https://perma.cc/2VGL-UCCB].
402. In re Allergan PLC Sec. Litig., No. 18 Civ. 12089, 2021 WL 4077942, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2021) (noting that event studies are the generally accepted method for
measuring damages in securities fraud class actions); Perrie M. Weiner et al., US Securities
Class Actions, CORPORATE DISPUTES, Oct.-Dec. 2019, at 69, 80 (“Event studies are commonly
used and widely accepted in securities class actions.”).
403. See Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event
Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553 (2018) (discussing limitations).
404. Jill E. Fisch, Jonah Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, Toward a Better Understanding of
Event Studies in Securities Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 12, 2016), https://clsblues
ky.law.columbia.edu/2016/09/12/toward-a-better-understanding-of-event-studies-in-securiti
es-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/EH32-LGUH].
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of price impact or loss causation,405 but their constraints are magnified during
periods of extreme market volatility406 and thus proof may be difficult to
establish in COVID-19 EDSL. As noted supra, one event study determined
that Carnival’s common stock price drops at the time of corrective disclosure
tracked market sector declines.
Because Securities Act section 11 and section 12(a)(2) do not require
proof of scienter or loss causation,407 and such claims may be filed in state
court, the Securities Act may offer a more fruitful path for plaintiffs to pursue
pandemic EDSL. Section 11 provides a formula—constituting the exclusive
method for calculations408—which provides that damages are generally
measured by the difference between the price of the offering and the price
on the date plaintiffs’ complaint was filed.409 Defendants have a potential
negative causation affirmative defense, which grants them the opportunity to
disprove that a stock drop was caused by an alleged misstatement or
omission.410 The defense may be employed even in connection with a motion
to dismiss, when negative causation is apparent on the face of the
complaint.411 The defense is the mirror image of causation under section
10(b),412 so it may be as difficult for defendants to disprove causation under
the Securities Act as it will be for EDSL plaintiffs to prove causation under
the Exchange Act.413 In general, however, the dismissal rate for section 10(b)
cases involving already-public companies is significantly higher than it is for
405. See Dean Seal, As Investor Suits Tick Up, Loss Causation May Be a Hard Sell,
LAW360 (May 4, 2020, 6:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1269242 [https://perm
a.cc/EF5T-KWYJ] (noting existence of tools to disentangle effect of general market
movements from effect of alleged securities fraud).
406. Michelle Levin & Ashwin Ram, Securities Enforcement Activity in the COVID Era:
A Backstop to Private Securities Litigation, A.B.A. (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.americanb
ar.org/groups/litigation/committees/securities/articles/2020/securities-enforcement-activitycovid-19/ [https://perma.cc/VP92-T72H].
407. See, e.g., In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996) (“No scienter
is required for liability under § 11; defendants will be liable for innocent or negligent material
misstatements or omissions.”).
408. See McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Ent., Inc. 65 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)
(rejecting attempt to seek benefit of the bargain damages).
409. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (setting forth damages formula).
410. See id. (setting forth defense).
411. Thad Behrens, Benjamin Goodman & Jasmine Tobias, Seven on 11: Seven Avenues
to Early Dismissal of Claims under Section 11 of the Securities Act, 50 SEC. REG. L. REP. 641
(Apr. 30, 2018).
412. Lau v. Opera Ltd., No. 20-cv-674, 2021 WL 964642, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2021)
(“Courts have recognized that the negative loss causation affirmative defense in the Section
11 context and the loss causation element of Section 10(b) claims are ‘mirror images.’”).
413. Scott A. Edelman et al., Securities Class Actions Arising from the COVID-19
Pandemic (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.milbank.com/en/news/securities-class-actions-arisin
g-from-the-covid-19-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/USD9-TSWU].
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sections 11 and 12 cases involving IPOs. Among securities cases filed from
2010–2019, the dismissal rate for the former is 56% and for the latter it is
39%.414
Third, defendants can argue that their alleged misstatements are mere
puffery, expressions of corporate optimism, or forward-looking statements
protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor.415 In the first disposition of pandemic
EDSL, in January 2021 a federal district court in California dismissed a
section 11 case after concluding that statements in defendants’ offering
documents were mere puffery.416 The court also rejected plaintiff’s
arguments concerning Items 303 and 105, primarily because the complaint
failed to allege that defendants could have anticipated the extent of the
pandemic at the time of their January 2020 IPO.417
Similarly, in April 2021 a federal district court in Florida dismissed
consolidated pandemic EDSL against Norwegian Cruise Line, in part
because the alleged material misrepresentations were mere puffery.418
Oddly, in the course of its discussion the court suggested that Norwegian’s
statements about marketing strategies during the pandemic could not have
been deceptive because they aligned with pronouncements about COVID-19
made by then-President Donald Trump.419 Unsurprisingly, the court
provided no legal support for its remarkable suggestion. Equally
inexplicable is a November 2021 decision by a federal district court in
California dismissing pandemic EDSL against the biopharmaceutical
company Sorrento Therapeutics, albeit with leave to amend. The
consolidated complaint had alleged that Sorrento and two executives misled
investors with several statements about the success of a COVID-19 antibody
when the product was still in a preclinical testing stage.420 According to the
dismissal order, a statement by Sorrento’s CEO that “[t]here is a cure. There
414. Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland, Stone Kalisa & Sam Curry, Guest Post: IPO
Litigation Risk, D&O DIARY (June 28, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/06/articles
/securities-litigation/guest-post-ipo-litigation-risk/ [https://perma.cc/CDQ7-LR76].
415. Jason Halper, Nathan Bull & Matthew Karlan, Anticipated Securities Litigation in
Response to the Pandemic, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 3, 2020), https://c
orpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/03/anticipated-securities-litigation-in-response-to-the-pand
emic/ [https://perma.cc/RY9S-PHKR].
416. Berg v. Velocity Fin., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-06780, 2021 WL 268250, at *3–9 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 25, 2021).
417. Id. at *9–10.
418. Douglas v. Nor. Cruise Lines, No. 20-21109, 2021 WL 1378296 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 12,
2021).
419. Id.
420. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint 2,
In re Sorrento Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 20-cv-009666-AJB-DEB (S.D. Cal. Nov.
18, 2021).

582

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

is a solution that works 100 percent” was a non-actionable statement of
corporate optimism.421 It is difficult to understand this characterization.
Forward-looking statements are protected by the PSLRA when future
risks are addressed explicitly and specifically. The safe harbor protected
some defendants in connection with securities litigation stemming from the
2008 financial crisis,422 but other defendants were left unprotected, where the
allegedly misleading disclosures were statements of present risk factors,
rather than forward-looking predictions about future events.423 Likewise,
statements about a company’s present ability to handle COVID-19 may not
be shielded by the safe harbor if they constitute a mix of present fact and
future events,424 and forward-looking statements are highly unlikely to be
protected if the accompanying cautionary language is generic.425 In February
2021 a federal district court handling consolidated pandemic EDSL in
Pennsylvania against biotechnology firm Inovio Pharmaceuticals and its top
executives mostly denied a motion to dismiss and mostly rejected application
of the safe harbor because the subject statements or omissions were of
present facts concerning defendants’ then-current capacity to manufacture
vaccines.426 Plaintiffs subsequently moved for class certification in July
2021.427 Conversely, in Norwegian Cruise Line the court applied the safe
harbor, even though defendants’ challenged statements related to historical
and contemporaneous acts, because they rolled into forecasts of future
action.428 And in September 2021 a federal district court partially granted
and partially denied a motion to dismiss in pandemic EDSL involving a
private prison defendant, after determining that many of the subject
statements were forward-looking, classic puffery—”generalized, vague,

421. Id. at 13.
422. See, e.g., Police Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 759 F.3d 1051 (9th
Cir. 2014) (affirming dismissal of complaint with prejudice).
423. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d
423, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss).
424. See, e.g., In re Quality Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130, 1146–48 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that mixed statements were actionable and reversing dismissal of action).
425. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 763 F. Supp. 2d
423, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that cautionary language was generic and denying motion
to dismiss in part).
426. McDermid v. Inovio Pharm., Inc., No. 20-01402, 2021 WL 601159, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 16, 2021).
427. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification,
McDermid v. Inovio Pharm., Inc., No. 20-01402-GJP (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2021).
428. Douglas v. Nor. Cruise Lines, No. 20-21109, 2021 L 1378296 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 12,
2021).
428. Id.
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nonquantifiable statements of corporate optimism,” or both.429
Fourth, defendants can rebut scienter allegations, in part by referencing
evolving advice from the Centers for Disease Control regarding COVID-19
and asserting that plaintiffs are arguing fraud by hindsight.430 Prior public
health crises, such as the 2014 Ebola outbreak and the 2004 H5N1 avian flu
outbreak, generated securities class action litigation against biotechnology
companies and medical equipment manufacturers for allegedly making false
and misleading statements regarding vaccines, drugs, and medical
equipment intended to stem the crises. A scienter-based argument by
defendants was successful in securities litigation involving the Ebola
virus.431 Similarly, in May 2021 the federal district court dismissed the
COVID-19 cruise line EDSL pending against Carnival—the world’s largest
cruise ship company—in large part because plaintiffs failed to adequately
plead scienter.432
Fifth, defendants can minimize potential damages under the PSLRA’s
bounce-back provision, which caps damages at the difference between
plaintiff’s purchase price and the mean trading price of the security during
the ninety days following a corrective disclosure. If plaintiff sells before the
ninety days, damages are capped at the difference between the purchase price
and the mean trading price between the disclosure date and the sale date.433
The bounce-back provision was intended to limit a plaintiff’s damages
to losses actually caused by the securities fraud or violation—as opposed to
unrelated market conditions—by allowing the market to incorporate all
relevant information and the stock price to adjust accordingly. The provision
thus functions as a rescissory cap on out-of-pocket damages in securities
litigation by affording the security an opportunity to recover.434 It can have
a major impact on damages, especially when the stock price appreciates after
the class period ends.
Post-PSLRA the contours of the bounce-back provision have rarely

429. Hartel v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 20-81063, 2021 WL 4397841, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Sept.
23, 2021).
430. See Edward J. “Ted” Bennett, Amanda M. McDonald & John S. Williams, Defending
Against Covid-19 Related Securities Class Actions, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 25, 2021, 4:01
AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/defending-against-covid-19-related-secu
rities-class-actions [https://perma.cc/9929-NB6Q] (asserting that COVID-19 health
information has been in flux and plaintiffs cannot argue fraud by hindsight).
431. See Jackson v. Halyard Health, Inc., No. 16-CV-05093-LTS, 2018 WL 1621539
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018) (granting motions to dismiss amended class action complaint).
432. Order at 30-33, In re Carnival Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 1:20-cv-22202 (S.D. Fla. May
28, 2021).
433. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1)-(2).
434. In re Veritas Software Corp. Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 962, 967 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007).
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been adjudicated. In 2021 one of the few courts to ever apply the provision
held in cybersecurity EDSL against Zoom that if there are multiple corrective
disclosures there are multiple relevant look-back periods. Damages can be
calculated based on an initial or a last partial corrective disclosure preceding
the date that a specific plaintiff sold its shares, subject to the discretion of the
court.435 Such an approach has the potential to significantly favor defendants
by sharply reducing settlement values. In some suits the bounce-back
provision can eradicate available damages.436
The bounce-back is somewhat inconsistent with Basic’s rationale,
insofar as the implied premise that it requires 90 days for the market to
incorporate all relevant information in incompatible with the notion of an
efficient market.437 Nevertheless, the cap remains part of the PSLRA’s
quarter-century legacy. The provision was rarely invoked and rarely
applicable pre-COVID-19 but it could function as a key defense tool in
pandemic EDSL.438 Defendants can use the bounce-back early in the
litigation, because a court may take judicial notice of stock price movement
without converting a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.439
Many of the COVID securities cases began on porous ground, insofar as they
were filed following modest stock price drops440 and/or proposed short class
periods based on the proximity of the filings to the outbreak of the virus.441
The bounce-back provision could further minimize potential damages and
settlement values in these and other pandemic actions.
Likely in recognition of some of the foregoing obstacles, in February
435. See In re Zoom Sec. Litig., No. 20-cv-02353-JD, 2021 WL 1375854 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
12, 2021) (denying motion for reconsideration).
436. See In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 2000) (observing
that recoverable damages would be zero if mean trading price of security during 90-day period
following corrective disclosure is greater than plaintiff’s purchase price).
437. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 351 (2014) (advancing this argument).
438. Schreiber & Tschirgi, supra note 393.
439. See, e.g., ScripsAmerica, Inc. v. Ironridge Global LLC, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1232
(C.D. Cal. 2015) (taking judicial notice without converting motion to dismiss).
440. See Kevin LaCroix, Tyson Foods Hit with COVID-19-Related Securities Suit, D&O
DIARY (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/02/articles/coronavirus/tysonfoods-hit-with-covid-19-related-securities-suit/# [https://perma.cc/2S3G-Y63V] (noting
2.5% price drop); Kevin LaCroix, AstraZeneca Hit with Securities Suit over COVID-19
Vaccine Development Setbacks, D&O DIARY (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2
021/01/articles/coronavirus/astrazeneca-hit-with-securities-suit-over-covid-19-vaccine-devel
opment-setbacks/ [https://perma.cc/GL32-82V9] (noting 5% price drop).
441. See Kevin LaCroix, Biotech Company Hit with COVID-19-Related Securities Suit,
D&O DIARY (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/03/articles/coronavirus
/biotech-company-hit-with-covid-19-related-securities-suit/ [https://perma.cc/3AJ4-M4TU]
(discussing pandemic EDSL).
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2021 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed (without prejudice) their pandemic
EDSL against Royal Caribbean.442 Voluntary dismissals are uncommon in
traditional non-merger objection securities class action litigation,443 and this
development thus signals a concession that the path to success against the
cruise line was too steep.
COVID-19 EDSL has been accompanied by SEC activity via the
issuance of guidance and the commencement of enforcement proceedings.
The DOJ has been less active than the SEC in this space. In March 2020 the
SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance issued nonbinding guidance
encouraging companies to disclose the risks and effects of COVID-19 and
explain how the company and management are responding to such risks.444
The guidance recommended that companies assess how COVID-19 has
affected their present and future operations by considering a non-exhaustive
list of ten topics that constitute the same types of disclosures that pandemic
EDSL plaintiffs are likely to focus on.445 The document also noted,
somewhat equivocally, that many COVID-19 disclosures may be subject to
the PSLRA’s safe harbor.446 In April 2020 the SEC issued a public statement
urging companies “to provide as much information as practicable regarding
their current financial and operating status, as well as their future operational
and financial planning.”447 And in June 2020 the Division of Corporation
Finance issued updated guidance.448
It has been suggested that the SEC’s disclosure guidance constitutes a
“litigation trap”449 and much of the pandemic private securities litigation to
date would not have occurred absent issuance of the documents by the
442. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, City of Riviera Beach Gen. Emp.
Ret. Sys. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 1:20-cv-24111 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2021).
443. Kevin LaCroix, Coronavirus-Related Securities Suit Against Royal Caribbean
Voluntarily Dismissed, D&O DIARY (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/03
/articles/coronavirus/coronavirus-related-securities-suit-against-royal-caribbean-voluntarilydismissed/# [https://perma.cc/B2EU-KQE3].
444. CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 9, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP.
FIN. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/coronavirus-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/U
7TY-473B].
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Jay Clayton & William Hinman, The Importance of Disclosure—For Investors,
Markets and Our Fight Against COVID-19 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-clayton-hinman [https://perma.cc/J9QT-BQTK].
448. CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 9A, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF
CORP. FIN. (June 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/covid-19-disclosure-considerations
[https://perma.cc/MNE4-G9AK].
449. Andrew N. Vollmer, The SEC’s COVID-19 Disclosure Guidance Is a Litigation
Trap, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 4, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/06/04/t
he-secs-covid-19-disclosure-guidance-is-a-litigation-trap/ [https://perma.cc/EVW7-TQCF].
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Commission.450 Such suggestions are hyperbolic but not meritless. PreCOVID very few companies made specific risk-factor disclosure concerning
a pandemic’s potential impact on their business.451 Form 10-Q requires
companies to disclose any material changes to the risk factors that were
included in their Annual Report on Form 10-K. A review by Ernst & Young
of Fortune 100 companies found that 90% included at least one new COVID19 risk factor in their 10-Q filings between February 1 and May 31, 2020452
and a separate review of the SEC filings by 3,644 publicly traded companies
in the United States found that virtually every company (99.6%) made some
level of pandemic disclosure by May 29, 2020.453 COVID-era disclosures
encouraged by the SEC may be identified by plaintiffs as revealing prior
material omissions or the disclosures may be characterized as misleading.454
The SEC’s activity has not been confined to the issuance of disclosure
guidance. In fiscal year 2020 the SEC opened more than 150 COVID-related
inquiries or investigations455 and by July 2021 it had commenced a modest
nine enforcement actions.456 Most of the actions targeted microcap and
penny stock issuers engaged in routine pump-and-dump schemes based on
false claims and misleading statements concerning COVID-19 tests and
450. See Robert Long, Elizabeth Clark & Alex Ingoglia, What to Expect from Securities
Litigation in 2021, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2021, 5:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/133
9565 [https://perma.cc/9LQD-394M] (advancing this argument).
451. J. Timothy Mast, Pamela S. Palmer & Robert L. Hickok, Operating in a Pandemic:
Securities Litigation Risk and Navigating Disclosure Concerns, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 14, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/14/operating-in-apandemic-securities-litigation-risk-and-navigating-disclosure-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/8R
5G-D8P9].
452. Pamela L. Marcogliese, Michael Levitt & Amy Fisher, First Quarter Disclosure
Trends and Second Quarter Disclosure Expectations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 29, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/29/first-quarter-dis
closure-trends-and-second-quarter-disclosure-expectations/ [https://perma.cc/TZ36-6KKR].
453. Daniel J. Taylor, The Spread of Covid-19 Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (July 8, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/08/the-spread-ofcovid-19-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/V89D-FPW5].
454. See Zelichov & Costley, supra note 374.
455. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ENF’T, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 11–12 (2020),
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3K35-AXY
V].
456. Kevin LaCroix, SEC Files COVID-19-Related Enforcement Action Against Digital
Health Firm, D&O DIARY (July 8, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/07/articles/coro
navirus/sec-files-covid-19-related-enforcement-action-against-digital-health-firm/# [https://
perma.cc/AN72-2MWY]. See, e.g., Press Release No. 2021-120, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
SEC Charges Company and Two Executives for Misleading COVID-19 Disclosures (July 7,
2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-120 [https://perma.cc/4GWP-39WZ]
(announcing no-admit settlement, for aggregate $185,000, of charges concerning misleading
statements by digital health care company about COVID-19 screening test and PPE).
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personal protective equipment (PPE).457 The SEC’s enforcement focus was
expected to continue as the pandemic persisted,458 and the Commission’s
December 2020 no-admit settlement with The Cheesecake Factory hinted at
a new phase. This action—unlike the prior microcap cases—involved
alleged violations of section 13(a) of the Exchange Act stemming from the
issuance of materially misleading disclosures about the risk that the
pandemic posed to the company’s operations.459 Specifically, The
Cheesecake Factory stated publicly that its restaurants were operating
sustainably during the pandemic while its internal documents showed that it
was losing approximately $6 million in cash per week and that it projected it
had only sixteen weeks of cash remaining. This was the SEC’s first
significant pandemic enforcement action, but by late-2021 it had not proven
to be a harbinger of future actions against other mid- or large-cap
companies.460
Pandemic-related cases comprise a significant sector of event-driven
securities litigation. The next section of this Article considers EDSL in an
entirely different sphere.
B. Cannabis
Another contribution to the ascent of EDSL is cannabis securities
litigation, which has proliferated since 2018. Cannabis-related businesses
(CRBs) historically lacked access to traditional sources of financing,461
primarily because marijuana has been classified since 1970 as a Schedule I
drug under the federal Controlled Substances Act.462 Circumstances changed
457. Kevin LaCroix, Canadian Testing Company Hit with COVID-19-Related Securities
Suit, D&O DIARY (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/12/articles/coronaviru
s/canadian-testing-company-hit-with-covid-19-related-securities-suit/ [https://perma.cc/94B
P-TC9Z].
458. See Giovanni A. Ferrari et al., Event-Driven Securities Litigation in the Age of
COVID-19, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP (June 11, 2020), https://www.seyfarth.com/news-insights/
event-driven-securities-litigation-in-the-age-of-covid-19.html [https://perma.cc/VHD9-XQ4
2] (predicting future pandemic EDSL and SEC enforcement actions).
459. Press Release No. 2020-306, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges the
Cheesecake Factory for Misleading COVID-19 Disclosures (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.sec
.gov/news/press-release/2020-306 [https://perma.cc/6USZ-P8A7].
460. Robert Long & Elizabeth Clark, Lessons from COVID Securities Rulings on
Dismissal Bids, Law360 (May 19, 2021, 4:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/13858
62 [https://perma.cc/L3QF-HJZ5]
461. Chris Gismondi & Wendy Michael, Feeling the Burn? The Plaintiffs’ Securities Bar
Has Set Its Sights on the Cannabis Industry, N.Y. L.J., May 15, 2020, https://www.law
.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/05/15/feeling-the-burn-the-plaintiffs-securities-bar-has-setits-sights-on-the-cannabis-industry/ [https://perma.cc/KW5H-38AT].
462. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
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with passage by Congress of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018463
(which decriminalized the cultivation of hemp), the legalization of adult-use
recreational cannabis in Canada in 2018,464 and the accelerating legalization
of medical and recreational cannabis products by individual states. By 2021
an estimated one in three Americans resided in a state with legalized
recreational marijuana.465 The total economic impact from cannabis sales in
the United States was projected to reach $92 billion in 2021 and spike to
$160 billion in 2025.466 The confluence of these developments has spurred
numerous CRBs—typically ancillary non-plant touching businesses—to sell
shares on the NYSE and Nasdaq, and other corporations already listed on the
U.S. exchanges have entered the industry.467
The advent of publicly traded cannabis corporations has attracted the
attention of the plaintiffs’ securities bar, which has filed an increasing
number of lawsuits alleging violations of the federal securities laws
following declines in the share price for the companies. Cannabis securities
class action litigation commenced in 2014468 and by March 2022 there had
been at least 33 such filings.469 Twenty-three of them occurred during 2019–
2021.470 This accelerating trend is expected to continue, driven in large part
by industry growth, stock price volatility,471 regulatory uncertainty,472 and the
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
463. Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334 § 10113, 132 Stat. 4490,
4908-14 (2018).
464. See Peter Bowal, Kathryn Kisska-Schulze, Richard Haigh & Adrienne Ng,
Regulating Cannabis: A Comparative Exploration of Canadian Legalization, 57 AM. BUS.
L.J. 677 (2020) (discussing legalization in Canada).
465. Stephanie Zimmerman, A Green Wave: Successful Ballot Measures for Marijuana
and Other Substances Create Opportunities for Lawyers, 107 A.B.A J. 16, 16 (2021).
466. Andrew Long, Marijuana Industry Expected to Add $92 Billion to U.S. Economy in
2021, MJBIZDAILY (May 11, 2021), https://mjbizdaily.com/marijuana-industry-expected-toadd-92-billion-to-us-economy-in-2021/?cn-reloaded=1 [https://perma.cc/JC2X-QJ3N].
467. Gismondi & Michael, supra note 461.
468. Robert Becher & Colin Gillespie, Quinn Emanuel Cannabis Litigation Practice
Alert: Recent Stock Drop Securities Actions in the Cannabis Industry, QUINN EMANUEL
URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP (2019), https://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/0gkbyflg/cann
abis-securities-action.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9PY-T5L7].
469. STAN. L. SCH., Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Current Trends in Securities
Class Action Filings, Cannabis, https://securities.stanford.edu/current-trends.html [https://p
erma.cc/ZES6-6ACU] (last visited Mar. 23, 2022).
470. Id.
471. Stephen Lenn, Is There a Pot-Com Bubble on the Horizon?, 34 WESTLAW J. CORP.
OFFICERS & DIRS. LIAB. (2019) (“Public cannabis stocks have been and will likely continue
to be volatile. . . .”).
472. Gismondi & Michael, supra note 461; Jeff Smith, As Marijuana Class Action
Lawsuits Surge, Experts Stress Accurate, Forthright Disclosures, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY
(June 25, 2020), https://mjbizdaily.com/how-marijuana-companies-can-avoid-class-action-
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increasing number of public offerings in the cannabis sector. Many of the
class actions to date have been piloted by the same small group of emergent
plaintiffs’ firms that is responsible for EDSL’s overall ascent.473 The
cannabis industry also has experienced multiple shareholder derivative
actions.474 The substantial liability exposure for CRB management in class
and derivative actions has been largely uninsured or underinsured.475
The cannabis EDSL trend reflects the broader phenomenon of
expanding securities class action litigation against life sciences companies.
In 2017 and 2018 approximately 20% of securities class action suits were
filed against life sciences companies and by 2019 this share had increased to
approximately 25%.476 In 2019 the number of such actions filed against life
sciences companies reached historic levels. Plaintiffs filed ninety-seven
securities class action lawsuits against life sciences companies that year477
and 9% of the actions were commenced against CRBs.478 Filings against life
sciences companies declined to 80 in 2020, consistent with the overall
pandemic-induced reduction that year, but still accounted for approximately
25% of all securities class action filings.479
As noted supra, life sciences companies are desirable targets for
securities class action plaintiffs for multiple reasons, including the
companies’ high degree of regulation by the FDA.480 EDSL against CRBs
lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/M8HS-WZWT].
473. See, e.g., Lawless v. Aurora Cannabis Inc., No. 20-13819, 2021 WL 3856158 (D.N.J.
Aug. 27, 2021) (appointing Pomerantz LLP and The Rosen Law Firm as co-lead counsel in
putative securities class action against Aurora Cannabis Inc.); Kevin LaCroix, A Rash of
Cannabis-Related Securities Class Action Lawsuits, D&O DIARY (Nov. 25, 2019), https:/
/www.dandodiary.com/2019/11/articles/securities-litigation/a-rash-of-cannabis-related-sec
urities-class-action-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/ZC4M-M6MK] (“[A]ll of the 2019 cannabisrelated lawsuits have been filed by the small group of plaintiffs’ firms euphemistically
referred to as the ‘emerging law firms’ that have been such a significant factor contributing
to the elevated levels of securities litigation.”).
474. See, e.g., Complaint, Janis v. Earle, No. 20-cv-00193 (N.D. Okla. May 7, 2020)
(alleging, inter alia, that CEO of CRB Upper Street Marketing mismanaged the company and
attempted to transfer its assets into another entity that he owned).
475. Kimberly E. Blair, Jonathan E. Meer & Ian A. Stewart, Cannabis Directors and
Officers Liability: Cause for Optimism?, WILSON ELSER (July 7, 2021), https://www.mondaq
.com/unitedstates/cannabis-hemp/1088586/cannabis-directors-and-officers-liability-causefor-optimism- [https://perma.cc/Z6UN-QK8T].
476. David H. Kistenbroker, Joni S. Jacobsen & Angela Liu, Insight: Life Sciences
Companies Targeted for Securities Class Actions, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 13, 2020, 4:00 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-life-sciences-companies-targeted-forsecurities-class-actions-1 [https://perma.cc/C5Q8-U5Q8].
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. See Dechert 2021 Survey, supra note 127, at 4 n.7.
480. Nicki Locker & Laurie B. Smilan, 2019 Life Sciences Securities Litigation Roundup,
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shares aspects of litigation against other companies in the life sciences sector,
insofar as the cases often focus on defendants’ communications with, and
responses to actions by, the FDA.481
Most of the cannabis EDSL has been filed pursuant to section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, but other actions have included section 11 claims. The
complaints usually center on disclosures related to operations, transactions,
financial guidance, financial restatements, and internal controls.482 Many of
them allege that the CRB made affirmative misrepresentations about
earnings prospects, or knowingly failed to disclose the minimal demand for
its products,483 the full risk of regulatory hurdles,484 and reductions in
revenue.485
Motions to dismiss are standard practice in cannabis EDSL, just as they
are in other industry sectors. Motions involving section 10(b) claims
frequently focus on plaintiffs’ thin scienter allegations.486 Plaintiffs in
cannabis cases often attempt to satisfy the scienter requirement by alleging
that CRB officers had access to the truth by virtue of their executive positions
within the companies, but intentionally or recklessly failed to disclose this
information to CRB shareholders.487 This is an arduous pleading path.
Analogous allegations in numerous non-cannabis cases were found
insufficient unless plaintiffs specifically identified the reports or statements
setting forth the allegedly true information.488 Thus, in EDSL involving CRB
WILSON SONSINI (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.wsgr.com/en/insights/2019-life-sciencessecurities-litigation-roundup.html [https://perma.cc/W26W-YP82].
481. Jack Queen, Pot Investor Class Actions Doubled in Past Year, LAW360 (Apr. 24,
2020, 4:15 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1266979/pot-investor-class-actions-doub
led-in-past-year [https://perma.cc/8FBD-XCKK].
482. Michael Jones & Adanna Uwazurike, Goodwin Procter LLP, Update on Securities
Litigation Against Cannabis Companies 5 (2020), https://www.goodwinlaw.com/files/Pract
iceReports/Cannabis-2020-YIR/flipbook/index.html?page=1 [https://perma.cc/WDQ8-X5T
G].
483. See, e.g., Jack Queen, Investors Press Canopy on Alleged Lies about Pot Demand,
LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2021, 9:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/classaction/articles/1342825 [ht
tps://perma.cc/4FLQ-JERB].
484. See, e.g., Complaint at 8, In re Curaleaf Holdings Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:19-cv-04486
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2019) (alleging that defendant Curaleaf, a CRB trading on the over-thecounter (OTC) market, failed to disclose that its products had not received regulatory
approval).
485. See, e.g., Complaint, Ganovsky v. Tilray, Inc., No. 20-cv-01240 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6,
2020) (alleging that defendant misled investors by overstating the value of an agreement with
a third-party vendor). This action was voluntarily dismissed in 2020.
486. Gismondi & Michael, supra note 461.
487. Gideon Mark & Laurie A. Lucas, Symposium, Cannabis—Legal, Ethical, and
Compliance Issues: Introduction, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 651, 672 (2020).
488. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 531
F.3d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs must specifically identify reports or
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Tilray, Inc., the court granted a motion to dismiss in 2021 after observing
that “scienter cannot simply be presumed from a defendant’s organizational
role or professional expertise”489 and completely discounting allegations
from a CW.490 Similarly, in litigation against Canopy Growth—the largest
Canadian CRB—the federal district court dismissed plaintiffs’ second
amended complaint in 2021 after discounting information provided by a CW
and concluding that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter.491
Adequately alleging a material misrepresentation or omission is another
steep hurdle for plaintiffs in cannabis EDSL, whether under section 10(b) or
section 11. In July 2021 the New Jersey federal district court dismissed
without prejudice the first amended complaint against Canadian CRB
Aurora—which alleged a section 10(b) claim following a 12% stock price
drop—in large part because the company had adequately disclosed the risks
associated with an oversupplied market, the lack of sufficient retail stores,
and a robust black market.492 Likewise, a New York trial court, relying on
federal precedent, dismissed section 11 litigation against Canadian CRB
Sundial Growers in large part because Sundial had included a robust 35-page
risk disclosure section in its prospectus. The court concluded that Sundial
had disclosed the exact type of risk underpinning plaintiffs’ complaint—
specifically, that risks are inherent in the agricultural sector and even when
cultivating cannabis indoors, crops are vulnerable to the elements.493
The decision in Sundial Growers highlights another obstacle—common
in post-IPO securities suits—confronted by cannabis plaintiffs in adequately
alleging a material misrepresentation or omission. The decision concluded
that the statements by defendant Sundial identified by plaintiff as false or
misleading were corporate puffery, mere expressions of corporate optimism,

statements containing relevant information); Industriens Pensionsforsikring A/S v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., No. 20-cv-02155, 2021 WL 4191467, at *19 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2021)
(“Courts routinely reject allegations that a defendant’s ‘position’ within a company, even an
important position, creates an inference of scienter.”); Set Cap. LLC v. Credit Suisse Gr. AG,
18 Civ. 2268 (AT) (SN), 18 Civ. 2319 (AT) (SN), 18 Civ. 4045 (AT) (SN), 2019 WL
4673433, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2019) (holding that plaintiffs must specifically identify
reports or statements containing relevant information).
489. Kasilingham v. Tilray, Inc., No. 20-cv-03459, 2021 WL 4429788, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2021).
490. Id. at *10.
491. Ortiz v. Canopy Growth Corp., No. 2:19-cv-20543, 2021 WL 1967714, at *43
(D.N.J. May 17, 2021) (amended op.).
492. In re Aurora Cannabis, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 19-20588, 2021 WL 2821167, at *11–13
(D.N.J. July 6, 2021).
493. In re Sundial Growers Inc. Sec. Litig, 127 N.Y.S.3d 699, at *6 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct.
May 15, 2020).
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or statements of opinion.494 As noted supra, puffery encompasses statements
that are too inexact to cause reasonable investors to rely upon them and
therefore cannot have misled them.495 In general, federal appellate courts to
consider the issue have held that puffery, puffing, or statements of corporate
optimism are not actionable as a matter of law and securities claims based
on such statements are subject to dismissal on a motion to dismiss.496
However, if puffery is both factual and material, it may be actionable.497
Opinion statements likewise rarely are actionable.498
In Sundial Growers the trial court concluded that such references in
Sundial’s offering documents as “high quality” and “premium” cannabis
were non-actionable puffery or opinions,499 and this decision was affirmed
on appeal in 2021.500 However, in September 2020, a few months before the
Sundial appellate decision was issued, securities litigation involving
Canadian CRB Aphria produced a different result. Here the federal district
court rejected an argument that references to an Aphria asset as “world class”
or “established and successful” were non-actionable puffery or expressions
of corporate optimism. According to the court, a reasonable investor could
rely on such statements, when viewed in context, because they indicate that
an asset is operational.501 Shortly thereafter Aphria announced that it was
merging with Tilray to form the largest cannabis company in the world.502
In another case, this one involving the collapse of Quebec-based CRB
HEXO Corporation, the federal district court dismissed plaintiffs’ first
amended class action complaint in March 2021, in part because defendants’
statements were protected by the PSLRA’s safe harbor (as to the Rule 10b5 claim) and bespeaks caution doctrine (as to the section 11 claim). As to

494. Id.
495. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 245 (2d Cir. 2016).
496. See Robert N. Kravitz, Room for Optimism: The “Puffery” Defense under the
Federal Securities Laws (Part 1 of 2), 19 SEC. LITIG. J. (2009), https://www.paulweiss.com
/media/104380/PW_KravABAFeb09.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZU9-95EH].
497. Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 682 (4th Cir. 1999); Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of
Baton Rouge & Parish of E. Baton Rouge v. Macrogenics, Inc., No. GJH-19-2713, 2021 WL
4459218, at *11 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2021).
498. In re Sundial Growers Inc. Sec. Litig, 127 N.Y.S.3d 699, at *5 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct.
May 15, 2020).
499. Id.
500. In re Sundial Growers Inc. Sec. Litig, 138 N.Y.S.3d 330 (Mem.) (N.Y. App. Div.
Feb. 16, 2021).
501. In re Aphria, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 18 Civ. 11376 (GBD), 2020 WL 5819548, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020).
502. Emily Ruscoe, Tilray Investor Sues over $3.8B Pot Industry Megamerger, LAW360
(Mar. 16, 2021, 7:43 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1365341/tilray-investor-suesover-3-8b-pot-industry-megamerger [https://perma.cc/99P4-WNL6].
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the latter, the court noted that HEXO’s cautionary language directly
addressed the relevant risk that the company was operating within a newly
legalized industry in Canada.503 The court also rejected plaintiffs’ arguments
concerning Items 105 and 303.504 A few months later a New York state court
judge also dismissed a proposed securities class action alleging a section 11
claim against HEXO, again in major part on the basis of the bespeaks caution
doctrine.505 The court in Canopy Growth also concluded that most of the
challenged statements by defendants were protected by the safe harbor.506
Finally, in September 2021 a federal court dismissed with prejudice section
10(b) and section 11 claims against Sundial Growers, in large part on the
basis of the safe harbor.507
Overall, the decisions to date in cannabis EDSL suggest that motions to
dismiss may turn in large part on the puffery issue,508 and those cases in
which the subject statements are not merely general and aspirational and are
unprotected by the safe harbor and bespeaks caution doctrine are more likely
to proceed to discovery. In addition, adequately alleging scienter will remain
a common obstacle for plaintiffs, even when CWs are available.
C. Corruption
Numerous event-driven securities class actions have been filed
following the resolution of enforcement actions under the FCPA or in
connection with domestic corruption. The FCPA, enacted in 1977, regulates
international corruption using both accounting and anti-bribery provisions.
The accounting provisions mandate regular reporting to the SEC,
maintenance of accurate books, records, and accounts, and the establishment
of internal accounting controls aimed at detecting and preventing FCPA
violations.509 The anti-bribery provisions criminalize the transfer of money
503. In re HEXO Corp. Sec. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 3d 281, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
504. Id. at 302–03.
505. Leung v. HEXO Corp., No. 150444/2020, 2021 WL 2327231 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 3,
2021).
506. Ortiz v. Canopy Growth Corp., No. 19-cv-20543, slip op. at 34 (D.N.J. May 17, 2021)
(amended op.)
507. Sun, A Series of E Squared Inv. Fund, LLC v. Sundial Growers, Inc., No. 20-CV03579, 2021 WL 4482276, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021).
508. See, e.g., Civil Minutes, at 6, In re: PharmaCielo Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. CV 20-2182
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss in cannabis EDSL in part based on
puffery defense). A motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in PharmaCielo was
pending in August 2021. Emilie Ruscoe, Investors’ Suit Still Too ‘Vague,’ Pot Co. Tells Calif.
Judge, Law360 (Aug. 3, 2021, 7:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1408989 [https://
perma.cc/V28V-BS9P].
509. 15 U.S.C. § 78d.

594

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

or other gifts to foreign officials and political actors with intent to influence
or obtain or retain business.510
Both the SEC and DOJ have enforcement authority (and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) recently began to assert
authority),511 but there is no private right of action under the FCPA.512 The
absence of a private right of action has spurred the filing of class actions
alleging securities fraud, as an antidote. In general, plaintiffs can pursue
such litigation if their allegations do not reflect an attempt to enforce the
FCPA and instead are independently actionable under the Exchange Act.513
Other collateral civil actions, including shareholder derivative actions,
commercial litigation, employment and whistleblower litigation, ERISA514
actions, RICO515 actions, and Alien Tort Claims Act516 litigation, also have
followed in the wake of SEC and DOJ FCPA investigations and enforcement
proceedings.517 Most of these other collateral actions have failed. For
example, courts have routinely dismissed FCPA-related derivative actions,
often for failure to meet the demand requirement imposed by many states,
including Delaware and New York.518 The requirement obliges plaintiff,
prior to suing derivatively, to ask the board of directors to sue on behalf of
the corporation or plead demand futility with particularity in the derivative
complaint.519
510. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a).
511. See FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 26, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.shearma
n.com/perspectives/2021/01/shearman-fcpa-digest-jan-2021-recent-trends-and-patterns-in-fc
pa [https://perma.cc/6T4X-3ZFF] (discussing first ever CFTC matter predicated on FCPA
allegations).
512. See Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419 (2012) (arguing
in favor of recognition of a private right of action in FCPA cases).
513. In re VEON Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-08672, 2017 WL 4162342, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 2017).
514. Pub. L. No. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
515. Pub. L. No. 91–452, 84 Stat. 822 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68).
516. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
517. Max B. Chester & Michael P. Mathews, The Rise in Litigation from FCPA
Enforcement, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2009), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/20
09/02/the-rise-in-litigation-from-fcpa-enforcement [https://perma.cc/95ZY-A8D2].
518. Courts Continue to Dismiss Shareholder Suits Based on FCPA Violations, ROPES &
GRAY (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2015/April/CourtsContinue-to-Dismiss-Shareholder-Suits-Based-on-FCPA-Violations [https://perma.cc/A87Q
-XK5P].
519. Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation
Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO STATE L.J. 1217, 1230–31
(2012). See United Food & Com. Workers Union and Participating Food Indus. Emps. TriState Pension Fund v. Zuckerberg, No. 404, 2020, 2021 WL 4344361 (Del. Sept. 23, 2021)
(clarifying demand futility standards).
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In standard EDSL, after a company has publicly disclosed potential
FCPA violations and/or settled with the federal government, plaintiff
shareholders file suit alleging that the company earlier fraudulently failed to
disclose, or made false or misleading disclosures regarding, the nature and
scope of the company’s FCPA violations or internal controls for detecting
such violations. To adequately allege bribery plaintiffs must plead the “who,
what, when, where, and how” of the alleged improper transaction.520 The
complaints in these actions often rely on statements made by defendant in a
deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) or settlement agreement with the
SEC or DOJ, in which the company admits facts about misconduct and
internal control failures and—in the case of DOJ involvement—avoids a
criminal conviction.521
Most of the putative FCPA-based securities class actions have been
dismissed, typically for failure to adequately plead a material
misrepresentation or omission.522 However, many of them have proceeded
to discovery and multiple major settlements have been finalized, often for
sums that substantially exceed the penalty assessed by the DOJ and/or
SEC.523 One review of 37 class action and derivative suits filed during a
four-year period against companies that disclosed FCPA investigations
found that 26 resulted in a monetary settlement.524 Resolutions have become
much larger since that review was conducted more than a decade ago. Major
FCPA EDSL settlements since then have included $3 billion (Petrobras, in
2018), $389.6 million (Cobalt International Energy, in 2019), $160 million
(Wal-Mart, in 2018), $62.5 million (SQM, in 2020), and $62 million (Avon,
in 2015).525
520. Schiro v. Cemex, S.A.B. de C.V., 438 F. Supp. 3d 194, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(dismissing second amended complaint with prejudice).
521. Grayson Stratton et al., When FCPA Violations Turn into Private Securities Cases,
LAW360 (July 10, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1175610 [https://perma
.cc/E5DS-EHCV].
522. Id.
523. George H. Brown, Debra Wong Yang & Matthew S. Kahn, Strategies for Mitigating
Civil Liability Consequences of FCPA Investigations & Enforcement Actions, 9 SEC. LITIG.
REP., Apr. 2012, https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/
BrownYangKahn-StrategiesforMitigatingCivilLiabilityConsequences%20(2).pdf
[https://perma.cc/UFV8-3T9D].
524. See Brian Grow, Bribery Investigations Spark Shareholder Suits, REUTERS (Nov. 1,
2010, 2:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bribery-lawsuits/bribery-investigationsspark-shareholder-suits-idUSTRE6A04CO20101101 [https://perma.cc/BW24-VAYR].
525. See Kevin LaCroix, Chilean Company Pays $62.5 Million to Settle Bribery-Related
Securities Suit, D&O DIARY (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/12/articles/
securities-litigation/chilean-company-pays-62-5-million-to-settle-bribery-related-securitiessuit/ [https://perma.cc/KV2A-9V6Z] (discussing SQM settlement); Kevin LaCroix, A Closer
Look at FCPA-Related Securities Suits, D&O DIARY (July 17, 2019), htt
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The Petrobras and Cobalt settlements ranked fifth and forty-fourth,
respectively, among the top 100 U.S. securities class action settlements of
all-time, as of December 31, 2020,526 and likely have encouraged plaintiffs’
class action counsel to further pursue FCPA cases. For example, EDSL was
commenced in August 2020 against Airbus after the aerospace giant earlier
agreed to pay combined global penalties of more than $3.9 billion to resolve
foreign bribery and export control charges. This was the largest global
foreign bribery resolution by 2020.527 The complaint in the follow-on EDSL
alleged that Airbus used bribery to obtain and retain aircraft, helicopter, and
defense deals, and the company’s stock price dropped after regulatory
investigations were disclosed and again as the scandal unfolded.528
Four primary categories of disclosures have been moderately fruitful
for plaintiffs in FCPA EDSL. The first is statements by a company about its
compliance with the law, its reputation for integrity, or its commitment to
ethical conduct, often as reflected in the adoption of a code of conduct or
ethics. Such general statements usually constitute non-actionable puffery,529
even if they are not explicitly aspirational. As noted by one court in a foreign
bribery securities case, “[t]he distinguishing feature of puffery is its use of
broad generalities, not its use of talismanic aspirational language.”530
Likewise, mere code or compliance program adoption, absent statements
assuring investors that a company’s employees are code-compliant or the
program is effective, is not misleading.531 However, if a company uses its
alleged adherence to its code of ethics or similar representations to reassure
the investing public about the company’s integrity, such statements may be

ps://www.dandodiary.com/2019/07/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/a-closer-look-atfcpa-related-securities-suits/ [https://perma.cc/85G3-P77B] (identifying settlements and
noting that FCPA cases constitute “yet another example of the kind of event-driven litigation
that has come to be such a significant factor in securities litigation filings in recent years”).
526. Top 100 Settlements, supra note 8, at 6–10.
527. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Airbus Agrees to Pay over $3.9 Billion in Global Penalties to
Resolve Foreign Bribery and ITAR Case (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/airb
us-agrees-pay-over-39-billion-global-penalties-resolve-foreign-bribery-and-itar-case [https:/
/perma.cc/VMT9-JX5T].
528. Rachel O’Brien, 5 Firms Eye Lead in Investors’ $4B Airbus Corruption Suit, LAW360
(Oct. 6, 2020, 3:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1317154 [https://perma.cc/53CF6EZW].
529. See, e.g., Salim v. Mobile TeleSystems PJSC, No. 19-CV-1589, 2021 WL 796088,
at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss second amended complaint); Das
v. Rio Tinto PLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 786, 806–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (observing that codes of
ethics are inherently aspirational and granting motions to dismiss).
530. Schiro v. Cemex, S.A.B. de C.V., 396 F. Supp. 3d 283, 298 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
531. See, e.g., Doshi v. General Cable Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 815, 830 (E.D. Ky. 2019)
(“The problem is that [defendant] never said it had an effective compliance program.”).
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actionable.532
The second category is statements from SOX certifications or SEC
filings concerning the existence or effectiveness of a company’s internal
controls. SOX certifications do not make any explicit reassurances regarding
the FCPA533 and general statements about internal controls are not
actionable.534 But plaintiffs have been successful when the statements
constitute an opinion about the effectiveness of the controls and the speaker
was aware the opinion was false. This may be reflected in admissions by the
company in settlement agreements with the SEC or DOJ535 or if the signing
officers knew that an internal audit contradicted the certifications.536
Similarly, false or misleading statements by a company that it is in
compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, and therefore it believes
its controls are effective, may be actionable, rather than constituting
puffery.537 Backward-looking statements regarding internal controls are
unprotected by the safe harbor and bespeaks caution doctrine.538
The third category is statements by a company about its financial
success, when those statements fail to disclose that success was attributable
to bribes made in violation of the FCPA. While there is no general duty to
disclose market or corruption risk539 the calculus changes when a bribing
company touts specific reasons for its impressive financials without
discussing the role that bribery has played. Such statements may be

532. In re Eletrobras Sec. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 450, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re
Petrobras Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 3d 368, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
533. Doshi v. General Cable Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 815, 834 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
534. Salim v. Mobile TeleSystems PJSC, No. 19-CV-1589, 2021 WL 796088, at *11
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021); Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgt. Grp., LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 500,
513 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
535. Doshi v. General Cable Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 815, 834 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
536. In re Eletrobras Sec. Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 450, 468–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(concluding that SOX certifications were indicative of scienter).
537. Villella v. Chem. & Mining Co. of Chile Inc., No. 15 Civ. 2106, 2017 WL 1169629,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017) (“The statements in the Annual Reports relay positive
assurances that SQM believed it was in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations
and that based on an evaluation, the CEO and CFO concluded that SQM’s controls were
effective.”).
538. In re VEON Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-08672, 2017 WL 4162342, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 2017).
539. Doshi v. General Cable Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 815, 831–33 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
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actionable,540 insofar as they place the source of revenue at issue.541
The fourth category is a failure to disclose a regulatory investigation
concerning potential FCPA violations. In general, as previously noted, the
failure to disclose an investigation is not actionable, because companies have
no obligation to disclose uncharged, unadjudicated wrongdoing, unless
disclosure is necessary to prevent the corporation’s other statements from
becoming materially misleading.542 The absence of a disclosure obligation
encompasses unadjudicated bribery allegations.543 The calculus can change
if, for example, the undisclosed investigation triggered a reasonable
possibility of an adverse impact on the company’s financial position in the
form of a penalty or disgorgement order.544 It may be a best practice for a
company to disclose the existence of an SEC or DOJ FCPA investigation—
especially after receiving a subpoena—to guard against liability stemming
from news reports that publicize the investigation and produce a stock price
drop.545 But generally this is not a reporting obligation. Indeed, one court
held in 2021 that if a company discloses a DOJ investigation it has no further
obligation to disclose that such investigation is for possible FCPA violations,
at least where the disclosure acknowledges the potential FCPA exposure.546
In that case the court dismissed plaintiffs’ second amended complaint,547
filed in the aftermath of defendant Mobile TeleSystems PJSC’s $850 million
540. See In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp. 3d 731, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 2017):
Braskem was certainly not obliged to publicly address the components and
determinants of the prices it paid Petrobas for naphtha. It was entitled to stay
mum on that point. But, having opened up that subject for discussion, it was not
at liberty to selectively omit what the SAC fairly alleges as a central determinant
of that price: the corrupt arrangement Braskem had struck with the Petrobras
officials it bribed.
541. In re VEON Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-08672, 2017 WL 4162342, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 2017).
542. In re Braskem S.A. Sec. Litig., 246 F. Supp. 3d 731, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
543. Ulbright v. Ternium S.A., No. 18-CV-6801, 2020 WL 5517313, at *10 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2020).
544. See Menaldi v. Och-Ziff Cap. Mgt. Grp., LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 500, 515 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (discussing disclosure obligation in context of Accounting Standards Codification 450,
which governs contingencies—”essentially, situations involving uncertainty as to a possible
gain or loss”). ASC 450 is relevant, because SEC regulations specify that where financial
statements are not prepared in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,
they are presumed to be misleading or inaccurate. 17 C.F.R. 210.4–01(a)(1) (2021).
545. Mauricio Espana, Hector Gonzalez & Brendan Herrmann, A Setback for FCPABased Securities Class Actions, LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1034244 [https://perma.cc/534N-ZHW2].
546. Salim v. Mobile TeleSystems PJSC, No. 19-CV-1589, 2021 WL 796088, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2021).
547. Id. at *15.
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parallel resolutions with the DOJ and SEC concerning FCPA violations.
Corruption-based EDSL is not limited to extraterritorial conduct.
Increasingly, event-driven cases are based on domestic bribery or kickbacks.
For example, in 2020 a federal district court declined to dismiss EDSL based
on alleged kickbacks made by pharmaceutical company AbbVie to doctors
who prescribed AbbVie’s flagship immunosuppressant drug Humira. The
details of the alleged kickback scheme, which involved cash, alcohol, trips,
and an elaborate network of “nurse ambassadors,” became public beginning
in early 2018, after which the company’s stock price fell. In declining to
dismiss the court held that statements in AbbVie’s Code of Business Conduct
were actionable, because they were unqualified representations about the
company’s conduct and not merely aspirational.548
Another case is EDSL stemming from bribery by Commonwealth
Edison (ComEd)—the largest electric utility in Illinois and a controlled
subsidiary of Exelon Utilities—that benefitted former Illinois Democratic
House Speaker Mike Madigan and his allies. The bribery scheme spanned
the years 2011–2019 and was designed to secure the passage of legislation
favorable to ComEd and Exelon. In 2020 ComEd entered into a DPA and
agreed to pay $200 million to resolve a federal bribery investigation,549 the
disclosure of which sent Exelon’s stock price tumbling.550 In 2021
defendants’ motions to dismiss the ensuing EDSL were mostly denied. The
court cited a line of recent cases holding that Items 105 and 303 impose a
duty to disclose regulatory non-compliance in Forms 8-K and 10-Q and
concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged a failure by Exelon to disclose
the Illinois bribery in its earlier SEC filings.551 The court also held that
certain statements in Exelon’s Code of Business Conduct were actionable
because they were unqualified and not merely aspirational. One such
statement was that “[w]e never request, offer or accept any form of payment
intended to improperly influence a decision.”552
In 2020 EDSL also was commenced against Ohio electric utility
FirstEnergy Corporation in connection with approximately $60 million in
548. Holwill v. AbbVie Inc., No. 1:18-cv-06790, 2020 WL 5235005, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
9, 2020).
549. Celeste Bott, ComEd to Pay $200M for Bribery Tied to Ill. House Speaker, LAW360
(July 17, 2020, 10:17 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1293102 [https://perma.cc/LM
65-55YT].
550. Clark Mindock, Exelon Wants Investor Suit Over Bribe Investigation Tossed,
LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1330513 [https://perma
.cc/2HTS-6TX5].
551. Flynn v. Exelon Corp., No. 19 C 8209, 2021 WL 1561712, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21,
2021).
552. Id. at *9.
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bribes paid to members of the Ohio General Assembly. FirstEnergy’s facts
are remarkably similar to Exelon’s facts. A criminal complaint preceding the
securities litigation alleged that FirstEnergy bankrolled the 2018 election of
Ohio Republican House Speaker Larry Householder, an effort by
Householder to pass a $1.3 billion bill subsidizing two troubled FirstEnergy
nuclear power plants, and a campaign to defeat a 2019 referendum to repeal
the bill. Following the arrests of Householder and four others, FirstEnergy’s
stock price plunged 45% and EDSL followed.553 A motion to dismiss a
parallel civil RICO suit filed by ratepayers was denied in February 2021.554
Motions to dismiss the securities litigation were pending in July 2021, when
FirstEnergy entered into a DPA and agreed to pay a $230 million penalty.555
Subsequently, in March 2022 the court mostly denied ten separate motions
to dismiss filed by FirstEnergy and various officers, directors, and
underwriters in the EDSL.556
A fourth example is consolidated securities litigation stemming from
bribery by Fiat Chrysler executives of senior officials of the United Auto
Workers (UAW) that generated a sprawling federal investigation and
numerous guilty pleas.557 Fiat bribed the UAW officials with cash and gifts
to score favors during collective bargaining. Many of the allegations in the
EDSL appear to have been lifted from a RICO suit, filed by Fiat rival General
Motors, that was dismissed in 2020.558 While that dismissal was on appeal,
553. Complaint ¶¶ 1–5, Owens v. FirstEnergy Corp., No. 20-cv-03785, 2020 WL 6973421
(S.D. Ohio July 28, 2020); Jessie Balmert & Jackie Borchardt, Ohio Energy Probe:
FirstEnergy Admits it Gave $56.6 Million to Nonprofit that Pleaded Guilty, CINCINNATI.COM
(Mar. 12, 2021, 10:00 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/politics/2021/03/12/ohi
o-bribery-probe-firstenergy-admits-gave-millions-generation-now-pleaded-guilty/46737400
01/ [https://perma.cc/XK5R-KVCM].
554. Smith v. FirstEnergy Corp., 518 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (S.D. Ohio 2021). Subsequently
the court certified a ratepayer class and then vacated the certification order. Smith v.
FirstEnergy Corp., Lead Case No. 20-cv-3987, 2021 WL 5416540 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 2021).
555. See S. DIST. OF OHIO, U.S. ATTY’Y’S OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FirstEnergy
Charged Federally, Agrees to Terms of Deferred Prosecution Settlement (July 22, 2021), http
s://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/firstenergy-charged-federally-agrees-terms-deferred-prose
cution-settlement [https://perma.cc/B7PX-QJUD].
556. In re FirstEnergy Corp. Sec. Litig., Nos. 2:20-cv-3785 & 2:20-cv-4287, 2022 WL
681320 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2022). Related state and federal derivative litigation settled for
$180 million in February 2022, subject to judicial approval. Dean Seal, Judge Demands
Names of FirstEnergy Execs Who Paid Bribes, LAW360 (Mar. 22, 2022, 8:54 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1476370/judge-demands-names-of-firstenergy-execs-whopaid-bribes.
557. See Linda Chiem, Fiat Chrysler Rips Investors’ Fraud Claims in UAW Bribes Suit,
LAW360 (Dec. 15, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1337863 [https://perma
.cc/9JBW-TQZ4] (reporting guilty pleas and prison sentences for three former Fiat Chrysler
employees).
558. See Linda Chiem, Stellantis Inks $5M Deal to End Investor FCA-UAW Bribes Suit,
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Stellantis NV—formed by the merger of Fiat Chrysler and Peugeot parent
Groupe PSA—agreed in 2021 to pay $5 million to settle the EDSL.559
A fifth case is EDSL against Energy Transfer, a Dallas-based energy
company that operates some of the largest oil and gas pipelines in the United
States. Energy Transfer’s stock price dropped following news in 2019 of a
federal bribery investigation concerning the grant of permits for construction
of the company’s 350-mile Mariner East pipeline carrying highly volatile
natural gas across Pennsylvania, and securities litigation ensued.560 Motions
to dismiss were largely denied in 2021, in part on the basis of actionable
statements in Energy Transfer’s Code of Ethics,561 and a motion for class
certification followed.562
In a sixth example, in 2020 a federal district court applied the Basic
presumption and certified a class of Novo Nordisk investors in EDSL
alleging the global healthcare company misled shareholders about the source
of its financial success while concealing a scheme to pay kickbacks to
pharmacy benefit managers in exchange for access to the U.S. insulin
market.563 Certification followed denial of a motion to dismiss. In declining
to dismiss the court rejected application of the PSLRA’s safe harbor because
defendants’ cautionary language was inadequate.564 The case settled for
$100 million in September 2021.565
What are the lessons of EDSL based on domestic bribery and
kickbacks? In most of the foregoing actions motion practice was in an early
stage at the time of this writing. However, AbbVie, Exelon, and Novo
Nordisk collectively suggest that many of the same considerations discussed
above in connection with FCPA-based EDSL will apply in domestic cases.

LAW360 (May 17, 2021, 2:04 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1385162 [https://perm
a.cc/KT4F-85FA] (discussing allegations allegedly cribbed from RICO suit).
559. Id.
560. See Allegheny Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Energy Transfer LP, No. 20-200, 2020 WL
1888950, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2020) (denying motion to transfer action to Northern
District of Texas).
561. Memorandum at 38-39, Allegheny Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Energy Transfer LP, No.
20–200 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2021).
562. Nathan Hale, Investors Seek Class Approval in Suit Over $3B Pa. Pipeline, LAW360
(Sept. 20, 2021, 5:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1423246 [https://perma.cc/53ZJ
-B4FE].
563. In re Novo Nordodisk Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-00209, 2020 WL 502176 (D.N.J. Jan.
31, 2020).
564. In re Novo Nordodisk Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-00209, 2018 WL 3913912, at *8–9
(D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2018).
565. Sarah Jarvis, Novo Nordisk to Pay $100M to Settle Investor Class Action, LAW360
(Sept. 24, 2021, 7:26 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1425225/novo-nordisk-to-pay100m-to-settle-investor-class-action [https://perma.cc/BT6S-Y942].
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D. Antitrust
The phenomenon of securities class action litigation following
regulatory, state, criminal, and/or other investigations for allegedly
anticompetitive conduct was noted at least as early as 2009,566 but the
practice did not become commonplace until years later, as an aspect of
EDSL’s escalation.567 Securities cases following antitrust investigations
typically allege that, in violation of federal securities laws, the defendant
company failed to disclose that it was engaged in the underlying
anticompetitive conduct.568 These cases are distinguished from those in
which plaintiffs seek to dress securities allegations in antitrust garb in order
to circumvent the PSLRA’s procedural requirements. The Supreme Court
rejected this latter approach in 2007 in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
v. Billing.569
Event-driven securities cases seek to accomplish the reverse of the
pleading practice that was forbidden in Billing. Plaintiffs in the event cases
seek to dress allegations of anticompetitive conduct in the regalia of
securities class actions.570 They often succeed. For example, in June 2021
antitrust EDSL premised on anticompetitive conduct in the interior molded
doors market settled for nearly $40 million, following certification of an
investor class and settlement of the parallel price-fixing litigation for more
than $60 million.571
Antitrust-driven securities fraud cases have raised several key issues.
One concerns the appropriate pleading standard to be applied when deciding
a motion to dismiss. Courts have generally concluded that the applicable
standard is supplied by the PSLRA and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of
566. See Kevin M. LaCroix, Alleged Anticompetitive Behavior and Follow-On Securities
Litigation, D&O DIARY (Apr. 10, 2009), https://www.dandodiary.com/2009/04/articles/se
curities-litigation/alleged-anticompetitive-behavior-and-follow-on-securities-litigation/
[https://perma.cc/6ZX7-Z5DQ] (noting increasing frequency of this practice).
567. See Samuel Groner & Andrew Cashmore, Trends in Securities Cases Based on
Antitrust Allegations, LAW360 (July 5, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1
060044 [https://perma.cc/S5SZ-ZERG] (noting that antitrust-based securities litigation is an
example of EDSL and such litigation has “become commonplace”).
568. Id.
569. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
570. Kevin M. LaCroix, Alleged Anticompetitive Behavior and Follow-On Securities
Litigation, D&O DIARY (Apr. 10, 2009), https://www.dandodiary.com/2009/04/articles/secur
ities-litigation/alleged-anticompetitive-behavior-and-follow-on-securities-litigation/ [https://
perma.cc/PG3T-8RYA].
571. Christopher Cole, Doormaker Settles Investors’ Stock-Drop Claims for $40M.
LAW360 (June 7, 2021, 5: 07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1391509/doormakersettles-investors-stock-drop-claims-for-40m [https://perma.cc/AUR3-4VZN].
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Civil Procedure,572 and falsity must be pled with particularity as to dual
allegations that federal securities laws have been breached573 and defendant
engaged in the underlying anticompetitive conduct.574 This conclusion also
encompasses other kinds of underlying illegality,575 including foreign
bribery. However, some courts have declined to resolve the issue576 or held
that plaintiff must merely state a “plausible claim” that the underlying
conduct occurred.577 A second issue is whether it suffices to plead scienter
or loss causation for plaintiff to merely allege the existence of a government
investigation—often by the DOJ—concerning anti-competitive conduct. In
general, it does not suffice as to either element.578 A third issue concerns
puffery and the impact of corporate codes of conduct.
The foregoing issues arose in EDSL stemming from private antitrust
litigation targeting the poultry industry, which is vertically integrated and
characterized by high barriers to entry.579 The antitrust litigation commenced
in 2016 when food distributor Maplevale Farms sued 27 defendants in the
Northern District of Illinois, alleging a conspiracy to fix chicken prices.580
This was followed by other antitrust class actions initiated on behalf of new
572. FED. R. CIV. P. 9. Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading requirement of factual
particularity with respect to fraud allegations.
573. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods Inc. Sec. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d 970, 996 (W.D. Ark.
2017) (applying PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards).
574. See, e.g., Gamm v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 944 F.3d 455, 465 (2d Cir. 2019) (“In
practical terms, the pleading standard required appellants to have alleged the basic elements
of an underlying antitrust conspiracy. . . .”).
575. See Samuel P. Groner & Fara M. Saathoff, Securities Litigation Premised on Failure
to Disclose Alleged Underlying Illegal Conduct, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(Dec. 26, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/26/securities-litigation-premisedon-failure-to-disclose-alleged-underlying-illegal-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/UT5X-4EGY]
(stating that holding of Gamm v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 944 F.3d 455 (2d Cir. 2019) “applies
no matter the nature of the underlying allegedly illegal acts”).
576. See, e.g., In re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig., No. 16-CV-7926, 2018 WL 1595985, at *15
n.11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (declining to resolve the issue).
577. Roofer’s Pension Fund v. Papa, No. 16-2805, 2018 WL 3601229, at *11 (D.N.J. July
27, 2018).
578. See, e.g., DeLuca v. GPB Auto. Portfolio, LP, No. 19-cv-10498, 2020 WL 7343788,
at *17 n.190 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2020) (scienter); Lipow v. Net 1 UEPS Techs., Inc., 131 F.
Supp. 3d 144, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (scienter); Lloyd v. CVB Fin. Corp., 811 F.3d 1200, 1203
(9th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming that announcement of investigation is insufficient to allege loss
causation, unless investigation relates to an alleged misrepresentation and inaccuracy of
misrepresentation is subsequently disclosed).
579. Gamm v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 944 F.3d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 2019).
580. Kevin LaCroix, Poultry Producers Hit with Antitrust Suits, Follow-On Securities
Litigation, D&O DIARY (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/10/articles/secur
ities-litigation/poultry-producers-hit-antitrust-suits-follow-securities-litigation/ [https://perm
a.cc/FF6V-GEKR].
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plaintiffs, including restaurant chains and restaurant supply companies.581
Ultimately, dozens of private chicken price-fixing cases were filed.582 In
2019 the DOJ revealed that it was investigating potential anticompetitive
conduct in the industry583 and indictments followed in 2020.584
Some defendants in the antitrust actions are privately held companies,
but many others are publicly traded. The shares of the public companies
plunged early in the antitrust litigation and securities class actions followed.
The poultry ESDL has fared poorly for plaintiffs, typically sinking in
connection with the issues noted above. In one decision, issued in 2019, the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an action against defendants
Sanderson Farms, Inc. and its officers.585 The Second Circuit held that where
a section 10(b) action is based on non-disclosure of illegal activity (such as
price-fixing), the facts of the underlying activity must be pleaded with
particularity under the PSLRA and Rule 9(b).586 In practical terms, this
required plaintiffs to allege with particularity the elements of an antitrust
conspiracy: (1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) in restraint of
trade; (3) affecting interstate commerce.587 In this case, plaintiffs failed to
satisfy their pleading burden. District courts in other poultry EDSL have
similarly granted motions to dismiss because plaintiffs failed to plead with
particularity the facts of the underlying antitrust violation.588
581. Id.
582. Dave Simpson, DOJ Subpoenas Tyson Amid Chicken Industry Antitrust Probe,
LAW360 (Aug. 5, 2019, 11:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1185150 [https://perma
.cc/3VR9-W4BJ].
583. Matthew Perlman, DOJ Probing Chicken Industry for Anti-Competitive Conduct,
LAW360 (June 25, 2019, 7:46 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1172909 [https://perma
.cc/8TAP-TMTN]. Some of the cases have settled. Christopher Cole, Three More Chicken
Cos. Settle Price-Fix Suit for $13M, LAW360 (Dec. 12, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.law360
.com/articles/1227712 [https://perma.cc/XWA8-GKQA]. Other cases were centralized in
2020 in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. See In re Broiler Chicken Grower Antitrust Litig.
(No. II), 509 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (J.P.M.L. 2020).
584. See Tom Polansek, U.S. Indicts Six More Chicken-Industry Executives over Alleged
Price-Fixing, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2020, 11:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usapoultry-charges/u-s-indicts-six-more-chicken-executives-over-alleged-price-fixing-idINKB
N26S31M [https://perma.cc/T3CW-BJTE] (reporting issuance of expanded superseding
indictment).
585. Gamm v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 944 F.3d 455 (2d Cir. 2019).
586. Id. at 466–67.
587. Maric v. St. Agnes Hosp. Corp., 65 F.3d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1995).
588. See In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 16-cv-5340, 2018 WL 1598670, at *9
(W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2018) (dismissing action with prejudice in part because proposed
amended complaint failed to allege with particularity facts forming bedrock of alleged
antitrust conspiracy); Hogan v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 16-cv-02611-RBJ, 2018 WL
1316979 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 2018) (dismissing action mainly because plaintiff failed to plead
underlying antitrust conspiracy with sufficient particularity). The court subsequently
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Class actions alleging securities violations by companies in the generic
drug industry that are the subject of DOJ and state price-fixing investigations
and enforcement actions further illustrate key issues that arise in this
category of EDSL.589 The generic drug market in the United States is huge—
approximately 90% of prescriptions filled are for generic drugs,590 which are
as safe and effective as their brand-name equivalents.591 The U.S. generic
drug market was valued at approximately $130 billion in 2020592 and the top
five generic companies—measured by global market share—are Teva,
Sandoz, Mylan, Pfizer, and Sun.593
The DOJ began investigating the generic drug industry for anticompetitive conduct at least as early as November 2014, subpoenas were
issued to several manufacturers and individual executives shortly
thereafter,594 and by 2020 the DOJ had indicted five companies and multiple
pharmaceutical industry executives. Most of the federal enforcement actions
against defendant drug companies have been resolved with DPAs that spare
the companies criminal convictions, while executives have typically entered

dismissed plaintiffs’ second amended complaint in Pilgrim’s Pride, based on the statute of
repose. Hogan v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 16-cv-02611, 2021 WL 1534602 (D. Colo. Apr.
16, 2021). See also United Food and Commercial Workers Int’l Union Local 464A v.
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 20-cv-01966-RM-MEH, 2022 WL 684169 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2022)
(dismissing consolidated amended class action complaint with prejudice, in a similar case
involving some of the same parties).
589. See generally Kevin LaCroix, Generic Drug Companies Hit with Antitrust
Enforcement Follow-On Securities Suits, D&O DIARY (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.dandodia
ry.com/2016/11/articles/securities-litigation/generic-drug-companies-hit-antitrust-enforceme
nt-follow-securities-suits/ [https://perma.cc/6DSY-NKX7] (discussing generic drug EDSL).
590. Generic Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/d
rugs/buying-using-medicine-safely/generic-drugs [https://perma.cc/AHJ2-JB7G].
591. Andrew W. Mulcahy, Price-Fixing Case Reveals Vulnerability of Generic Drug
Policies, RAND BLOG (July 15, 2019), https://www.google.com/search?q=Price-Fixing+
Case+Reveals+Vulnerability+of+Generic+Drug+Policies&oq=Price-Fixing+Case+Reveals
+Vulnerability+of+Generic+Drug+Policies&aqs=chrome..69i57.5551j0j4&sourceid=chrom
e&ie=UTF-8 [https://perma.cc/MWZ8-D7UF].
592. IMARC, US Generic Drug Market Industry Trends, Share, Size, Growth,
Opportunity and Forecast 2021–2026, https://www.imarcgroup.com/us-generics-market (last
visited Oct. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/82VV-998C].
593. Charles-André Brouwers, Lu Chen, Mark Lubkeman & Brian Bush, Boston
Consulting Group, The Paths to Value for US Generics (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.bcg.co
m/en-us/publications/2020/paths-to-value-for-united-states-generics [https://perma.cc/SZC2BXBL].
594. See Kevin LaCroix, Generic Drug Companies Hit with Antitrust Enforcement
Follow-On Securities Suits, D&O DIARY (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.c
om/2016/11/articles/securities-litigation/generic-drug-companies-hit-antitrust-enforcementfollow-securities-suits/ [https://perma.cc/E8BL-JXAA] (discussing generic drug EDSL).

606

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

guilty pleas.595
The DOJ did not act alone. The Attorneys General of 20 states filed a
civil action in 2016596 and subsequently filed two amended complaints
alleging market allocation and price fixing in the generic drug market. The
most recent amended complaint, filed in June 2020, identified 46 states, the
District of Columbia, and four U.S. territories as plaintiffs and 26 companies
and ten individuals as defendants. Whereas the DOJ criminal action
encompassed a narrow subset of generic drugs,597 the civil action was
expansive. The amended complaint by the Attorneys General added 80
additional generic drugs to the existing lengthy list of pharmaceuticals—
including those used to treat HIV, cancer, and depression—for which most
of the industry was accused of fixing prices.598 The litigation to some extent
modeled prior tobacco and opioid cases and has been described as targeting
“most likely the largest cartel in the history of the United States.”599 The
litigation is proceeding as an MDL that also includes private plaintiffs.600
Share prices of the pharmaceutical companies receiving DOJ subpoenas
sharply declined and securities class actions followed, beginning in 2016.601
The complaints in the EDSL often allege that during the class period
defendants artificially inflated their share price by falsely attributing their
excellent financial results to astute business strategies rather than collusive
increases in generic drug prices.602

595. Jeffrey May, Antitrust News: Fifth Pharmaceutical Company Charged in Generic
Drug Price Fixing Probe, WOLTERS KLUWER ANTITRUST LAW DAILY (July 6, 2020).
596. Bryan Koening, AGs Pile on Generic Cos. with 3rd Price-Fixing Complaint, LAW360
(June 10, 2020, 7:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1281659/ags-pile-on-genericscos-with-3rd-price-fixing-complaint [https://perma.cc/N9R9-DWJK]
597. Bryan Koenig, Glenmark, Teva Say DOJ ‘Rewriting’ Price-Fixing Indictment,
LAW360 (Aug. 9. 2021, 9:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1410990
[https://perma.cc/T4AB-A4M9].
598. Bryan Koening, AGs Pile on Generic Cos. with 3rd Price-Fixing Complaint, LAW360
(June 10, 2020, 7:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1281659 [https://perma.cc/5ZH
A-23ZP].
599. Christopher Rowland, Generic Drug Industry Is Riddled with Price-Fixing Schemes,
Investigators Say, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018, 4:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/busines
s/la-fi-generic-drugs-prices-20181213-story.html [https://perma.cc/XMT4-GZTN] (quoting
Joseph Nielsen, Connecticut Assistant Attorney General).
600. In re Generic Pharm. Pricing Antitrust Litig., No. 2:16-md-02724 (E.D. Pa. July 13,
2020).
601. Kevin LaCroix, Generic Drug Companies Hit with Antitrust Enforcement Follow-On
Securities Suits, D&O DIARY (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/11/articles
/securities-litigation/generic-drug-companies-hit-antitrust-enforcement-follow-securitiessuits/ [https://perma.cc/2P86-YTJ9].
602. See, e.g., Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board v. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., 432 F.
Supp. 3d 131, 143 (D. Conn. 2019):
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Plaintiffs have fared significantly better in this line of EDSL than in the
poultry cases. Some of the litigation settled early.603 Numerous other cases
proceeded after denials of motions to dismiss and some classes were
certified. In March 2021 the federal district court in Connecticut certified a
class of investors in Teva Pharmaceuticals in antitrust EDSL. Teva also is a
defendant in the state antitrust litigation and its U.S. subsidiary was
criminally charged in August 2020 by the DOJ for conduct relating to its
alleged collusion to fix certain generic drug prices.604 Plaintiffs in the
certified class allege that Teva was able to leverage its stock price, inflated
by its collusive behavior, to help finance a $40 billion purchase in 2016 of
Actavis, which is the worldwide generics business of Allergan.605
Prior to certification the court largely denied defendants’ motion to
dismiss. The court determined that Teva, incorporated in Israel, failed to
comply with Item 5 of SEC Form 20-F (which is applicable to certain foreign
private issuers and requires the same disclosures as Item 303) by failing to
disclose the price-based nature of its profits.606 The court also rejected
arguments that (1) Teva’s statements were forward-looking, insofar as they
discussed past performance but omitted pricing as a profit factor, and (2)
mere puffery, insofar as statements that the company faced “fierce
competition” were actionable, given the collusive nature of the generic drug
market.607 However, the court rejected the argument that Teva was obligated
to disclose two subpoenas from the DOJ and Connecticut Attorney General,
because federal securities laws do not require disclosure of uncharged,
unadjudicated misconduct, and the case subsequently settled for $420
million in January 2022.608
Plaintiffs basically allege that the defendants implemented ‘a strategy to
systematically raise generic drug prices across a large swath of Teva’s generic
drug portfolio,’ which the plaintiffs refer to as the ‘Price-Hike
Strategy. . . . According to the plaintiffs, however, the defendants failed to reveal
the actual reason for the company’s financial success, and attributed the growth
to ‘fundamental business strategies’ such as cost-cutting and ‘good product
management.’
603. See, e.g., Jeff Montgomery, Lannett Drug Price-Fixing Settlement Gets Del. Judge’s
OK, LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020, 10:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1322250 [https:
//perma.cc/86GR-3438] (describing settlement in generic drug EDSL against Lannett
Company).
604. In re Teva Sec. Litig., No. 17-cv-558, 2021 WL 872156 (D. Conn. Mar. 9, 2021).
605. Id. at *2.
606. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Bd. v. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., 432 F. Supp. 3d 131,
163–64 (D. Conn. 2019).
607. Id. at 166.
608. Id. at 167; Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and Providing for Class Notice,
In re Teva Sec. Litig., No. 3:17-cv-00558 (SRU) (Jan. 27, 2022).
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The federal district court in New Jersey denied a motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint in a different securities class action that named
as defendants Allergan, six of its top executives, and the board of directors.609
The amended complaint alleged that Allergan conspired to increase the
prices of six generic drugs—some by as much as 7,000%—and made
materially false statements or omissions about the conspiracy.610 In resolving
the motion to dismiss the court first determined that plaintiffs plausibly
alleged that Allergan participated in a price-fixing conspiracy.611 The court
so held without applying a stricter standard requiring specificity in pleading
the underlying anticompetitive conduct.
The Allergan court next examined whether plaintiffs adequately alleged
material misstatements or omissions, premised on defendants’ failure to
disclose the underlying alleged anticompetitive conduct. The court, citing
Matrixx, rejected defendants’ argument that Allergan’s statements were nonactionable puffery and concluded that plaintiffs’ allegations sufficed.612
Allergan had made repeated representations that its ability to raise prices was
attributable to such factors as its strong supply chain, the reliability of highquality supply, its diverse portfolio, and the uniqueness of its pipeline and
product line, when its price-fixing scheme was driving the price increases
for its generic drugs.613 The court held, consistent with a line of prior
decisions,614 that statements crediting revenues to legitimate business factors
put the source of the revenue at issue, thereby making the company’s failure
to disclose a source of that revenue misleading.615 As noted supra, this same
issue has arisen in the foreign bribery event-driven cases. The court also
held that Allergan’s statements minimizing the significance of the on-going
federal investigation were misleading, and, if the company was engaged in
price-fixing for any drugs, a federal investigation into such conduct would
be material.616
609. In re Allergan Generic Drug Pricing Sec. Litig., Civ. Action No. 16-9449, 2019 WL
3562134 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2019).
610. Id. at *6–9.
611. Id. at *6.
612. Id. at *7–11.
613. Id.
614. See, e.g., Steiner v. MedQuist, Inc., No. 04-5487, 2006 WL 2827740, at *16 (D.N.J.
Sept. 29, 2006) (holding that statements attributing revenues to legitimate business factors
such as increased sales were misleading because they failed to disclose defendants’ illicit
billing scheme).
615. 2019 WL 3562134, at *10.
616. Id. In January 2021 the DOJ moved to intervene in this litigation. See Bill Wichert,
Feds Want in on Allergan Collusion Suit amid Criminal Probe, LAW360 (Jan. 6, 2021, 3:02
PM), https://www.law360.com/lifesciences/articles/1342188/feds-want-in-on-allergan-collu
sion-suit-amid-criminal-probe [https://perma.cc/2LKW-NN4K].
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In July 2021 Allergan settled for $130 million while the investors’
motion for class certification was pending.617 This was the first such deal
struck in the generic drug price-fixing EDSL,618 and it likely constituted a
harbinger of future outcomes in other such cases. To date, federal district
court decisions in at least four other actions in the generic drug EDSL have
been mostly favorable to plaintiffs, and additional settlements would be
unsurprising.
First, in litigation against generic manufacturer Taro, the court largely
denied the motion to dismiss, after crediting information supplied by CWs
and holding that Taro had placed the source of its profitability at issue
without disclosing the underlying collusion.619 Second, in litigation against
Mylan and several of its officers, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that
the company’s Code of Conduct and Business Ethics—which stated that
Mylan was committed to complying with applicable antitrust and fair
competition laws—was materially misleading for failing to disclose the
company’s anticompetitive conduct.620 The court categorized this statement
as non-actionable puffery.621 However, the court also held that Mylan’s
statements about its net income and revenue were materially misleading
insofar as such metrics were inflated by virtue of its anticompetitive
activity,622 and it found information supplied by a CW adequate to support
an allegation of scienter as to price-fixing.623 The court later certified an
investor class in 2020.624
Third, in litigation against McKesson Corporation (a pharmaceutical
wholesaler), the court denied a motion to dismiss after holding that defendant
had a duty to disclose that some portion of its increased profits was
attributable to collusive activity.625 The key to this holding was that
617. Bill Wichert, Allergan Strikes $130M Deal over Drug Price-Fixing Claims, LAW360
(July 12, 2021, 4:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/newjersey/articles/1402298 [https://per
ma.cc/7PZF-NP92].
618. Id. The court subsequently denied a motion to dismiss in opt-out litigation against
Allergan. TIAA-CREF Large-Cap Growth Fund v. Allergan PLC, No. 17-cv-11089, 2021
WL 4473156 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2021).
619. Speakes v. Taro Pharm. Indus., Ltd., No. 16-cv-08318 (ALC), 2018 WL 4572987, at
*6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2018).
620. In re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig., No. 16-CV-7926, 2018 WL 1595985, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 28, 2018).
621. Id.
622. Id. at *6.
623. Id. at *17.
624. In re Mylan N.V. Sec. Litig., No. 16-CV-7926, 2020 WL 1673811 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6,
2020).
625. Evanston Police Pension Fund v. McKesson Corp., 411 F. Supp. 3d 580, 599–600
(N.D. Cal. 2019).
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McKesson had placed the source of its profitability at issue without
disclosing the underlying illegality.626 The court also held that scienter was
adequately pled, in large part on the basis of the so-called core operations
doctrine.627 Specifically, the magnitude of the price-fixing conspiracy and
its significance to McKesson’s revenues, in combination with the defendant
executives’ leadership roles at the company (CEO and CFO, respectively)
and their statements touting their knowledge of the generics markets,
sufficed to warrant application of the doctrine.628
Finally, a trio of decisions by the federal district court in antitrust EDSL
against Lannett Company and its former CEO and CFO also underscores the
key issues discussed above. In the first decision, issued in 2018, the court
granted a motion to dismiss after steeply discounting information supplied
by CWs and rejecting application of the core operations doctrine.629 In the
second decision, issued in 2019, the court denied a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ third amended complaint, which asserted a modified theory of
liability. This time plaintiffs abandoned their argument that defendants
misrepresented their own anticompetitive conduct in favor of the successful
allegation that defendants misled investors by stating that generic drug price
increases were the result of competitive market forces, despite knowing that
the market was being driven by their competitors’ antitrust violations.630 The
626. Id.
627. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Messy Mental Markers: Inferring
Scienter from Core Operations in Securities Fraud Litigation, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 507 (2012)
(analyzing core operations doctrine).
628. McKesson Corp., 411 F. Supp. 3d at 601. Subsequently, an investor class was
certified and McKesson was granted partial summary judgment, with respect to one of two
corrective disclosures. Evanston Police Pension Fund v. McKesson Corp., No. 18-cv-06525CRB, 2021 WL 4902420 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2021).
629. Utesch v. Lannett Co., 316 F. Supp. 3d 895, 904–06 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
630. Utesch v. Lannett Co., 385 F. Supp. 3d 408, 418–21 (E.D. Pa. 2019). But see
Plymouth Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Patterson Cos., Inc., No. 18-cv-871, 2019 WL 3336119, at *15
(D. Minn. July 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted as modified, 2019 WL
4277302 (Sept. 10, 2019) (rejecting argument that where defendants touted their success in
“highly competitive” dental supply market, they were required to disclose their scheme to fix
dental supply prices). It is difficult to understand how defendants’ statement was not
misleading in this case. Cf. Pelletier v. Endo Int’l PLC, 439 F. Supp. 3d 450, 465–66 (E.D.
Pa. 2020) (citing first two decisions in Utesch, rejecting argument that defendants’ failure to
disclose their participation in conspiracy to fix generic drug prices constituted securities fraud,
and accepting argument that defendants’ statements about market conditions, sources of
revenue, and pricing decisions were actionable). The court subsequently certified an investor
class in Endo. See Pelletier v. Endo Int’l PLC, No. 17-cv-5114, 2021 WL 2023608 (E.D. Pa.
May 20, 2021) (certifying class). The Endo litigation settled for $63 million in October 2021.
Craig Clough, Endo Investors Ink $63M Deal in Generics Stock Inflation Suit, LAW360 (Oct.
15, 2021, 10:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1431670 [https://perma.cc/MVZ576L7].
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court also rejected defendants’ arguments that their statements were mere
puffery and the core operations inference was inapplicable.631 In the third
decision, issued in August 2021, the court certified the class.632
To date, the generic drug EDSL has produced a single appellate
decision, which was favorable to plaintiffs. In a pair of lower court decisions
in securities litigation against generic drug manufacturer Impax Laboratories
the Northern District of California granted motions to dismiss, ultimately
with prejudice. In the first decision the court rejected application of the core
operations inference, because the complaint failed to allege that defendant
executives knew of the alleged collusion.633 In the second decision, issued
after plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, the court deemed
plaintiff’s loss causation allegations insufficient as to price-fixing, because
neither the issuance of a DOJ subpoena for four generic medications nor the
disclosure of an investigation constituted the requisite corrective disclosures
linked to stock price declines.634 But on appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed in
part, in 2021, holding that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded loss causation
as to their price-fixing theory.635 The litigation subsequently settled for $33
million.636
What conclusions can be drawn from the antitrust EDSL? First, one of
the primary obstacles for plaintiffs in these cases is the requirement to prove
an antitrust conspiracy—a case within a case. If plaintiffs must plead with
particularity the underlying collusive conduct this may be outcomedeterminative for motions to dismiss. Second, there has been non-uniform
application by courts of the core operations doctrine, likely because its
contours are poorly defined. Third, successful use by plaintiffs of CWs to
allege scienter can hinge on whether courts accept the proposition that
information supplied by such witnesses should always be deeply discounted.
Fourth, a fruitful falsity theory is likely to be that defendants placed the
source of their profitability at issue without disclosing the underlying

631. Utesch v. Lannett Co., 385 F. Supp. 3d 408, 421-24 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
632. Utesch v. Lannett Co., No. 16-5932, 2021 WL 35609949, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12,
2021) (certifying class).
633. Fleming v. Impax Labs. Inc., No. 16-cv-06557-HSG, 2018 WL 4616291, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 7, 2018).
634. New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Ass’n of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund
v. Impax Labs Inc., No. 16-cv-06557-HSG, 2019 WL 3779262, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
2019).
635. New York Hotel Trades Council & Hotel Ass’n of New York City, Inc. Pension Fund
v. Impax Labs Inc., No. 19-16744, 2021 WL 81719 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 2021).
636. Melissa Angell, Impax Inks $33M Deal with Investors in Price-Fixing Suit, LAW360
(Aug. 2, 2021, 7:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1408921 [https://perma.cc/H676967Z].
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collusion. Fifth, it does not suffice to plead scienter for plaintiffs to merely
allege the existence of a government investigation concerning anticompetitive conduct, and the disclosure of such investigations does not
establish loss causation. Sixth, plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the puffery
argument if defendants’ statements directly conflict with the collusive nature
of the product market.
E. #MeToo
The #MeToo movement simultaneously has had a major impact on
corporate America and has constituted another EDSL catalyst.637 The
movement began on a limited basis in 2007638 but did not become prominent
until 2017, when sexual assault allegations against entertainment mogul
Harvey Weinstein surfaced. Even before the movement coalesced,
shareholders pursued occasional derivative and securities fraud class actions
in response to sexual harassment scandals. These pioneering actions—
commencing in 1998 with a derivative suit involving ICN Pharmaceuticals639
and continuing with both derivative and class action litigation involving
Hewlett-Packard in 2012—failed.640
The #MeToo movement and recent scandals in a spectrum of industries
have sparked a new, somewhat more successful generation of litigation641
that constitutes a significant subset of EDSL. In 2019, at least ten new
actions asserting securities law claims based on corporate sexual misconduct
were commenced, consistent with both the rate of filings in 2018 and 2017642
637. Karen Y. Bitar & Sarah Fedner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Recent Developments in
Securities Litigation: The “Event Driven” #MeToo Lawsuit (June 10, 2019), https://www.se
yfarth.com/print/content/22734/recent-developments-in-securities-litigation-the-eventdriven-metoo-lawsuit.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW2S-D75X].
638. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1147 n.2 (2019).
639. See White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001) (affirming dismissal of derivative
action involving alleged sexual misconduct by CEO of ICN).
640. See Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d 961 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 845 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir 2017) (affirming
dismissal of securities fraud action involving sexual misconduct by former Hewlett-Packard
CEO); Zucker v. Andreessen, No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del. Ch. 2012) (dismissing
derivative action).
641. See Jyotin Hamid, Tricia Sherno & Brooke Willig, #MeToo’s Unexpected
Implications for Shareholder Litigation, LAW360 (May 15, 2020, 5:28 PM), https://www
.law360.com/articles/1269565 [https://perma.cc/QK6U-BP8V] (describing evolution of
litigation).
642. Susan L. Saltzstein & Jocelyn E. Strauber, #MeToo Litigation: The Changing
Landscape, a Year Later, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 13, 2020). https://www.law.com/newyorklawjourn
al/2020/03/27/metoo-litigation-the-changing-landscape-a-year-later/ [https://perma.cc/Q2AT
4KW8] [hereinafter A Year Later].
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and predictions made when the #MeToo movement began in earnest.643
Additional actions began in subsequent years. For example, the S&P 500
video gaming giant, Activision Blizzard (responsible for Call of Duty, World
of Warcraft, and Candy Crush), and three of its top executives were targets
of #MeToo EDSL that kicked off in August 2021 after news about alleged
pervasive sexual discrimination and harassment at the company surfaced and
its share price dropped 6%.644 The foregoing judicial developments have
taken place in tandem with legislative activity. Since 2017, at least fifteen
states have passed new laws protecting against workplace sexual
harassment.645
EDSL in the #MeToo sector typically concerns public statements issued
by a corporation—often in codes of conduct—with respect to company
values, integrity, and adherence to ethical standards, compared with
directors’ and officers’ alleged knowledge of behavior and practices within
the company that undercut such policies.646 The complaints often allege that
subsequent disclosure of the true facts led to a stock price decline and harmed
investors. Alternatively, the complaints allege that the company engaged in
a cover-up of the abuse, failed to take adequate steps to address it, or failed
to truthfully disclose what steps it did or did not take to deter, investigate, or
curb the problem after allegations of abuse became public.
In contrast, the derivative actions generally allege that the company’s
directors and officers breached their fiduciary duties or wasted corporate
assets when they ignored the hostile work environment caused by sexual
harassment, failed to remedy the situation, and then incurred subsequent
severance and settlement payments and litigation costs. Derivative actions
based on #MeToo misconduct have been filed against Google’s parent
company Alphabet, CBS, Liberty Tax, Lululemon Athletica, McDonald’s,
National Beverage, Nike, Twenty-First Century Fox, Victoria’s Secret
parent company L Brands, and Wynn Resorts, among others.647 The
643. See Dunstan Prial, Attorneys Predict Wave of #MeToo Investor Suits, LAW360 (Feb.
14, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1012534 [https://perma.cc/E865AQPY] (reporting expected wave of #MeToo EDSL).
644. See Complaint, Cheng v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. 21-cv-06240 (C.D. Cal. filed
Aug. 3, 2021). The company confirmed in September 2021 that an SEC investigation was
proceeding in tandem with the securities litigation. See Amanda Ottaway, A Cheat Sheet for
Activision Blizzard’s Legal Woes, LAW360 (Sept. 21, 2021, 9:41 PM), https://www.law
360.com/articles/1423693 [https://perma.cc/CE8Z-PEL7] (reporting SEC investigation).
645. Erik A. Christiansen, How Are the Laws Sparked by #MeToo Affecting Workplace
Harassment?, 45 ABA LITIG. NEWS 11, 11 (2020).
646. Susan L. Saltzstein & Jocelyn E. Strauber, #MeToo Litigation: The Changing
Landscape, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1, 2019, https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/02/28/m
etoo-litigation-the-changing-landscape/ [https://perma.cc/6PDB-US3V].
647. See Scott Carlton, ABA Practice Points, The #MeToo Movement and the Shareholder

614

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

derivative action involving Alphabet settled in 2020 for a nominal $310
million—which in dollar terms was the largest-ever shareholder derivative
settlement,648 the derivative action against L Brands settled in 2021 for a
nominal $90 million,649 and the derivative action against Fox settled in 2017
for $90 million.650
In multiple instances dual class and derivative actions have been filed
against the same company based on overlapping #MeToo factual allegations,
consistent with a recent pattern in securities litigation. In 2020, 55% of
settled securities class actions involved an accompanying derivative
action.651 The #MeToo derivative settlements also reflect another recent
trend in derivative litigation overall—beginning in the mid-2010s—in which
settlements include a significant cash payment.
Historically, such
settlements only encompassed defendant’s agreement to adopt certain
governance reforms and to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.652 Now such
settlements often include those features as well as a major cash payment. In
L Brands, for example, defendant agreed in July 2021 to adopt multiple
management and governance reforms—including supplementation of its
existing code of conduct with standalone policies on sexual harassment—
Derivative Action, American Bar Ass’n (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/litigation/committees/class-actions/practice/2019/me-too-movement-lawsuits-shareholderderivative-action/ [https://perma.cc/AJV2-QZBU] (discussing multiple #MeToo derivative
actions); Hailey Konnath, Victoria’s Secret Plagued by ‘Abusive’ Culture, Investor Says,
LAW360 (June 18, 2020, 10:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1284003 [https://per
ma.cc/LA7C-E9TF] (discussing L Brands #MeToo derivative actions in Ohio and Delaware);
J. Edward Moreno, New McDonald’s Suit Widens Stockholder Sex Scandal Probe, LAW360
(Aug. 6, 2021, 7:14 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/delaware/articles/1410576 [https://
perma.cc/5SSX-PMPF] (discussing McDonald’s litigation).
648. Kevin LaCroix, Alphabet Establishes $310 Million Fund in Google Sexual
Misconduct Lawsuit Settlement, D&O DIARY (Sept. 27, 2020), https://www.dandodia
ry.com/2020/09/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/alphabet-agrees-to-310-millionfund-in-google-sexual-misconduct-lawsuit-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/6FEZ-37UD]. The
settlement will be funded over ten years, so the present value is less than $310 million.
649. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Rudi v. Wexner, No. 2:20-cv-3068 (S.D.
Ohio filed July 30, 2021).
650. Mark Lebovitch, Settlement of Workplace Harassment Suit at 21st Century Fox,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 19, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2
017/12/19/settlement-of-workplace-harassment-suit-at-21st-century-fox/ [https://perma.cc/L
KL6-CZ8V].
651. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2020 REVIEW
AND ANALYSIS 10 (2021), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Cla
ss-Action-Settlements-2020-Review-and-Analysis [https://perma.cc/W8GG-SZK5].
652. See Priya Cherian Huskins, Five Types of Derivative Suits with Massive Settlements,
Woodruff Sawyer (Oct. 13, 2020), https://woodruffsawyer.com/do-notebook/five-derivativesuits-types-massive-settlements [https://perma.cc/KK2C-VLLV] (observing that vast
majority of derivative suits settle with no cash payment other than payment of attorneys’ fees).
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and to fund these reforms with $90 million over the course of at least five
years.653
Not coincidentally, the number of public companies mentioning
“sexual harassment” in risk factor disclosures also has spiked in recent years,
despite the absence of any specific securities law requirement to disclose
internal sexual harassment investigations. More than half of such disclosures
in the last two decades (approximately 60 of 117) appeared after 2017.654
Companies make such non-mandatory disclosures for multiple practical
reasons, including a desire to preemptively shape the narrative about the
alleged abusive conduct.655
The disclosure rules most likely applicable to sexual harassment
investigations include Items 103 and 303, but even these provisions may
have little significance. Item 103 requires disclosure of both material legal
proceedings currently pending against a company and any such proceedings
known to be contemplated by governmental authorities, but it does not
specifically require disclosure of internal sexual misconduct
investigations.656 Moreover, no disclosure is required if there is a proceeding
involving primarily a claim for damages but the amount involved does not
exceed 10% of the current assets of the company and its subsidiaries.657 An
aggregation rule requires companies to count toward the 10% threshold all
proceedings that present in large degree the same legal and factual issues,658
but very few #MeToo cases will involve damage claims that exceed the 10%
threshold, even if aggregated.659
Item 303 requires disclosure of known trends and uncertainties that that
have had or that the company reasonably expects will have a material
favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues from continuing

653. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, Rudi v. Wexner, No. 20-cv-3068 (S.D.
Ohio filed July 30, 2021).
654. A Year Later, supra note 642.
655. Deborah Birnbach, Jennifer Fay & Dylan Schweers, The Securities Law Questions
Raised by #MeToo, LAW360 (Feb. 28, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/10
15772 [https://perma.cc/2945-77ZV].
656. Spencer Feldman, Securities Law Blog, Reporting Sexual Misconduct Allegations
May Not Be Ready for SEC Disclosure Yet but Should Be Part of the Conversation, OLSHAN
(Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.olshanlaw.com/pp/blogpost-reporting-sexual-misconduct-alleg
ations-may-not-be.pdf?79491 [https://perma.cc/V9KE-L9YS] (observing that adverse
investigatory findings concerning sexual misconduct “neither rise to the level of pending legal
proceedings for purposes of Item 103, nor are they deemed to constitute the initial stage of
pending legal proceedings”).
657. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103(b)(2) (2021).
658. Id.
659. Hemel & Lund, supra note 231, at 1650–51.
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operations.660 Allegations of sexual harassment against a CEO or other top
executive may have such an effect and thus be subject to mandatory
disclosure.661 This conclusion is suggested by research demonstrating that
sexual harassment leads to lower productivity and higher rates of employee
absenteeism and turnover,662 as well as by the potential litigation costs
stemming from #MeToo claims.
One analysis, published in 2018, concluded that “the viability of
securities law claims against companies that fail to disclose the extent of
corporate sexual misconduct will be case specific,” and plaintiffs are likely
to fare best in those cases in which defendants have made inaccurate specific
statements about ongoing litigation.663 With the benefit of hindsight we can
assess the accuracy of that conclusion by examining how plaintiffs fared in
#MeToo EDSL from 2018–2020.
The results have been decidedly mixed, with decisions rendered in
separate putative class actions involving defendants CBS, Liberty Tax,
National Beverage, Papa John’s, Signet Jewelers, Uber, and Wynn Resorts.
Plaintiffs achieved their greatest success in the Signet litigation, which
settled for $240 million in 2020664 after the federal district court denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss the fifth amended complaint665 and motion for
judgment on the pleadings,666 and then certified an investor class.667 Signet
sought leave to appeal to the Second Circuit in an effort to obtain a Cignaesque ruling, and the Second Circuit granted leave, but the appeal was
withdrawn following a successful mediation.668 As of December 31, 2020,
the Signet settlement ranked among the top seventy-five securities class
action settlements of all-time.669
The primary issue presented by the motion for judgment on the
pleadings was whether statements in Signet’s Code of Conduct and Code of
660. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(2021).
661. Birnbach, Fay & Schweers, supra note 655.
662. Hemel & Lund, supra note 231, at 1652.
663. Id. at 1654–55.
664. Dean Seal, Signet’s $240M Investor Settlement Gets Final OK, LAW360 (July 21,
2020, 7:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1294237 [https://perma.cc/ZS97-97PX]
[hereinafter Signet Settlement].
665. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 16 Civ. 6728 (CM), 2018 WL 6167889
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018).
666. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., 389 F. Supp. 3d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
667. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 16 Civ. 6728, 2019 WL 3001084 (S.D.N.Y.
July 10, 2019).
668. Signet Settlement, supra note 664.
669. Sarah Jarvis, Investor Settlements Held Steady in 2020 Despite Pandemic, LAW360
(Feb. 25, 2021, 9:50 PM), https://www.law360.com/banking/articles/1358941 [https://perma.
cc/H3H5-PV4X].
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Ethics constituted non-actionable puffery and were therefore immaterial as
a matter of law, pursuant to the decision in Cigna, which had been issued by
the Second Circuit a few months earlier. The federal district court firmly
rejected Signet’s argument, stating:
Cigna did not purport to change the well-established law regarding
materiality. It did not announce a new legal rule, let alone one
deeming an entire category of statements — those contained in a
company’s code of conduct — per se inactionable. . . .
Significantly, Cigna did not rule (as Defendants imply) that all
statements in codes of conduct qualify as ‘puffery.’670
The district court concluded that context matters, consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decisions in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.671 and
Basic Inc. v. Levinson.672 And in Signet, the facts starkly differed from those
alleged in Cigna. The statements in Cigna’s Code of Conduct were not
actionable because they were exceptionally vague and aspirational. In sharp
contrast, in the face of credible allegations (in a prior lawsuit) that Signet
suffered from rampant sexual harassment, the company sought to reassure
the investing public that it did not operate a toxic workplace. It did so by,
inter alia, including representations in its periodic SEC filings that it
expressly denied the allegations in the prior litigation and by falsely
affirming its fidelity to internal policies which committed the company to
making hiring decisions solely on the basis of merit, disciplining misconduct
in its ranks, and providing employees with a means to report sexual
harassment without fear of reprisal.673 As the court previously noted when it
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the fifth amended complaint,
“statements contained in a code of conduct are actionable where they are
directly at odds with the conduct alleged in a complaint.”674 When the court
denied the motion to dismiss it likewise found that plaintiff adequately
alleged that defendants made materially false or misleading statements in
violation of Item 103, insofar as the public disclosures made by Signet
mischaracterized the prior litigation, which alleged pervasive sexual
harassment that reached the highest offices in the company.675
Plaintiffs also experienced some success in the #MeToo EDSL
involving defendant CBS. In 2020 the federal district court denied in part
670. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., 389 F. Supp. 3d 229–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
671. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (7th Cir. 1976).
672. 389 F. Supp. 3d at 230–31.
673. Id. at 231.
674. In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 16 Civ. 6728, 2018 WL 6167889, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018).
675. Id.
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and granted in part a motion to dismiss the amended complaint in that case,
which concerned alleged sexual misconduct by former CBS CEO and
Chairman of the Board, Les Moonves.676 The court acknowledged that “it is
not the case that all statements in a code of conduct are categorically
immaterial puffery.”677 It then identified three situations in which courts
allowed statements in a code of conduct to survive a motion to dismiss: (1)
a company wielded its code to reassure investors that nothing was amiss
when faced with suspicions of internal malfeasance, (2) statements in the
code were sufficiently detailed and concrete that a reasonable investor could
rely upon them, and (3) the code included statements that were so anathema
to the alleged internal wrongdoing that, even if general or aspirational, they
were materially false.678
The CBS court then distinguished Signet and held that most of the
statements in CBS’s Business Conduct Statement (BCS) were mere puffery,
because they were far too general and aspirational to invite reasonable
reliance, and none were alleged to be false or misleading.679 The same was
true with respect to statements in CBS’s Code of Ethics.680 This holding is
dubious, because the court concluded that even such factual BCS statements
as CBS “will . . . take all steps” [and] “remedial action” [to stop] “sexual
harassment” were too general and disconnected from plaintiffs’ central
theory of securities fraud to be material.681 According to the court, no
reasonable investor would rely on these statements.682 It is not obvious that
this is correct.
The court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that Item 303 imposed on
CBS an affirmative duty to disclose its executives’ sexual misconduct. Item
303 requires disclosure where a trend, demand, commitment, event, or
uncertainty is both (1) presently known to management and (2) reasonably
likely to have material effects on the registrant’s financial conditions or
results of operations.683 Disclosure is required only with respect to those
trends and other topics that the registrant actually knows of when it files the
relevant report with the SEC.684 Item 303 disclosures most often relate to
micro- and macroeconomic issues, such as erosion of the registrant’s market
676. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for So. Cal. v. CBS Corp., No. 18-CV-7796, 2020 WL
248729 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2020).
677. Id. at *7.
678. Id.
679. Id. at *8–9.
680. Id. at *10.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015).
684. Indiana Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2016).
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share.685
In CBS the court rejected both defendants’ argument that information
about workplace sexual misconduct is categorically exempt from disclosure
under Item 303 and plaintiffs’ argument that Item 303 requires disclosure of
foreseeable events, such as the negative impact on CBS’s earnings or
revenues caused by the departure of Moonves. Defendants’ argument was
misplaced because Item 303 is intentionally general,686 and plaintiffs’
argument was misplaced because Item 303 only requires disclosure of
uncertainties that are more than foreseeable or possible.687 The court
concluded that CBS had no duty to disclose either the company’s alleged
hostile culture toward women or the percolating #MeToo accusations against
Moonves, because the amended complaint did not allege that the uncertain
futures of Moonves and other executives were reasonably likely to have an
impact on the company’s financial performance.688
So how did the amended complaint in CBS survive? The court allowed
the action to proceed based on a statement by Moonves at a major industry
event that “[#MeToo] is a watershed moment. . . . It’s important that a
company’s culture will not allow for this. And that’s the thing that’s farreaching. There’s a lot we’re learning. There’s a lot we didn’t know.”689
The court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged that this was a misleading
statement of material fact,690 and the statement could be imputed to CBS. In
effect, the amended complaint was saved by an allegation suggesting that
Moonves was deceptively trying to cover-up his own misconduct. In 2020
plaintiffs moved for class certification,691 and that motion was pending in
2021.
Plaintiffs barely survived the motion to dismiss in CBS, but in numerous
event-driven cases saving even one claim is plaintiffs’ primary objective.
Once the case proceeds beyond this juncture settlement odds dramatically
shorten. However, apart from Signet and CBS, plaintiffs have fared poorly
in #MeToo EDSL since 2018. Dismissals were granted (and sometimes
affirmed) in separate cases involving defendants Liberty Tax,692 National

685. 2020 WL 248729, at *14.
686. Id. at *15.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id. at *13.
690. Id.
691. Reenat Sinay, CBS Investors Seek Class Cert. in #MeToo Suit Over Moonves,
LAW360 (Aug. 3, 2020, 5:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1297627 [https://perma
.cc/X2YJ-KLA4].
692. In re Liberty Tax, Inc. Sec. Litig., 828 Fed. App’x 747 (2020).
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Beverage,693 Papa John’s,694 Uber,695 and Wynn Resorts,696 although leave to
amend was generally allowed.
Most of the foregoing decisions rejected as puffery those non-specific
or aspirational statements about corporate culture or representations set forth
in corporate codes of conduct, codes of ethics, or earnings calls. This was
true in Liberty Tax,697 Papa John’s,698 and Wynn Resorts.699 In Papa John’s,
the federal district court held that the “statements in the Code are
quintessential puffery,”700 rejected plaintiffs’ Item 303 argument because the
#MeToo risk was not a risk known to management,701 and dismissed the first
amended complaint. Leave to amend was granted, but in 2021 the court
dismissed the second amended complaint—this time with prejudice—on the
same grounds as before.702
In Wynn Resorts the federal district court in Nevada granted defendants’
motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. The court held that
statements in the company’s Code of Conduct were merely aspirational and,
citing the Ninth Circuit, stated that “investors do not rely on puffery when
making investment decisions.”703 Again, it is not clear that this latter point
is always true. Indeed, contrary empirical evidence suggests that investors
do not ignore vague optimism when making investment decisions.704 In any
event, the court granted leave to amend, and in July 2021 a different federal
judge granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. The court held that “[a]spirational
statements in a code of conduct are not misleading,”705 but it found that two
specific statements not set forth in the code were actionable. One was the
statement by defendant Stephen Wynn that “[t]he idea that I ever assaulted
693. Luczak v. Nat’l Bev. Corp., 812 Fed. App’x 915 (11th Cir. 2020).
694. Oklahoma Law Enf. Ret. Sys. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 3d 550
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
695. Irving Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund v. Uber Tech., 398 F. Supp. 3d 549 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
696. Ferris v. Wynn Resorts Ltd., 462 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (D. Nev. 2020).
697. 828 Fed. App’x at 750–51.
698. 444 F. Supp. 3d at 560.
699. 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1120–22.
700. 444 F. Supp. 3d at 560.
701. Id. at 564.
702. Oklahoma Law Enf. Ret. Sys. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., No. 198-CV-7927 (KMW),
2021 WL 371401 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2021).
703. 462 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (citing In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir.
2010)).
704. See Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them,
10 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 339 (2008) (critiquing the puffery doctrine).
705. Ferris v. Wynn Resorts Ltd., No. 18-cv-00479, 2021 WL 3216462, at *10 (D. Nev.
July 28, 2021).
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any woman is preposterous,” made in response to a Wall Street Journal
article revealing allegations about his sexual misconduct.706 As to loss
causation, the court, inter alia, found to be persuasive cases accepting the
inflation maintenance theory, in the absence of guidance from the Ninth
Circuit.707
In the meantime, the parallel Wynn Resorts #MeToo derivative action
settled for a cash payment of $41 million, plus corporate therapeutics and
governance reforms that plaintiffs’ expert valued at an additional $49
million.708 In addition, Wynn Resorts was fined $55 million for covering up
or ignoring the sexual abuse allegations against Wynn, its former CEO,
following investigations by the Nevada Gaming Control Board and the
Massachusetts Gaming Commission.709
Sexual harassment is pervasive in the workplace.710 Claims against
directors and officers arising from such misconduct can expose their
employers to EDSL, as well as to massive costs encompassing reputational
harm, consumer boycotts, declines in market capitalization, loss of corporate
opportunities, and legal expenses for internal investigations, regulatory
proceedings, and employment litigation.711 What are the lessons of #MeToo
EDSL to date? Primarily, it is difficult for a complaint to survive in these
cases. Most of the allegations concerning codes of conduct and ethics will
be treated as mere puffery and the outcome will often turn on whether the
subject statements are specific misrepresentations, rather than vague and
aspirational commentary. Items 101 and 303 are unlikely to be helpful to
plaintiffs.
Still, the litigation and the #MeToo movement have spurred
fundamental changes in corporate conduct. As noted, disclosures regarding
sexual harassment have become significantly more common. In the M&A
environment, representations in transaction documents that no harassment or
706. Id. at *7.
707. Id. at *19.
708. Kevin LaCroix, Dismissal Motion Granted in Wynn Resorts #MeToo-Related
Securities Suit, D&O DIARY (June 1, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/06/articles/se
curities-litigation/dismissal-motion-granted-in-wynn-resorts-metoo-related-securities-suit/
[https://perma.cc/3D9G-YPDE].
709. Sarah Jarvis, Wynn Resorts Can’t End Investors’ Revived Suit over Ex-CEO, LAW360
(July 30, 2021, 3:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1408074 [https://perma.cc/J86QXKFF].
710. See Michael D. Rebuck, Note, Sexual Misconduct & Securities Disclosure in the
“#MeToo” World, 75 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 105 (2020) (summarizing survey data
concerning harassment).
711. Kelly Bryant Thoerig, Pamela S. Palmer & Susan K. Lessack, #MeToo: Is Your
Company Covered?, TROUTMAN PEPPER (Nov. 2018), https://www.troutman.com/insights/
metoo-is-your-company-covered.html [https://perma.cc/M4AX-3R4C].
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assault allegations have been made against the acquired company’s senior
employees also have proliferated.712 From 2017–2020, the number of S&P
1500 corporations with all-male boards of directors dipped from 179 to 30,
and by 2020 no S&P 500 company retained an all-male board.713
Employment agreements for CEOs of S&P 1500 companies increasingly
include termination provisions that identify sexual harassment and
discrimination as grounds for cause.714 And the #MeToo movement has been
described as “stunningly effective in removing perpetrators from positions
of power.”715
The massive settlement in Signet may serve to attract additional
litigation in this sector, but potential #MeToo EDSL plaintiffs should be
cognizant that the magnitude of the Signet settlement was in large part a
function of the compelling allegations of misrepresentations and omissions
concerning losses in Signet’s in-house jewelry customer lending program
that accompanied the #MeToo allegations.716 #MeToo securities class
actions not involving accounting or financial fraud are unlikely to yield a
Signet-size settlement. Finally, it is important to underscore that derivative
suits stemming from #MeToo allegations also have produced multiple
plaintiff-friendly outcomes.717
F. Cybersecurity
The final category of EDSL analyzed herein concerns cybersecurity. In
2021 the World Economic Forum identified cybersecurity failure as a top
“clear and present danger” and critical global threat.718 Cyber threats are
712. A Year Later, supra note 642.
713. Mary Billings, April Klein & Yanting Shi, Investors’ Response to the #MeToo
Movement: Does Corporate Culture Matter?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept.
20, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/09/20/investors-response-to-the-metoomovement-does-corporate-culture-matter/ [https://perma.cc/6VCV-EY88].
714. Rachel Arnow-Richman, James Hicks & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Anticipating
Harassment: #MeToo and the Changing Norms of Executive Contracts, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 19, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/04/19/anticipati
ng-harassment-metoo-and-the-changing-norms-of-executive-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/7M
MC-ALK2].
715. Jessica A. Clarke, The Rules of #MeToo, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 37, 46.
716. See Kevin LaCroix, Signet Jewelers Settles #MeToo-Related Securities Suit for $240
Million, D&O DIARY (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/03/articles/securiti
es-litigation/signet-jewelers-settles-metoo-related-securities-suit-for-240-million/# [https://
perma.cc/HKZ2-MTXX] (highlighting the loan portfolio allegations in the Signet EDSL).
717. Id.
718. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2021, at 11 (16th ed. 2021),
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increasing in both scope and frequency, in part because the COVID-19
pandemic generated an abrupt transition to fully remote work for many
companies.719 According to one survey, at least 20% of companies, including
some of the world’s largest, suffered data breaches in 2020.720 A second
survey identified 1,108 data compromises in 2020, up from 785 in 2015 but
down from 1,632 in 2019.721 A third survey identified 846 compromises in
the first half of 2021, which projected to an annualized total that would be
the largest during the period 2015–2021.722
More than a quarter of companies that have been victimized by
cyberattacks have been victimized more than once, and by 2020 five large
companies had experienced seven or more cyberattacks—Facebook, Sony,
Amazon, Comcast, and T-Mobile.723 Indeed, large companies with a market
capitalization of at least $10 billion were most at risk for a cyberattack during
the period 2011–2021,724 and they now regard cyber breaches as a cost of
doing business. Item 105 of Regulation S-K requires a description of
material risks that impact a business, and a majority of companies choose to
disclose cybersecurity risks in the risk factors section of their periodic
reports. A 2020 survey of cybersecurity disclosures for 76 of the Fortune
100 companies from 2018 to May 2020 found that all of the companies
disclosed cybersecurity as a risk factor and only one company in 2020 did
not disclose data privacy as a risk factor.725 Cybersecurity also has become

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2021.pdf [https://perma.c
c/N6FW-J9A8].
719. Cara Peterman & Sierra Shear, Key Trends in Recent Cyber-Related Securities Class
Actions, LAW360 (Sept. 24, 2021, 4:16 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1423957
[https://perma.cc/JV5L-KZA9].
720. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, U.S. Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Outlook and
Review—2021, at 30 (2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/us-cybersecurity-and-data-privac
y-outlook-and-review-2021/ [https://perma.cc/3EMA-MKGA].
721. IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, Data Breach Report: 2020 in Review (Jan.
2021), https://www.idtheftcenter.org/identity-theft-resource-centers-2020-annual-data-breac
h-report-reveals-19-percent-decrease-in-breaches/ [https://perma.cc/3XW5-JM7Y].
722. IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, First Half 2021 Data Breach Analysis: Data
Compromises are Up, Individuals Impacted are Down 1 (July 2021), https://notif
ied.idtheftcenter.org/s/2021-first-half-data-breach-analysis [https://perma.cc/64XM-P5FC].
723. AUDIT ANALYTICS, Trends in Cybersecurity Breach Disclosures 10 (2020),
https://www.auditanalytics.com/audit-analytics-reports [https://perma.cc/K4QM-Y2AZ].
724. John Cheffers, Guest Post: Cybersecurity Incident and Litigation Review 2021, D&O
DIARY (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/08/articles/cyber-liability/guestpost-cybersecurity-incident-and-litigation-review-2021/ [https://perma.cc/2N8J-GDWW].
725. Steve W. Klemash, Jamie C. Smith & Chuck Seets, What Companies are Disclosing
About Cybersecurity Risk and Oversight, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 25,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/25/what-companies-are-disclosing-about-cy
bersecurity-risk-and-oversight/ [https://perma.cc/Y4YM-F6CC].
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a core component of ESG and sustainability-related frameworks.726
Cyber breaches have spawned substantial EDSL.727 From 2018–2019
approximately 50 securities lawsuits—many of which were class actions—
were filed following data security incidents,728 with plaintiffs alleging
inadequate pre-breach disclosure of cyber risks, overstatement of cyber
strengths, or delayed disclosure to the market following breach detection.729
Additional actions were commenced in 2020 and six cyber-related securities
class actions were filed from January–July 2021.730
One example is the securities class action filed in January 2021 after
the world’s most audacious and sophisticated cyberattack took place. This
attack was launched with the likely backing of the Russian government
against defendant SolarWinds, a network infrastructure management
company whose 300,000 global clients include most of the Fortune 500 as
well as all five branches of the U.S. military.731 The networks of
approximately 18,000 SolarWinds clients (including at least nine U.S.
federal agencies) were compromised, and in mid-2021—while the EDSL
was pending—the SEC was investigating whether corporate victims failed
to disclose the effects of the espionage on their businesses.732 The motion to
726. John F. Savarese, Sarah K. Eddy & Sabastian V. Niles, Cybersecurity Oversight and
Defense—A Board and Management Imperative, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
(May 14, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/14/cybersecurity-oversight-and-de
fense-a-board-and-management-imperative/ [https://perma.cc/9WLL-VV3Q].
727. See Peter Halprin, Pamela Woods & Nicole Pappas, Cybersecurity Event-Driven
Securities Litigation Has Arrived, LAW360 (Jan. 12, 2021, 5:59 PM), https://www.law
360.com/articles/1343650 [https://perma.cc/DPJ4-2QHA] (observing that EDSL “appears to
have arrived in the cybersecurity liability context”).
728. Brian Scarbrough, Caroline Meneau & Huiyi Chen, How to Navigate a Hardening
D&O Insurance Market, LAW360 (Oct. 6, 2020, 3:51 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/1317119 [https://perma.cc/U2JQ-J7BC].
729. See, e.g., In re Equifax Inc. Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1205 (N.D. Ga. 2019)
(“Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made multiple false or misleading
statements and omissions about the sensitive personal information in Equifax’s custody, the
vulnerability of its internal systems to cyberattack, and its compliance with data protection
laws and cybersecurity best practices.”).
730. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, Securities Class Action Filings: 2021 Midyear Assessment
5 (July 2021), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-ActionFilings-2021-Midyear-Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6SC-VFJN].
731. Complaint, Bremer v. SolarWinds Corp., No. 21-cv-00002 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 4,
2021); Allison Grande, SolarWinds Hit with Shareholder Suit Over Nation-State Hack,
LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2021, 10:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1341546/solarwinds-hitwith-shareholder-suit-over-nation-state-hack
[https://perma.cc/T2AK-3V3M];
Ben
Kochman, 6 Cybersecurity Events that Have Defined 2021, LAW360 (July 12, 2021, 6:43
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1397884 [https://perma.cc/BZ7B-JNSY].
732. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, In the Matter of Certain Cybersecurity-Related Events
(HO-14225) FAQs (June 25, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/enforce/certain-cybersecurity-
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dismiss by SolarWinds, filed in August 2021, condemned the consolidated
complaint—which relied on information provided by ten CWs—as part of
the growing trend of event-driven securities litigation, “where any calamity
that befalls a public company is framed as a violation of the securities
laws. . . .”733 Derivative litigation against SolarWinds also ensued, based on
an alleged breach of the duty of oversight.734
Another recent example of cyber EDSL is the May 2021 litigation that
followed a cybersecurity breach at Ubiquiti, which develops and markets
equipment and technology platforms for high-capacity Internet access.735
One report concluded that “[s]ecurities class actions are now routinely filed
by shareholders after the announcement of a data breach.”736
Most of the cybersecurity EDSL has been based on section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.737 Plaintiffs in these cases generally raise—but sometimes
conflate—two distinct securities fraud claims that correspond to two distinct
investor classes. One class includes shareholders who purchased stock after
the company made affirmative statements about the company’s
cybersecurity regime and commitment to data privacy but before the breach
occurred. The second class includes investors who bought after the breach
but prior to the public disclosure,738 which has often been delayed.

related-events-faqs [https://perma.cc/L9QG-P2EW] (offering amnesty to companies which
addressed outstanding disclosure violations in response to SolarWinds attack prior to
responding to SEC’s request for information).
733. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Complaint 6, In re SolarWinds Corp.
Sec. Litig., Master File No. 21-CV-138-RP (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2021).
734. See Katryna Perera, SolarWinds Hit with Del. Derivative Suit over Sunburst Hack,
LAW360 (Nov. 5, 2021, 7:55 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1438188 [https://perma.
cc/TF58-MEPK] (reporting derivative action). Similarly, a data breach derivative suit
implicitly based on an alleged breach of the duty of oversight was filed against T-Mobile USA
in November 2021. Kevin LaCroix, Data Breach-Related Derivative Suit Filed Against TMobile USA Board, D&O DIARY (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/11/arti
cles/cyber-liability/data-breach-related-derivative-suit-filed-against-t-mobile-usa-board/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/M7ZP-QDXY].
735. Complaint, Molder v. Ubiquiti, Inc., No. 21-CV-04520 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 19,
2021).
736. CLEARY GOTTLIEB, 2019 Cybersecurity Developments: A Year in Review 11 (Jan.
2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/2019-cybersec
urity-developments-a-year-in-review [https://perma.cc/9TFH-J3KM].
737. Daniel J. Marcus, Note, The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive Solutions for
Protecting Consumers’ Personal Information, 68 DUKE L.J. 555, 570 (2018).
738. Avi Gesser, Patrick Blakemore & Peter Bozzo, Reducing Risk in the Dawn of Equifax
and Other Cyber-Related Securities Fraud Class Actions, CYBERSECURITY L. REP. (Feb. 13,
2019), https://www.davispolk.com/publications/reducing-risk-dawn-equifax-and-other-cybe
r-related-securities-fraud-class-actions [https://perma.cc/572N-QWTU].
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The SEC issued non-binding guidance in 2011739 and 2018740
concerning cybersecurity risks, cyber incidents, and the disclosure of data
breaches. A 2014 study concluded that the 2011 guidance had “resulted in a
series of disclosures that rarely provide differentiated or actionable
information for investors.”741 The 2018 guidance was an updated repackage. The SEC’s two documents collectively emphasized the need to
promptly disclose any cybersecurity incidents that are material to investors.
However, they were mostly non-specific,742 failed to clarify a company’s
duty to update disclosures following the occurrence of a significant cyber
event, failed to “create a specific obligation to disclose all cybersecurity
incidents in a current report filing,”743 and by late-2021 had not been codified
in SEC rules.744 The SEC also published at least one ancillary advisory
concerning the development of cybersecurity risk governance standards.745
In 2017 the SEC’s Division of Enforcement created a dedicated Cyber
739. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No.
2 (Cybersecurity) (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidan
ce-topic2.htm [https://perma.cc/ZH3N-V4J7].
740. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Commission Statement and Guidance on Public
Company Cybersecurity Disclosures (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2018
/33-10459.pdf [https://perma.cc/47DR-VR2X].
741. Investor Responsibility Research Center, What Investors Need to Know About
Cybersecurity: How to Evaluate Investment Risks 5 (June 2014), http://www.advisorselect.c
om/transcript/what-investors-need-to-know-about-cybersecurity-how-to-evaluate-invest%A
Dment-risks/what-investors-need-to-know-about-cybersecurity-how-to-evaluate-investment
-risks [https://perma.cc/R25W-U5RU].
742. Tash Bottum, Note, Material Breach, Material Disclosure, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2095,
2124–25 (2019).
743. William Johnson, Scott Ferber & Matthew Hanson, SEC Returns Spotlight to
Cybersecurity Disclosure Enforcement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 1,
2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/01/sec-returns-spotlight-to-cybersecurity-di
sclosure-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/4RBY-TJMR].
744. The SEC had been expected to release proposed new rules in October 2021 that would
mandate disclosures about cybersecurity risk governance. See Vivek Mohan, David Simon
& Richard Rosenfeld, SEC Increasingly Turns Focus Toward Strength of Cyber Risk
Disclosures, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 25, 2021), https://corpgov.law.h
arvard.edu/2021/07/25/sec-increasingly-turns-focus-toward-strength-of-cyber-risk-disclosur
es/ [https://perma.cc/6LTJ-LSQ7]. Subsequently, that target date was extended, and the SEC
finally released proposed new guidance in March 2022. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
LLP, SEC Proposes Rules on Cybersecurity Disclosure (Mar. 11, 2022), https://www.gibso
ndunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/sec-proposes-rules-on-cybersecurity-disclosure1.pdf?1 [https://perma.cc/E2JN-EP34] (summarizing proposed amendments, which, inter
alia, require companies to disclose material cybersecurity incidents within four business days
of making a materiality determination).
745. Ira Rosner & Shardul Desai, Managing Risk After SEC’s Cyber Enforcement Action,
LAW360 (June 28, 2021, 4:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/newyork/articles/1397789/man
aging-risk-after-sec-s-cyber-enforcement-action [https://perma.cc/97RC-BCD5].
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Unit,746 but cybersecurity enforcement actions have been rare,747 consistent
with the Commission’s general perspective that such actions contravene the
public interest when a company has been victimized by a cyber incident.748
Indeed, the Division has stated that “[w]e do not second-guess good faith
exercises of judgment about cyber-incident disclosure.”749 Prior to mid2021, the SEC appears to have commenced only two cyber enforcement
actions, and in both of them disclosure of the cybersecurity vulnerability
lagged awareness of the vulnerability by approximately two years.750
Enforcement accelerated beginning in June 2021,751 and the SEC has
underscored that deficient cybersecurity disclosure controls and procedures
can generate an enforcement action even in the absence of a disclosure
violation, data breach, or third-party intrusion.752 In addition, it is clear that
746. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Press Release No. 2017–176, SEC Announces
Enforcement Initiatives to Combat Cyber-Based Threats and Protect Retail Investors (Sept.
25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-176 [https://perma.cc/MWD9VAAN].
747. See Matthew Bacal, Robert Cohen & Joseph Hall, SEC Enforcement Action
Highlights Need for Internal Communications About Cybersecurity Problems, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 12, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/12/secenforcement-action-highlights-need-for-internal-communications-about-cybersecurity-probl
ems/ [https://perma.cc/6DXB-PT9N] (observing that “the SEC has filed few cases involving
cybersecurity-related disclosures”).
748. John F. Savarese, Wayne M. Carlin & Sabastian V. Niles, A New Angle on
Cybersecurity Enforcement from the SEC, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 26,
2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/06/26/a-new-angle-on-cybersecurity-enforcem
ent-from-the-sec/ [https://perma.cc/8U3T-2AWG].
749. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Press Release No. 2018-71, Altaba, Formerly Known as
Yahoo!, Charged with Failing to Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees to Pay $35
Million (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71 [https://perma.cc/
VR4M-HD3S].
750. William Johnson, Scott Ferber & Matthew Hanson, SEC Returns Spotlight to
Cybersecurity Disclosure Enforcement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 1,
2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/01/sec-returns-spotlight-to-cybersecurity-di
sclosure-enforcement/ [https://perma.cc/R9V7-HT66]. This tally excludes a few actions
commenced under SEC Regulation S-P, which requires regulated financial services firms to
safeguard the personal data of their customers. Id.
751. See Paul Ferrillo, Bob Zukis & George Platsis, Cybersecurity and Disclosures, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 4, 2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/10/0
4/cybersecurity-and-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/SET4-SM2U] (discussing two recent
Consent Orders); Michael Osnato, Allison Bernbach & William LeBas, Key Takeaways from
Recent SEC Cybersecurity Charges, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/10/01/key-takeaways-from-recent-sec-cybersecuritycharges/ [https://perma.cc/8NMM-KGKA] (discussing SEC cyber settlements with eight
registered investment advisers and broker-dealers).
752. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Press Release No. 2021-102, SEC Charges
Issuer with Cybersecurity Disclosure Controls Failures (June 15, 2021), https://www.sec.g
ov/news/press-release/2021-102 [https://perma.cc/NG6Q-Q9MW] (announcing settlement
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courts may consider the SEC’s 2018 guidance when evaluating whether an
omission relating to cybersecurity is materially misleading under Rule 10b5.753
The cyber breach disclosure lag has been significant in the absence of
more specific SEC guidance and strict SEC enforcement. A survey of public
companies that disclosed cyber breaches from 2011–2019 found that a mean
108 days elapsed before companies discovered the breach and another 49
days, on average, before the breach was announced.754 More recently, in
2020 the discovery window was truncated but the disclosure window was
longer. In 2020 it took a mean 44 days to discover a breach and a mean 53
days to disclose it after discovery.755 This dichotomy suggests that firms’
cybersecurity controls have improved but disclosures frequently remain
untimely. When disclosure does occur it typically does not occur in an SEC
filing. Fewer than 30% of public companies with a cyber breach from 2011–
2020 disclosed the breach in such a filing.756
Scienter and loss causation are the two elements of section 10(b) claims
that have presented the stiffest obstacles to cybersecurity EDSL plaintiffs.
The disclosure of a massive data breach suffered by Equifax in September
2017 prompted securities litigation after the company’s stock price plunged
by almost 36%.757 A motion to dismiss was mostly denied in 2019,758 and
this decision marked the first time that scienter and loss causation allegations
survived a motion to dismiss in a cybersecurity event-driven case.759
Loss causation allegations in prior cybersecurity cases often suffered
from the defect that disclosures of even large breaches were unaccompanied
by a significant stock price decline.760 A 2016 study by Georgetown
University’s Security and Software Engineering Research Center analyzed
with First American Financial Corporation, a Fortune 500 company that provides title
insurance and other financial services).
753. In re Alphabet, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 20-15638, 2021 WL 2448223, at *8 (9th Cir.
June 16, 2021).
754. AUDIT ANALYTICS, Trends in Cybersecurity Breach Disclosures 5 (May 2020),
https://www.auditanalytics.com/audit-analytics-reports [https://perma.cc/W5EV-8YN8].
755. Derryck Coleman, Audit Analytics Releases Third Annual Cybersecurity Report
(Apr. 6, 2021), https://blog.auditanalytics.com/audit-analytics-releases-third-annual-cybersec
urity-report/ [https://perma.cc/E8F9-PDM2].
756. Id.
757. In re Equifax Inc. Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1214 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
758. Id. at 1252.
759. Gesser, Blakemore & Bozzo, supra note 738.
760. CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP, Cyber Breaches: Lessons Learned from
Shareholder Derivative and Securities Fraud Litigation 1 (2018), https://www.clearygot
tlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2018/cyber-breaches-lessons-learned-from-shareholder
-derivative-and-securities-fraud-litigation-pdf [https://perma.cc/7TZ4-KBR4].
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the impact of disclosed breaches by 64 publicly traded companies and
concluded that “the announcement of data breaches does not have a
meaningful impact on the volatility of equities across industries, and does
not meaningfully depress the stock longer than a week.”761
More recently, the market has reacted to data breaches. As noted,
Equifax’s share price plunged more than 35% following disclosure of the
company’s breach, and other major adverse price movements following
breach disclosures have occurred at Yahoo and elsewhere. For example, a
2021 survey of 34 large companies that experienced one or more data
breaches found that three years after the breach their average share prices
underperformed the Nasdaq by -15.6%.762 These negative price movements
have helped shape some sizable settlements. The Equifax EDSL settled for
$149 million in 2020, and this resolution was accompanied by a $32.5
million settlement in a parallel derivative suit.763 The company also agreed
to pay a combined $700 million to resolve federal and state claims and
hundreds of civil consumer fraud class actions.764 Earlier, in 2018 the Yahoo
EDSL settled for $80 million, the related Yahoo derivative suits settled for
$29 million,765 and Yahoo settled with the SEC for $35 million in the
agency’s first enforcement action based on a cybersecurity disclosure
violation.766 The SEC’s dedicated Cyber Unit was responsible for the
investigation that led to charges against Yahoo.767
The foregoing settlements may encourage plaintiffs’ class action
761. See Russell Lange & Eric Burger, S2ERC Project: Market Implications of Data
Breaches 12 (Dec. 16, 2016); Cara Peterman, The Rise of Cyber-Related Securities Class
Actions, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1019321 [https://perma
.cc/8ZTS-8M2Q] (quoting the study).
762. Paul Bischoff, How Data Breaches Affect Stock Market Share Prices, COMPARITECH
(Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/data-breach-shareprice-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/3V4A-C9HV].
763. Emilie Ruscoe, Equifax Investors’ Attys Will Earn $29.6M Fee in Stock Suit, LAW360
(July 2, 2020, 4:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1288773 [https://perma.cc/Q5NBFG4H].
764. Id.
765. Kevin LaCroix, Equifax Data Breach-Related Securities Suit Settled for $149
Million, D&O DIARY (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/02/articles/securiti
es-litigation/equifax-data-breach-related-securities-suit-settled-for-149-million/ [https://perm
a.cc/Z9MY-8V46].
766. Craig A. Newman, SEC Cyber Agenda: Actions Taken in 2018 Forecast 2019’s
Priorities, BLOOMBERG LAW 4 (2018), https://www.pbwt.com/content/uploads/2018/12/Bloo
mberg-Law-SEC-Cyber-Agenda-Patterson-Belknap.pdf [https://perma.cc/57YL-KYE4].
767. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Press Release No. 2018–71, Altaba, Formerly Known
as Yahoo!, Charged with Failing to Disclose Massive Cybersecurity Breach; Agrees to Pay
$35 Million (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-71 [https://perm
a.cc/4P4A-8JDD] [hereinafter Yahoo Settlement].
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counsel to pursue future cybersecurity event-driven litigation. However,
Equifax may be an outlier, insofar as the data breach was vast (it exposed the
personal information of 150 million U.S. consumers), the breach revealed
particularly sensitive data, and the impact on the company and its share price
was immense.768 Equifax’s stock made a partial recovery, but three months
after the breach was disclosed the company’s market capitalization still was
down approximately $3 billion.769 In addition, by the time the operative class
action complaint was filed in Equifax, plaintiffs had compiled a treasure
trove of relevant evidence, including congressional testimony by former
senior Equifax executives and numerous investigative media reports.770 This
combination of critical factors will rarely occur in other cases.
To gauge the prospects of future cybersecurity EDSL it is useful to
examine the decisions on motions to dismiss in Equifax and other data breach
cases. The Equifax opinion is particularly instructive. To begin, the Georgia
federal district court rejected defendants’ argument—which, as noted supra,
is often lodged against EDSL in general—that plaintiffs merely alleged nonactionable corporate mismanagement. As the court properly held,
allegations that defendants made misleading statements or omissions
concerning corporate mismanagement at Equifax could support a section
10(b) claim.771 The court also distinguished Heartland Payment Systems, a
prior case that over the years had become a poster child for failed data breach
securities litigation. Heartland was dismissed in large part because plaintiffs
attempted to show falsity merely by alleging that defendant had suffered a
security breach after stating that it placed a high emphasis on maintaining a
high level of security.772 In contrast, in Equifax, plaintiffs alleged falsity by
characterizing defendants’ data security system as dangerously deficient and
falling far short of industry standards.773 The Equifax opinion also rejected
defendants’ puffery defense because their statements about security were not

768. Newman, supra note 766.
769. Avi Gesser, Patrick Blakemore & Peter Bozzo, Lessons from Equifax on How to
Mitigate Post-Breach Legal Liability, CYBERSECURITY L. REP. (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.
davispolk.com/sites/default/files/lessonsfromequifax_cslr_reprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJ8S
-XV3Q].
770. See, e.g., Hamza Shaban, ‘This Is a Travesty’: Lawmakers Grill Former Equifax
Chief Executive on Breach Response, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonp
ost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/10/02/what-to-expect-from-equifaxs-back-to-back-heari
ngs-on-capitol-hill-this-week/ [https://perma.cc/K6L8-XP6R] (describing testimony of
former Equifax CEO Richard Smith).
771. 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1217–18.
772. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148, at
*5 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2009).
773. 357 F. Supp. 3d at 1221.
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obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor.774 Finally, the court
concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged loss causation, although it
declined to accept the materialization of risk theory in the absence of
endorsement by the Eleventh Circuit.775
Other decisions have been mostly negative for plaintiffs. In data breach
EDSL against Federal Express involving a Russian cyberattack on the
company’s European shipping subsidiary TNT, the court dismissed the
complaint in 2021 after defendants accused plaintiffs of attempting to
“exploit this recent trend towards ‘event-driven’ litigation.”776 The court
dismissed partly because information provided by a CW was insufficiently
specific to establish the falsity of defendants’ statements, which also were
protected by at least two of the three prongs of the PSLRA’s safe harbor.777
Similarly, in 2021 the court dismissed data breach EDSL against
software company Zendesk, because plaintiffs failed to adequately plead
both scienter and a material misstatement or omission. The court granted
leave to file a third amended complaint,778 but plaintiffs opted to appeal and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in 2022.779 Earlier, in 2020, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of cybersecurity EDSL against PayPal,
based on plaintiffs’ failure to adequately allege scienter,780 after the district
court had concluded that statements by plaintiffs’ CWs were insufficiently
indicative of scienter.781
Cybersecurity EDSL against Facebook also was dismissed in 2020,
with leave to amend. Prior to the dismissal Facebook agreed in 2019 to pay
a $5 billion penalty imposed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
connection with the company’s violation of a 2012 consent decree
concerning data privacy practices.782 The civil penalty was one of the largest
ever assessed by the federal government for any violation and dwarfed all
prior fines by the FTC in a privacy case. Simultaneously, Facebook settled
774. Id. at 1224.
775. Id. at 1250.
776. Sarah Jarvis, FedEx Beats Investors’ Cyberattack Suit for Good, LAW360 (Feb. 4,
2021, 7:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1352280 [https://perma.cc/49VL-N4BA].
777. In re Fed Ex Corp. Sec. Litig., Master File No. 19-cv-05990, 2021 WL 396423, at
*10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2021).
778. Reidinger v. Zendesk, Inc., No. 19-cv-06968-CRB, 2021 WL 796261, at *7–10 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 2, 2021).
779. Local 353, I.B.E.W. Pension Fund v. Zendesk, Inc., No. 21-15785, 2022 WL 614235
(9th Cir. Mar. 2, 2022).
780. Eckert v. PayPal Holdings, Inc., 831 F. App’x 366 (9th Cir. 2020).
781. Sgarlata v. PayPal Holdings, Inc. 409 F. Supp. 3d 846, 856–59 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
782. Marshall L. Miller & Jeohn Salone Favors, The Facebook Settlement, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 29, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/29/thefacebook-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/R568-ME42].
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with the SEC for $100 million in connection with the Cambridge Analytica
scandal,783 in which the personal data of millions of Facebook users was
collected without their consent by the British consulting firm. Facebook also
agreed in 2020 to pay $550 million in the largest-ever cash settlement
resolving privacy-related private litigation, in connection with the
company’s use of biometric software.784 So Facebook was no stranger to
data privacy issues. However, in the cybersecurity EDSL, which also
involved the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook prevailed. The court
held that various statements by defendants were protected by the PSLRA’s
safe harbor, other statements were not false, and plaintiffs had failed to
adequately plead loss causation.785
In contrast, in 2021 the Ninth Circuit largely reversed the district court’s
dismissal of consolidated cybersecurity EDSL against Google, parent
company Alphabet, and some of their top executives.
Security
vulnerabilities in the Google+ social network had exposed user data from
more than 50 million accounts—although apparently no actual breach
occurred—and securities litigation ensued, with Rhode Island designated as
lead plaintiff. The district court dismissed Rhode Island’s amended
complaint with leave to further amend, after holding that defendants’
statements about the importance of privacy to users and Alphabet’s general
commitment to the protection of its users’ data were non-actionable puffery
and plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege scienter.786 Plaintiffs declined
to amend and instead appealed after the district court entered judgment.787
This strategy succeeded. The Ninth Circuit cited Matrixx and the SEC’s
2018 cybersecurity disclosure guidance and concluded that statements made
by Alphabet in two of its 2018 10-Qs were materially misleading insofar as
they omitted to mention the Google+ security vulnerabilities of which
Google then was aware.788 According to the court, the 10-Q omissions
“significantly altered the total mix of information available for
decisionmaking [sic] by a reasonable investor.”789 The Ninth Circuit also
783. Id.
784. In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litig., No. 15-cv-03747-JD, 2021 WL
757025 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2021); Kevin LaCroix, Facebook to Pay $550 Million in LargestEver Privacy Settlement, D&O DIARY (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/01
/articles/privacy/facebook-to-pay-550-million-in-largest-ever-privacy-settlement/ [https://per
ma.cc/P447-6AJC].
785. In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 477 F. Supp. 3d 980, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
786. In re Alphabet, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 18-cv-06245-JSW, 2020 WL 2564635, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2020).
787. In re Alphabet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 1 F.4th 687 (9th Cir. 2021).
788. Id. at 703.
789. Id. at 704–05.
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concluded that plaintiffs had adequately alleged scienter, notwithstanding
the absence of allegations from CWs.790
Plaintiffs also prevailed in the earlier consolidated cybersecurity EDSL
against Yahoo, which involved two separate significant data breaches in
2013 and 2014. Plaintiffs alleged that Yahoo misled investors by failing to
disclose the breaches in its public filings while touting the strength of its
cybersecurity practices, and indeed the breaches were not disclosed until
2016.791 The litigation settled for $80 million in 2018 after the court denied
as moot motions to dismiss, leave to amend was granted, and an amended
complaint was filed.792 This was the first major recovery in a section 10(b)
action based on a company’s alleged failure to adequately disclose
cybersecurity incidents and risks.
Yahoo, like Equifax, might constitute an outlier. The Yahoo double
breaches, disclosed almost two years after the fact, were massive and had a
material impact on the company. The breaches compromised all of Yahoo’s
three billion user accounts and were not disclosed to the investing public
until Yahoo was in the process of closing the acquisition of its core operating
Internet business by Verizon Communications.793 Post-disclosure, the
business was acquired by Verizon for $350 million less than the $4.83 billion
it previously had offered.794 This specific fact pattern also is unlikely to
replicate in future cases.
Still, Equifax, Yahoo, and Google no doubt serve to encourage
plaintiffs’ class action counsel to pursue additional cybersecurity EDSL. In
late-2021 such litigation was pending against multiple other companies,
including Zoom and Capital One.795 Plaintiffs in these cases and future

790. Id. at 707. The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied the request by Alphabet and
Google for an en banc rehearing. Order, In re Alphabet, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 20-15638 (9th
Cir. July 23, 2021).
791. In re Yahoo! Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 17-CV-00373-LHK, 17-CV-01525-LHK, 2018
WL 4283377 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2018).
792. Kevin LaCroix, Yahoo Settles Data Breach-Related Securities Suit for $80 Million,
D&O DIARY (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/03/articles/securities-litiga
tion/yahoo-settles-data-breach-related-securities-suit-80-million/ [https://perma.cc/GG2MGRH9].
793. See Yahoo Settlement, supra note 767.
794. Irina Ivanova, Verizon Slashes Offer Price for Yahoo over Data Breaches, CBS NEWS
(Feb. 21, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/verizon-yahoo-merger-price-databreaches/ [https://perma.cc/QG7A-EKWU].
795. See, e.g., In re Zoom Sec. Litig., No. 20-cv-02353 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2020) (EDSL
arising from Zoom’s alleged false and misleading statements concerning its data privacy and
security risks). In February 2022 the federal district court granted in part and denied in part
defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Zoom EDSL, with leave to amend. In re Zoom Sec.
Litig., No. 20-cv-02353-JD, 2022 WL 484974 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2022).
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actions likely will encounter many of the same issues that were dispositive
in the unsuccessful litigation discussed above. Indeed, in September 2021 a
federal district court in California dismissed cyber EDSL against First
American Financial Corporation, a Fortune 500 company, after concluding
that various of defendants’ subject statements were non-actionable
puffery.796
Likewise, in June 2021 the federal district court in Maryland dismissed
with prejudice both consolidated securities class actions and consolidated
derivative actions against Marriott stemming from a massive data breach in
the hotel giant’s Starwood guest reservation system. Hackers stole the
personal information of up to 500 million guests and a raft of litigation
ensued. In the securities class actions the court applied both the safe harbor
and the bespeaks caution doctrine, distinguished Equifax and concluded that
Marriott’s statements concerning a commitment to safeguard customer
privacy were non-actionable puffery, and, inter alia, discounted information
concerning scienter provided by seven CWs.797 In the federal derivative
actions the federal securities claims were dismissed primarily because
plaintiff failed to own Marriott shares during the relevant time period.798 A
separate derivative action arising from the same cyberattack was dismissed
by the Delaware Chancery Court in October 2021.799 The Marriott and First
American litigation more generally reflect the fate of cybersecurity EDSL to
date than do Equifax, Yahoo, and Google.800
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PERCEIVED PLAGUE OF EDSL
Multiple solutions to the perceived problem of EDSL have been
proposed. This part briefly critiques some of the major proposals. At the
outset, however, it should be emphasized that, as demonstrated above, there

796. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 16–17, In re First American Fin.
Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 20-9781 DSF (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2021). However, leave to amend
was granted. Id. at 21.
797. In re: Marriott Int’l, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litig. (Sec. Actions), MDL
No. 19-md-2879, 2021 WL 2407518 (D. Md. June 11, 2021)
798. In re: Marriott Int’l, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litig. (Derivative Actions)
at 19, MDL No. 19-md-2879 (D. Md. June 11, 2021)
799. Firemen’s Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. Sorenson, C.A. No. 2019-0965-LWW, 2021 WL
45937777 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 2021).
800. An appeal in the Marriott EDSL was pending in late-2021. See Caleb Drickey,
Investors Urge 4th Circ. To Revive Marriott Data Breach Suit, LAW360 (Nov. 15, 2021, 6:59
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1440228 [https://perma.cc/GR3R-5BCC] (reporting
appeal).
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is no substantial problem in search of a solution. A careful examination
suggests that much event-driven litigation has merit and courts are wellequipped to dismiss the chaff.
Five reform proposals are addressed herein. First, as noted supra, in
2020 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a rulemaking petition with the
SEC seeking to restrict pandemic EDSL. The Chamber asked the SEC, inter
alia, to bar liability for statements about the impact of COVID-19 on a
company’s business, whether forward-looking or not, so long as suitable
warnings were attached. For the reasons discussed, the Chamber’s petition
was misguided. It rested upon a broad, shallow critique of event-driven
litigation that was tied in part to a rejection of plaintiffs’ use of the widely
accepted materialization of risk theory to show loss causation. The petition
also falsely assumed that courts would be inundated by a wave of unjustified
pandemic cases, and it weakly argued that the PSLRA’s safe harbor requires
revision.
A second proposal is for Congress to permit interlocutory appeals of
denials of motions to dismiss, either as of right or based upon a discretionary
standard. Multiple state courts, including New York, allow such appeals. In
contrast, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of a motion
to dismiss does not qualify as a final decision (and thus there is no appeal as
of right), and discretionary appeals generally land outside the scope of 28
U.S. § 1292(b). That statute requires district court certification that the order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for a difference of opinion, and for which an immediate appeal may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The appellate
court then must exercise its discretion to allow the appeal.801
Unsurprisingly, section 1292(b) has been applied “relatively sparingly
and in exceptional cases.”802 For example, in the Equifax EDSL the court
denied Equifax’s request to file an interlocutory appeal of the order on the
motion to dismiss.803 The proposal to revise the Federal Rules stems from
the critical role that motions to dismiss play in securities litigation. If
motions are denied, “class certification and settlement virtually always
follow.”804 The Equifax settlement that followed denial of the motion to

801. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
802. Katayoun Donnelly & Blain Myhre, Pushing Pause: Interlocutory Appeals under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b), American Bar Ass’n (June 3, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
litigation/committees/appellate-practice/articles/2019/spring2019-pushing-pauseinterlocutory-appeals-under-28-usc-1292b/ [https://perma.cc/97H6-8TWD].
803. In re Equifax Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 17-CV-3463-TWT, 2019 WL 3449673 (N.D. Ga.
July 29, 2019).
804. Pincus, supra note 70, at 5.

636

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:3

dismiss and denial of interlocutory appeal was the largest to date in
cybersecurity EDSL. Similarly, FCPA-related EDSL against Cognizant
Technology Solutions Corporation settled for $95 million in September
2021805 after the federal district court refused to certify an interlocutory
appeal of an order denying motions to dismiss.806 However, a fundamental
problem with this reform proposal is that expanding appeals as of right or on
a discretionary basis likely would flood the Circuits with meritless appeals.
One of the primary objectives of section 1292(b) is to preserve the
institutional efficiency of the federal court system.807 A torrent of appeals,
many of them meritless, would undermine that objective.
A third proposal is for Congress to amend the PSLRA and
simultaneously strengthen the statute’s pleading standard and discovery
stay.808 Such a proposal is unsupported by any compelling evidence that the
onerous pleading standard fails to separate the wheat from the chaff, or that
the strict discovery stay has failed to accomplish its intended purpose.
Indeed, the universal use by plaintiffs of confidential witnesses809 essentially
proves that the stay is operating as designed. In the absence of a powerful
stay provision reliance on CWs would be unnecessary.
A fourth proposal is for Congress to enact a cap on damages in non-IPO
cases because securities class actions simply shift money from current
shareholders to plaintiff shareholders.810 This proposal also seems
misguided. As noted, the PSLRA already includes a bounce-back provision
which caps damages at the difference between plaintiff’s purchase price and
the mean trading price of the security during the 90 days following a
corrective disclosure. The provision functions as a rescissory cap on out-ofpocket damages in securities fraud litigation and it can eradicate recovery.
The larger debate about the benefits of securities class action litigation811 is
805. Melissa Angell, Cognizant Inks $95M Deal to End Investors’ Bribery Action,
LAW360 (Sept. 7, 2021, 11:10 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1419573 [https://perm
a.cc/59PV-FRFJ].
806. In re Cognizant Tech. Solutions Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 16-6509, 2021 WL 1016111
(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2021).
807. Donnelly & Myhre, supra note 802.
808. Pincus, supra note 70, at 5. The PSLRA imposes an automatic stay of all discovery
and other proceedings during the pendency of a motion to dismiss, absent application of one
of two exceptions—when particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to
prevent undue prejudice to the party seeking relief. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
809. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., Case No. 15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC,
2016 WL 5390533, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (“The Court is aware that confidential
witnesses have become a staple of securities litigation.”).
810. Pincus, supra note 70, at 5.
811. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006).
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beyond the scope of this Article. Here, it suffices to note that an effective
damages cap already exists, and since fewer than 1% of securities cases
proceed to trial the imposition of a further cap seems superfluous, with
potential major drawbacks that include a chilling effect on the filing of
meritorious cases.
A fifth proposal is to adopt a rule requiring plaintiffs in securities
litigation who lose motions to dismiss to pay the prevailing defendants’
attorneys’ fees, under the theory that fee-shifting would re-align the costbenefit analysis for investors considering pursuing tenuous claims.812 Such
a requirement would contravene the solid policy rationales justifying the
long-standing American Rule,813 pursuant to which prevailing parties are not
entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees. A major drawback to the fifth
proposal is the inherent inequity of making fee-shifting one-directional. A
second drawback is, again, the substantial chilling effect the new rule would
have on meritorious securities class action litigation. In 2015 Delaware’s
state legislature amended the Delaware General Corporation Law to prohibit
Delaware stock corporations from including in their charters or bylaws loserpays provisions in connection with “internal corporate claims” brought by
stockholders.814 This prohibition, encompassing those claims typically
brought in M&A and corporate governance litigation, was adopted in large
part to address the chilling impact that loser-pays provisions could have on
the enforcement by stockholders of fiduciary duties. The Delaware
amendment is instructive in the EDSL context, even if it does not clearly
cover federal securities claims.
CONCLUSION
Securities class action litigation has experienced a major transformation
in recent years. Whereas securities cases previously focused on financial or
accounting fraud, increasingly such actions are based on the alleged
concealment or misrepresentation of substantial adverse events. The new
focus is the defining characteristic of event-driven securities litigation.
EDSL has raised numerous difficult issues that have recurred across some of

812. See Reed & Lloyd, supra note 141, at 3 (arguing that fee-shifting would alter the
risk/benefit analysis for plaintiffs and their counsel).
813. See Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation, 104 VA. L. REV. 59
(2018) (arguing in favor of allowing fee-shifting provisions in corporate charters and bylaws,
but only subject to robust judicial oversight); Peter Karsten & Oliver Bateman, Detecting
Good Public Policy Rationales for the American Rule: A Response to the Ill-Conceived Calls
for “Loser Pays” Rules, 66 DUKE L.J. 729 (2016) (arguing against fee-shifting).
814. Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(f), Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 109(b).
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the major categories of the litigation, including COVID-19, cannabis,
foreign and domestic corruption, antitrust, #MeToo, and cybersecurity.
Careful examination of EDSL suggests that much of it has merit. Recent
proposals to restrict the litigation either legislatively or judicially are mostly
unjustified. Courts already are well-equipped to weed out the meritless
cases, and many of the restrictive proposals seem designed merely to sharply
tilt the litigation playing field in favor of corporate defendants.

